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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
State sovereignty is a fundamental organizing principle of international relations. 
Although always imperfectly respected, the sovereignty norm-set—most essentially 
territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and non-interference—carries enormous weight. 
It is not, however, static. In fact, the current status of state sovereignty is the subject of 
some debate. Has globalization significantly eroded sovereignty? Have emerging norms 
like the Responsibility to Protect redefined sovereignty in important ways? Studies 
addressing these and related questions respond to an increasing recognition of the 
essentially constructed nature of state sovereignty and of the need for scholarship that 
historicizes and contextualizes it, illuminating the dynamics and texture of global order.1 
 This dissertation examines an essential component of sovereignty, the norm of 
non-interference, arguing that—yes—sovereignty has evolved over time, and especially 
since the end of the Cold War, but that this evolution has been uneven; in fact, we can 
observe distinct regional patterns of shared understandings and practices of sovereignty. 
Furthermore, this regional variation is not simply defined by divergence between the 
global North and global South, but in fact exists across regions in the global South. 
Specifically, the norm of non-interference, a watchword in developing regions during the 
post-decolonization era, has nevertheless eroded over time in important ways in Latin 
America and Africa as intrusive regionalism has developed there. Non-interference has 
meanwhile been upheld and protected to a much greater degree in Southeast Asia.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Biersteker 2013; Weber 1995, 2. 
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 I attribute divergence in normative trajectories to regional identity discourses in 
Latin America and Africa that have presented a challenge to Westphalian sovereignty. In 
the shorter term, regional democratic density and economic performance critically 
affected the development (or not) of intrusive regionalism, and the link between these 
factors and normative stasis or change is provided by the international ideational context. 
 
Sovereignty Norms in the Global South 
Because sovereignty is so fundamental to international society, we tend to think of it as 
constant (dating back to the Peace of Westphalia), but, if “anarchy is what states make of 
it,”2 so is sovereignty. As Christian Reus-Smit explains, the “meaning and behavioral 
implications of the principle vary from one historical context to another” and, “Unless 
embedded within a larger complex of values, the principle of sovereignty cannot alone 
provide that state with a coherent social identity sovereignty has no purposive content.”3 
The meaning of sovereignty varies across time and space. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European states (and the United 
States) differentiated their own sovereign rights to freedom from interference from those 
rights of non-European states, the sovereignty of which was considered to be conditional 
on their ability to adhere to the ‘standards of civilization.’4 Indeed, non-European states 
struggled during this period to gain recognition and full admittance into the ‘family of 
nations’ and to oblige more powerful and established states to respect the norm of non-
interference in their dealings with them. For example, as outlined in Chapter 3, Latin 
American states (which gained independence much earlier than most African and Asian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Wendt 1992. 
3 Reus-Smit 1997, 567, 565. 
4 Glanville 2014, 112. 
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nations) sought to constrain U.S. interventionism through sovereignty-promoting regional 
law in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The United States resisted its southern neighbors’ 
efforts to codify non-interference and other sovereignty norms, but it finally relented in 
the mid-1930s; the Seventh International Conference of American States of 1933 adopted 
the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, establishing the principles of 
sovereign equality, non-intervention, territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, and the “subjection of foreigners to local legal jurisdiction.”5 According to 
Arnulf Becker Lorca, this convention “marked the dissolution of the standard of 
civilization” in the Americas.6  
A decade later, World War II ended and the United Nations was established, and 
these events carried important implications for state sovereignty, generalizing Latin 
American states’ acquisition of statehood and sovereign rights to the global level. The 
end of the war itself ushered in a wave of decolonization resulting in the creation of 
eighty new formally sovereign states over the next several decades, drastically altering 
the international landscape.7 Furthermore, the 1945 United Nations Charter established 
more clearly the meaning and status of sovereignty by “firmly and unambiguously” 
codifying sovereign states’ rights to self-determination and non-interference.8 How would 
sovereignty function in a post-World War II world constituted by so many new (post-
colonial) states? The short answer is that states in the global South expressed particular 
enthusiasm for strict interpretations of sovereignty, at least in the wake of decolonization. 
The post-colonial ‘condition’—born of regime insecurity and the recent collective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Shaw 2004, 51. 
6 Lorca 2014, 8. 
7 United Nations n.d. 
8 Glanville 2014, 8. 
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memory of colonialism and intervention (framed with ‘civilizing’ discourses) motivated 
Southern states to guard their external sovereignty and to push back against infringements 
on exclusive domestic jurisdiction made with reference to doctrines that are reminiscent 
of the language of the ‘standard of civilization.’   
The idea that post-colonial international spaces operate according to different 
logics than does the First World is a common refrain. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, for 
example, argues that states in the global South hold fast to their sovereignty, even as they 
attempt the expansion of international cooperation.9 Others characterize international 
relations in the global South—especially Africa—as dominated by realist logics of ‘might 
makes right’ and absent of shared commitments to liberal internationalism and human 
security (or shared norms more generally), in contrast to their Northern counterparts.10 
Amitav Acharya and A.I. Johnston conclude in their 2007 edited volume on comparative 
regional institutions that “[t]he design of regional institutions in the developing world has 
been more consistently sovereignty-preserving than sovereignty-eroding,” relative to 
their counterparts in Europe and North America, and that “[t]he more insecure the 
regimes, the less intrusive are their regional institutions.”11 In other words, regionalism in 
the global South hasn’t failed at European Union-style regionalism (with its sovereignty 
ceding or pooling) but rather functions for different purposes, supporting newly 
developing states as they face internal instability and external intervention and other 
forms of neocolonialism. Acharya explains in a separate article that while regionalism in 
Europe in part responded to “the declining legitimacy of nationalism” in the wake of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Braveboy-Wagner 2009. 
10 See brief but highly relevant literature review in Williams 2007, 253-255. 
11 Acharya and Johnston 2007, 262. 
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devastating war, nationalism and post-colonial regionalism were in fact mutually 
reinforcing in the global South.12  
 These assessments aren’t exactly wrong, but they overlook important 
developments over time and important normative differences across post-colonial 
regions. Sovereignty norms are neither static nor monolithic, even in the global South. 
Beginning a few years before the end of the Cold War, a resurgence or ‘second wave’13 
of regionalism swept the globe; regionalist rhetoric became more prominent in 
international politics, new regional institutions emerged, and existing regional 
organizations took on new roles and deeper levels of cooperation and integration.14 This 
trend makes up part of what has been termed the ‘new regionalism,’ a phenomenon 
inspiring renewed scholarly interest in the regional level of global governance: “There is 
little doubt that the mid-1980s marked something of a turning-point in the fortunes of 
regionalism.”15 The trend accelerated with the end of the Cold War, as international 
cooperation through intergovernmental organizations was reinvigorated at the global 
level as well. The most visible developments at the forefront of the new regionalist wave 
took place in Europe, where the 1986 Single European Act set as an objective the 
establishment of a single market by 1992 and set in motion the transformation of 
regionalism on that continent.  
As regional cooperation widened and deepened across the globe, some regional 
groupings—like those in Latin America and Africa—became more willing to use 
intrusive means to promote and protect democracy, human rights, and (human) security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Acharya 2007, 633. 
13 Those who consider the regionalist trend beginning in the 1980s to be the ‘second wave’ consider the 
‘first wave’ to encompass regional projects in the 1950s and 1960s.  
14 Fawcett 1995. 
15 Fawcett 1995, 9. 
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in their member states, thereby demoting non-interference within the regional normative 
hierarchy. Other groupings—like Southeast Asia’s—remained protective of strict 
sovereignty norms. By intrusive regionalism I mean actions carried out by states and 
regional organizations—located in the same region as the target state—that encroach 
upon domestic political or security matters, seeking to monitor or alter state action in 
some way or affect the outcome of a domestic crisis. In Latin America and Africa, 
activities including state monitoring (of human rights practices and electoral processes) 
as well a range of interference practices taken in response to domestic political and 
military crises (e.g., public condemnation, fact-finding missions, economic sanctions, 
peacekeeping missions) have been increasingly legitimized, institutionalized, and carried 
out since this second wave of regionalism. This is surprising in light of Acharya and 
Johnston’s formulation (above), given that Southeast Asian nations have arguably 
advanced the furthest in the project of state-building—boasting stronger state institutions 
and economies than their counterparts in Latin American and (especially) Africa—but 
have most maintained the attitude towards sovereignty norms that we associate with the 
insecurities of new post-colonial states.  
 This divergence in regional normative trajectories (uneven erosion of the norm of 
non-interference) since the second wave of regionalism beginning in the 1980s and 
accelerating in the 1990s is a puzzling phenomenon and the primary explanandum of this 
study. It is also the case, however, that (subtler) regional variation existed before the 
1980s. For example, Latin America created a regional human rights commission to 
monitor state practices in 1959 and dispatched election observation teams to member 
states in an ad hoc fashion throughout the Cold War period. These and other intrusive 
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legal and practical developments during the Cold War—for which evidence is presented 
in Chapter 2—suggest that the more pronounced variation we find in the late 20th century 
has historical roots. 
 
This dissertation has two main objectives: to establish underappreciated variation in 
sovereignty norms in the global South and to explain this variation. Chapter 2 speaks to 
the first objective and Chapters 3-7 to the second. The remainder of the present chapter 
presents my methodological approach and explanatory framework. 
 
Methodological Approach 
This dissertation takes an historical comparative approach,16 analyzing developments 
over time in the three world regions discussed above—Latin America, Africa, and 
Southeast Asia—in order establish that important variation exists and to draw 
conclusions about causal factors contributing to their divergent normative trajectories. I 
have selected these cases—defined by current membership in relevant regional 
organizations—because they represent diverse outcomes and together cover much of the 
global South: 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Bennett and George 2005. 
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Table 1.1 Case Overview 
Region (Relevant Organization) Membership Population 
Latin America (Organization of 
American States—OAS—
minus the United States and 
Canada) 
35 (North, Central, South America) 910 million 
Africa (African Union) 54 (all African states except 
Morocco) 
967 million  
Southeast Asia (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations—
ASEAN) 
10 (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam) 
601 million 
 
 As already noted, I seek to answer two main questions: 1) how has the status of the norm 
of non-interference varied over time and across regions? and 2) what accounts for this 
variation? To answer the first question, I trace relevant regional law over time in the three 
regions as well as regional practices—state monitoring and intrusive responses to 
intrastate crises—that violate non-interference by assuming jurisdiction over domestic 
affairs. I compare practices with the use of an original dataset of domestic disputes rising 
to a ‘crisis level’ and intrusive regional responses to these crises. Chapter 2 provides 
more details on this quantitative component of the study. In the rest of the dissertation, I 
employ a qualitative case study method to investigate the causal processes contributing to 
normative stasis and change. Chapter 3 covers pan-movements and regionalist activities, 
beginning as early as the 1820s, leading up to the formation of formal regional 
organizations [the OAS, the Organization of African Unity (OAU, predecessor to the 
African Union), and ASEAN in 1948, 1963, and 1967, respectively]. Chapters 4-7 
investigate developments relevant to non-interference that have taken place since the 
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establishment of these organizations. I am particularly interested in (uneven) normative 
change since the second wave of regionalism beginning in the mid-1980s. 
The temporal and geographical scope of this project is vast, and the main 
dependent variable (the status of the norm of non-interference) subsumes many different 
practices (e.g. election monitoring, sanctions, peacekeeping) and issue areas (democracy, 
human rights, security) that are often considered separately. There are of course breadth-
depth tradeoffs associated with this aspect of the research design.  As I further argue in 
the concluding chapter (Chapter 8), though, the comparative regionalism literature is ripe 
for such a broadly comparative study because of the availability of excellent work on 
particular regions written by area experts and because of the general dearth of studies 
directly comparing multiple regions (as many existing studies take the form of the edited 
volume). 
 
A Theory of Intrusive Regionalism from the Second Wave 
I identify two kinds of variation in the status of the norm of non-interference—temporal 
and regional—and therefore seek to answer two questions: 1) Why did regional 
groupings in the developing world introduce (or enhance existing) interference practices 
at this particular time (beginning in the mid-1980s and especially after 1990), and 2) Why 
did some regions (Latin America and Africa) do so to a much greater degree than others 
(Southeast Asia)? 
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International ideational context 
In order to begin addressing the question of timing, I turn first to the changing 
international ideational context, where we observe the rise of liberal internationalism 
beginning in the late 1970s (and especially with the end of the Cold War) and the 
emergence of the human security paradigm in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Because 
the intrusive regional practices we see during the second wave of regionalism are aimed 
at promoting and protecting democracy, human rights, and intrastate security, this context 
is relevant. 
Liberal internationalism means different things to different people, but I define it 
as a doctrine favoring the international promotion and protection of liberal values (i.e. 
free markets, democracy and human rights), especially through multilateral institutions. 
In the late 1970s, democracy and human rights came to feature more prominently in 
individual states’ foreign policies and in the agenda of international institutions. This 
incorporation took place alongside the growth of the international human rights 
movement. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (of which the 
United States and Soviet Union were members) adopted the Final Helsinki Act, which 
aimed to promote East-West cooperation and set forth, among other things, commitments 
to human rights and democracy. The act facilitated the establishment of domestic human 
rights monitoring groups and initiated the Helsinki Process, a series of meetings over the 
course of several years where progress on the objectives of the act, including human 
rights and democracy, were assessed.17 These meetings provided opportunities for 
participating states to draw attention to other states’ particular violations of Helsinki Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Bloed 1990, 12-21. 
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commitments.18 When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, his administration made human 
rights promotion an explicit priority of U.S. bilateral foreign policy, and European states 
followed suit a few years later.19 Entry into force of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights took place in 1976, followed by that of the American Convention on Human 
Rights in 1978. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the 1970s the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights took on a more influential role in regional politics, issuing highly 
critical reports of member states’ systematic abuses of human rights. 
The Third Wave of democratization swept the globe in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
the international human rights movement grew more powerful. During the Ronald 
Reagan administration, U.S. human rights commitments dropped out somewhat from its 
international priorities in favor of anti-communism, but, with the end of the Cold War, 
‘democratic enlargement’ replaced anti-communism as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign 
policy. The “liberal zeitgeist” of the time was reinforced by this “appearance of a 
unipolar system presided over by a liberal democratic great power.”20 Writing in 1992, 
legal scholar Thomas Franck observed the emergence of a right to democratic governance 
supported by “international rules and processes by which the governance of nations is 
increasingly being monitored and validated.”21 International financial institutions and 
Western countries increasingly tied loans and official development assistance to domestic 
political reforms beginning in the late 1980s. This conditionality was stronger in rhetoric 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Huntington 1991, 90. 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1979. 
20 Hobson 2009, 385. 
21 Franck 1992, 50. 
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than in practice, but even the rhetorical shift contributed to pressure on developing 
countries to adhere to or at least pay lip service to liberal norms. 22  
 
Human security is more difficult to pin down as a concept than liberal 
internationalism. Broadly speaking, it is defined against traditional understandings of 
state security that focus on external military threat. Instead, it is a people-centered notion; 
the human is the referent of security rather than the state, and the state itself may be the 
source of insecurity. Although many approaches to thinking about human security exist, 
we can generally differentiate between two basic definitions, one that identifies threats to 
human security narrowly and one broadly. The narrow version focuses on “violent threats 
to individuals and communities.” The broad version is more multidimensional or holistic 
and seeks to draw our attention to the intersection of issue areas that had traditionally 
been addressed separately in (international) policymaking, like economic development, 
environmental degradation, human rights, public health, et cetera. It considers “hunger, 
disease, pollution, affronts to human dignity, threats to livelihoods, and other harms in 
addition to violence” to be sources of human insecurity.23  
The term human security itself first gained widespread international attention 
when it appeared in the United Nation’s Development Program’s 1994 Human 
Development Report (where the broad definition was used), but, as I outline in Chapter 5, 
precursor or component policy discourses—which I term ‘human centrism’ and ‘holistic 
problem solving’—emerged in the 1980s as part of a critical response at the international 
and regional levels to the impact of economic structural adjustment programs (imposed 
on developing countries by international financial institutions). The United Nations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Dunning 2004; Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 135.  
23 Human Security Research Project 2010. 
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Economic Commission for Africa played a key role in leveling these critiques and 
promoting these new policy discourses. In the 1990s, calls for a redefinition of security 
went hand in hand with calls for a redefinition of sovereignty (“sovereignty as 
responsibility”24), providing foundation for the emergence of the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine.25 According to the Responsibility to Protect, states forfeit their right to 
freedom from intervention when they fail to protect their populations from mass 
atrocities. 
 
Regional identity discourses 
In order to begin addressing the question of regional variation, I first turn to regional 
ideational structures. We can observe distinct sets of historically shared ideas about 
collective distinctiveness and community solidarity (identity or identification—see 
below).  Ideas about legitimate behavior (norms) are discursively linked to these 
collective identities. I argue that these historically rooted regional identity discourses 
provided foundation for normative change over time and especially during the second 
wave of regionalism when these identity discourses interacted with more proximate 
causal factors (see below).  
 The study of collective identity has a long history in international relations. Karl 
Deutsch’s work emphasizes the importance of peaceful collective identities to the 
emergence of a security community.26 Constructivists—particularly Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett—later built on Deutsch’s concept of the security community.27 Martha 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Deng et al 1996. 
25 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001. 
26 Deutsch et al 1957. 
27 Adler and Barnett 1998. 
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Finnemore explains changes in patterns of humanitarian intervention over time in part 
with reference to changes in ‘identification,’ the degree to which states identify with 
peoples and therefore perceive them to be deserving of intervention. For Finnemore, 
identification differs from identity in that it	  “emphasizes the affective relationships 
between actors rather than the characteristics of a single actor.”28  More recently, Jeffrey 
Checkel and Peter Katzenstein have investigated the construction of a regional identity in 
Europe.29 Most work on identity in international relations, though, focuses on national 
identities to explain, for example, the foreign policies of individual states.30  
Ideas about identity don’t have to be universally sincerely held to matter. What is 
important is that these intersubjective ideas about group responsibility, solidarity, 
common values and collective distinctiveness (and their exchange or diffusion through 
discourse) structure relationships and constrain and enable actors who care about 
legitimacy. As Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson contend, social identity has causal 
weight “regardless of whether or not the actor internalizes the components constituting 
this identity.”31 
Where do regional identity discourses originate? Pan (or macronational) 
movements like pan-Europeanism, pan-Asianism, pan-Americanism,32 pan-Arabism, and 
pan-Africanism emerged alongside nationalist movements in the 19th and 20th centuries.33 
Like nationalism, pan ideologies were based on ‘imagined communities,’ albeit broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Finnemore 1996. 
29 Checkel and Katzenstein 2009. 
30 Katzenstein 1996. 
31 Krebs and Jackson 2007, 57. 
32 Pan-Americanism emerged earlier (in the 1820s). 
33 Duara 1997, 1033.  
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ones.34 In the global South, pan movements often played an important role in the 
decolonization struggle. The state and state sovereignty as they exist now were not 
inevitable. Latin American independence leader Simon Bolivar sought to form a 
federation of Hispanic-American states in the 1820s. According to historians Sven Saaler 
and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, ‘regional bloc’ thinking was highly influential globally 
in the 1930s. In the 1920s and 1930s, pan-Asianist activities led German general and 
academic Karl Haushofer to assert that there was “a trend toward a future world order 
that would be dominated by large, regional blocs, replacing the existing order 
characterized by the sovereign nation state.”35 In the 1950s and 1960s, there was a 
campaign among radical pan-Africanist leaders to form a ‘United States of Africa’ 
modeled after the United States or Soviet.  
Even though these political unions did not materialize, pan-ideologies with 
transnational or supranational threads, like pan-Africanism and pan-Americanism—and 
pan-Asianism prior to Japanese imperialism—exist in tension with nationalism and 
Westphalian sovereignty. Michael Barnett discusses this tension in his work on pan-
Arabism; Arab nationalism and Westphalian sovereignty have been at times in conflict, 
but the construction of state-centric meanings for Arab nationalism accommodated 
Westphalian sovereignty, reducing this tension.36 Historian Prasenjit Duara refers to this 
tension as cosmopolitanism versus competitive nationalism, and Southeast Asia scholar 
Amitav Acharya distinguishes ‘universalist’ regionalism from ‘nationalist’ regionalism. 
In 1966, then-president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania delivered his famous speech “The 
Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist” in which he discusses the tension between nationalism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Anderson 1983. 
35 Saaler and Szpilman 2011, 8. 
36 Barnett 1995. 
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and statebuilding, on the one hand, and transnational and supranational pan-Africanism, 
on the other. This ‘dilemma’ is present in all three cases, but is resolved earlier in the 
Asian case (in favor of nationalism and state sovereignty).  
 
Latin America: Decolonization came early to South and Central America (1820s), and 
liberalism and legalism feature prominently in the history of pan-Americanism, even 
before the United States became a participant in hemispheric conferences in the late 19th 
century. Latin American regionalism is distinctive in the global South for its legalist 
culture: a “transnational legal consciousness” developed among the revolutionary elite, 
and a pan-American community of jurists, diplomats and legal activists produced a body 
of regional law. This project was understood as a task that advanced the “completion” of 
“civilization” in the region, securing Latin American states entry into the “family of 
nations.”37 The principle of non-interference became central to pan-American legal 
discourse, in part due to actual and potential U.S. interventionism, but other norms, based 
in the Western enlightenment ideals of the 19th century independence movements, were 
also highly salient. These included commitments to representative government and (later) 
human rights that were important to the collective identity of the Western hemispheric 
society of states, defined in part against “Old World absolutism.”38  
Tensions between non-interference and the regional promotion of democracy and 
human rights persisted over many decades. This tension is apparent in the founding 
charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) (1948), in which these norms are 
enshrined. In the post-World War II period, liberal values were embedded in institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Obregon 2002, 253. 
38 Snyder 1984, 229. 
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and practices—a regional human rights commission and ad hoc election observation 
missions—but the rise of authoritarianism and U.S. Cold War interventionism stalled the 
further development of intrusive liberal regionalism in Latin America. When widespread 
democratization brought down the region’s dictators in the 1980s, and U.S. foreign policy 
transformed at the end of the Cold War, this allowed for the renewal of multilateralism 
generally and intrusive liberal regionalism specifically.  
 
Africa: The bulk of African states gained independence in the late 1950s and 1960s,39 
over 100 years after decolonization in Latin America. In the decades leading up to 
independence, though, an active pan-African movement constructed and promoted an 
ideology of African transnationalism, which would later present a challenge to strict 
sovereignty norms in independent Africa. We might think of pan-African 
transnationalism as situated between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism; Africans 
are to identify with (and are responsible for) other Africans, even if they are 
geographically very distant and are not formally citizens of the same state.  Pan-
Africanism originated in the diaspora, where individuals of African ancestry (typically 
descendent from victims of the transatlantic slave trade) perceived Africa to be “one 
unity” since they could not “trace their particular roots.”40 In the post-World War II 
period, radical pan-Africanists (including Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah) led 
a call to create a United States of Africa (noted above) that would merge all (former) 
colonial territories on the continent into one independent political unit and present a 
united front in the international sphere. The campaign against the apartheid regime in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Decolonization continued into the 1970s 
40 Abdul-Raheem 1996, 1, quoting W.E.B. Du Bois. 
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South Africa also began during this post-war period, when most of Africa had not yet 
decolonized. The 1958 All-African People’s Conference, in an act of pan-African 
solidarity, was the first international meeting to call for international sanctions against 
South Africa. 
The pan-Africanist movement culminated in the establishment of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Although delegates rejected the United 
States of Africa proposal at this founding summit, the discourse of pan-African 
transnationalism endured beyond it in regional politics and continued to present a 
challenge to strict sovereignty norms. This tension contributed to the gradual erosion of 
the norm of non-interference over time.41 For example, the OAU’s decades-long 
condemnation of and sanctions regime against South Africa—which evoked solidarity 
with oppressed African people and employed the language of universal human rights—
exposed the OAU to accusations of hypocrisy, including those voiced by African leaders 
in favor of more intrusive regionalism. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, regional 
developments at the level of law and practice—including the OAU peacekeeping mission 
to Chad and the establishment of a regional human rights charter providing for a 
commission—reflected both the changing international ideational context and the effect 
over time of the challenge posed to non-interference by pan-African transnationalism. It 
wasn’t until the late 1980s and early 1990s that a more substantial normative shift took 
place—the so-called ‘shift from non-interference to non-indifference’—when economic 
crisis and the threat of international marginalization (see below) prompted policy-relevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Williams 2007. 
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actors in Africa to engage in a collective ‘rethink’ of the regional normative order and to 
reform this order with reference to pan-African solidarities. 
 
Southeast Asia: Pan-Asianism and liberal norms were not relevant to the founding of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN (1967). The solidarity existing among 
the original ASEAN members was not transnational (but rather statist) and not pan-
Asianist (but rather anti-communist). The original members of ASEAN (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) also shared an illiberal ideology; these 
states justified authoritarianism with their need to foster economic development and 
undercut the appeal of communism. Pan-Asianism as a movement and ideology had 
existed at the level of civil society in the late 19th and early 20th century. Japanese 
imperialist pan-Asianist schemes in the 1930s and 1940s invalided the movement, 
though, and no concrete political projects came of it after this. Southeast Asian regional 
institution building didn’t take place until the region was sufficiently polarized along 
Cold War lines. The perceived and actual subversive activities of communist China 
contributed to a common threat of these non-communist states. In addition to anti-
communism, the original ASEAN members shared a common belief that a capitalist 
authoritarian ‘developmental’ state would best foster economic growth. These 
commonalities, rather than competing with strict sovereignty norms, were actually quite 
compatible with strict sovereignty. Later, this distinctive Southeast Asian domestic social 
order would be framed in terms of  “Asian Values” by those elites promoting it. The 
discourse of Asian Values, which emphasizes collectivism over individualism and 
economic development over civil and political rights, is reinforced rather than challenged 
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by the so-called ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way is a set of procedural and regulative 
inter-state norms, the most important of which is non-interference. Southeast Asia’s 
economic successes in the 1980s made it possible for ASEAN states to promote Asian 
Values and the ASEAN Way—against the growing hegemony of liberal 
internationalism—as distinctive and successful domestic and regional norms. During the 
second wave of regionalism, ASEAN reasserted rather than reformed its regional 
normative order. 
 
Proximate factors: regional democratic density and economic performance  
Given the international ideational context of the 1980s and 1990s, groups of democracies 
and states experiencing economic crisis or uncertainty were more willing or motivated to 
support intrusive regionalism than were authoritarians and high performing economies. 
The multidimensional logic of this argument is outlined below, but, broadly speaking, I 
assert that democracies and economically underperforming states are more vulnerable to 
domestic and international pressure (including pressure to adopt liberal internationalist 
foreign policies) and are more interested in international image management, including 
the improvement of their region’s collective image. 
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1) Democratic density  
 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace42 
 
Democratization in Latin America during the 1980s was wide and deep, and, by the end 
of this decade, the average Polity score of all its states was 6, reflecting a high ‘density’ 
of democracy in the region.43 The achievement of this critical mass of democracies 
contributed to the renewal of the development of intrusive regionalism (especially 
democracy promotion) in the region, for the reasons I outline below. Neither Africa nor 
Southeast Asia has achieved this density. Although average democracy scores have been 
on the rise in the last twenty years, average scores remain in the ‘anocracy’ range.  
 Even though high democratic density was not achieved in these two regions, 
though, gradual liberalization (short of democratization) opened up more space for civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Data accessed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
43 Pevehouse 2005 uses the term ‘democracy density.’  
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society, and individual states democratized. Active civil society groups—some of which 
favor intrusive regionalism—contributed to regional reform, as did the protagonism of 
new democracies. This was especially consequential when the democratic protagonist 
was a more influential state with regional leadership aspirations, like South Africa and 
Indonesia.  
In the abstract, the link between democracy and intrusive regionalism this is 
logical, because democracy is associated with the principle of popular sovereignty,44 and 
this principle presents a challenge to absolute sovereignty. Furthermore, the intrusive 
regionalism that has developed since the second wave of regionalism is largely aimed at 
promoting liberal values related to democracy and human rights (rather than, say, 
economic redistribution or theocracy), and democracies would seem more likely to 
promote liberalism abroad than would non-democracies. The causal link between 
democracy and intrusive regionalism is perhaps more complicated and multifaceted, 
though, than it appears at first glance. Let’s outline and unpack these facets. 
 First and most straightforwardly, some foreign policy decision-makers in 
democracies are ‘true believers’ in liberalism and therefore seek to spread liberal norms 
to their neighbors. Liberalism constitutes part of their identity and therefore shapes, to 
some degree, their beliefs and preferences. These could be beliefs about ‘right and 
wrong’, or what Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane term ‘principled beliefs’ (e.g., 
“political imprisonment is immoral”) and/or beliefs about ‘cause and effect’ (Goldstein 
and Keohane’s ‘causal beliefs,’ e.g., “the spread of democracy promotes peace”).45  
Regarding the first type of belief, a new democracy might be especially zealous about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ochoa Espejo 2012. 
45 Goldstein and Keohane 1993. 
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spreading liberalism, because the memory of the recently-evicted repressive regime 
motivates officials in the new government to work against similar repression of their 
regional ‘brothers and sisters’ in other countries. The existence of a prominent discourse 
of transnational solidarity (e.g., pan-Africanism) in the region strengthens this logic. We 
do find examples of new democracies justifying intrusive regionalism with reference to 
the crimes of a previous regime. For example, post-apartheid South Africa under Nelson 
Mandela (1994-1999) and later Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) was a lead proponent of 
regional democracy promotion and institutional reform at the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) in the late 1990s, and its leaders explicitly framed efforts to promote 
democracy and human rights in the region as a continuation of the African National 
Congress’s decades-long anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa.46  
‘Cause and effect’ beliefs about democracy also provide a link between regime 
type and support for intrusive regionalism. In his study of the role of regional 
organizations in member state democratization, Jon Pevehouse finds that the greater the 
‘democratic density’ (the proportion of democracies) of a regional organization, the more 
likely it is to pressure its member states—through a variety of means—to transition to 
democracy and/or to consolidate democracy. He argues that democratic members of 
regional organizations are motivated to pursue regional democracy promotion, in part, by 
their belief that democracy brings economic and political advantages to the region; they 
buy into academic and policy discourses that make a connection between democracy on 
the one hand, and a laundry list of ‘goods’ on the other hand: interstate peace, trade, 
economic growth and stability, cooperation, and the formation of alliances.47 These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Mandela 1993, 88. 
47 Pevehouse 2005, 18 
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discourses, which have long existed, rose in prominence beginning in the 1980s and 
especially in the post-Cold War era, as liberalism ascended. 
 Second, democracies—particularly recently transitioned democracies—are 
sometimes motivated to create intrusive liberal regional institutions by their interest in 
creating international mechanisms to protect their own fragile regimes from non-
democratic domestic challengers. This is the logic of Andrew Moravcsik’s ‘lock-in’ 
thesis, which he advances to explain the creation of the European human rights regime.48 
Key steps in the process of creating the Latin American democracy promotion regime 
beginning in the late-1980s were indeed championed by newly established democracies.49 
In 1991 and 1992, for example, the OAS adopted a resolution and a protocol50 
establishing investigation and sanctions procedures in the event of an unconstitutional 
change in government in a member state. And Chilean diplomat Heraldo Munoz has 
explained that Chile’s sponsorship of this resolution was driven, in part, by the new 
Chilean regime’s desire “to safeguard and consolidate the newly regained democracies 
against lingering authoritarianism.”51 Chile had transitioned to democracy in 1990. 
 Third, democracies sometimes support intrusive regionalism aimed at the 
promotion of democracy and human rights in order to legitimate themselves to domestic 
and international audiences. A regime might do so in direct response to pressure (from 
other states and/or civil society groups) to adopt specific liberal internationalist foreign 
policy positions, or it might be a good way to generally telegraph a liberal identity in 
order distance/distinguish itself from a former autocratic regime and/or to maintain or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Moravcsik 2000. 
49 Legler and Tieku 2010, 477. 
50 OAS 1991b; OAS 1992. 
51 Munoz 1998, 1. 
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capitalize on its international democratic image.  According to Pevehouse, foreign policy 
reorientation towards liberal internationalism helps new democracies establish legitimacy 
“both internally and externally.” Liberal foreign policy moves can also reinforce an 
established democracy’s status as such.52  
Relatedly, democracies might face greater costs when they do not support 
intrusive regionalism than would non-democratic non-supporters. A democratic image is, 
in the post-Cold War era, a social or ‘soft power’ resource, and democracies want to 
preserve this resource; they have more to lose in this regard. Being seen to support 
regional policies that shield repressive states from international accountability might 
detract from this image. Thomas Risse argues that ratifying an international treaty 
increase’s a state’s “target vulnerability” to transnational and domestic pressure to 
comply with that treaty, because of the target state’s reputational concerns. A similar 
logic applies to states that want to protect their democratic image.53 Furthermore, 
democracies are often less insulated than non-democracies from domestic pressure 
groups, some of which may voice criticism of seemingly illiberal foreign policy stances. 
In the mid-1990s, the Philippines and Thailand were the only democratic members of 
ASEAN, and they faced internal and external pressure to prevent Myanmar from joining 
the association because of Myanmar’s human rights record. Denying Myanmar’s 
membership based on its domestic situation would have contravened ASEAN’s strict 
interpretation of the norm of non-interference, but, for a period of time, both Thailand 
and the Philippines worked to postpone Myanmar’s accession. The Philippines, for its 
part, expressed concern about jeopardizing its own image as a “champion of human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Pevehouse 2005, 17-18 
53 Risse 2013, 437. 
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rights.”54 Pressure from the international community only seemed to embolden the other 
ASEAN states to proceed with accession, and Myanmar became an ASEAN member in 
1997. 
 Finally, democratic states sometimes promote intrusive regionalism in order to 
promote liberalization in the region, because they want to improve the region’s collective 
image or reputation. States interested in telegraphing a democratic image aren’t satisfied 
to promote their own domestic quality of democracy—they are also keen to manage the 
democratic image of their region. First of all, being a member of an organization with a 
reputation for being a ‘dictators’ club’—a term used to describe each of the OAS, the 
OAU, and ASEAN a various points in their histories—detracts from the democratic 
image of all member states vis-à-vis the international community. The illiberalism of 
some creates a negative externality for all. Therefore, despite the domestic and foreign 
policies of any particular member state, it may suffer (by association) from the negative 
perception extraregional actors have of the region and/or regional organization based on 
its illiberalism. South Africa’s second post-apartheid president, Thabo Mbeki, was 
particularly enthusiastic about democracy and human rights promotion on the continent, 
and he often justified his efforts with reference to Africa’s need to achieve a more liberal 
image in the world, in order to counter Afro-pessimism and attract foreign direct 
investment (among other things). He reasoned that firms are wary of investing in Africa, 
because its countries, as a group, have a reputation for not respecting rights, including 
property rights.55  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Quoted in Ba 2009, 120. 
55 Tieku 2004, 253. 
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2) Economic performance 
 
Source: The World Bank56 
 
Poor economic performance renders states materially and socially vulnerable and can 
create legitimacy deficits (vis-à-vis domestic and international audiences). It contributes 
to an image of dysfunction (in the eyes of investors and the international community), 
and draws attention to/calls into question existing practices (of individual states and of 
regions as collective actors). Economic performance affects a state’s international image 
as well as its susceptibility to formal conditionality and to less formal social pressure.  
Materially and socially vulnerable states are more open to reforming regional norms in 
order to correct an image of dysfunction and attract resources.  Proponents of intrusive 
regionalism have promoted it as a strategy for addressing these problems of material and 
social vulnerability in the wake of economic crisis, and it has been adopted as such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Data accessed at http://data.worldbank.org 
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strategy in response to this framing. The logic of this strategy is far from obvious and 
only makes sense in light of the international and regional ideational context(s) discussed 
above. 
 Emerging international policy discourses in the 1980s—precursors to the human 
security paradigm—emphasized the interrelatedness of economic, governance, and 
security problems. Regional management of governance and security could therefore be 
pitched as a way to address economic problems. Furthermore, states (or groups of states) 
seeking to legitimate themselves to the international community are more likely to seek 
ways to communicate support for international norms, like the promotion of democracy, 
human rights, and human security. Economic crisis makes regimes more vulnerable to 
domestic pressures, including from groups in favor of liberal international foreign policy 
and intrusive regionalism. Finally, states interested in projecting an image of success, 
functionality, or low political risk (vis-à-vis investors) seek to improve the governance 
and security situation of its neighbors in order to not be associated with their dysfunction, 
illiberalism, et cetera.  
The African norm shift emerged from regional policy processes responding to the 
economic crisis of the 1980s and the related problem of the continent’s negative 
international image. Figure 1.2 shows Africa’s poor economic performance compared to 
other regions, and especially compared to the original members of ASEAN (the ASEAN 
Five). Again, the international context of the 1980s and 1990s is crucial to understanding 
the logic of this response, because the rise of liberal internationalism and the human 
security paradigm created a link between economic development, on the one hand, and 
liberal governance and security on the other hand. In the post-Cold War era, part of 
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image management involves affirming hegemonic liberal norms. Furthermore, because of 
the economic crisis of the 1980s, African regimes faced waning legitimacy vis-à-vis 
domestic groups and a wave of political protest swept the continent. Some civil society 
activists at this time were pushing for greater civil society involvement in the OAU and 
for intrusive regional institutions to manage domestic governance and security. 
Whereas Africa’s economic crisis contributed to its image of dysfunction and 
rendered it materially and socially vulnerable, Southeast Asia’s remarkable growth rates 
created an image of success for the region and bestowed upon ASEAN and its member 
states material and social security in the early 1990s. ASEAN states expressed 
satisfaction about the region’s positive international image and conviction in Southeast 
Asia’s distinctive set of regional norms, which emphasize state sovereignty over regional 
responsibility. However, when the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit, it damaged the region’s 
international image of success, making ASEAN states more materially and socially 
vulnerable to liberalization pressures. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, we see a modest 
erosion of the norm of non-interference in Southeast Asia, and states have justified this 
move in terms of image management in the wake of the economic crisis. 
While the Latin American norm shift is mostly attributable, in the short term, to 
widespread democratization in the region, I find evidence (discussed in Chapter 4) 
suggesting that economic uncertainty at the end of the Cold War (after a decade of poor 
economic performance) contributed to Latin American states’ interest in cooperating with 
the United States on shared political goals (like democracy promotion) in order to 
strengthen their relationship with the United States and therefore bolster economic 
cooperation with it. This follows a similar (but not identical) logic to developments in 
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Africa at the end of the Cold War and (to a lesser degree) Southeast Asia in the late 
1990s. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
In the empirical and concluding chapters of this dissertation, I address two important 
alternative arguments, one power-centric and one functionalist.  
 
Great power influence and interventionism 
Especially because these regions are populated by post-colonial ‘developing’ states, it is 
imperative to investigate the role that great powers—the Cold War superpowers, former 
colonial powers, and, in the case of Southeast Asia, China—have played in the 
development of regional normative orders. I consider the influence exerted by these 
powers on regional norms as well as the impact that perceived and actual great power 
interventionism has had on the regional construction of norms relevant to non-
interference. 
 First, potential great power influence on the content of norms in the global South 
is multidimensional. Powerful states need not always directly compel weaker states to 
adopt or reject particular regional norms (through, for example, aid conditionality or 
shaming tactics), they might also build social structures (e.g. the “Washington 
consensus”) that affect the beliefs and preferences of these states and thereby influence 
them to adopt or reject certain norms. This latter exercise of power is what Steven Lukes 
has termed the ‘third face’ or power, the first and second faces referring to more direct 
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influence and agenda setting, respectively.57 This third face is related to what Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall term ‘structural power’58 and to Antonio Gramsci’s notion 
of ‘hegemony.’59 In tracing the development of law and practices relevant to the norm of 
non-interference in my three regions, I look for evidence of both direct great power 
influence as well as the effect of hegemonic discourses.  
 Second, and briefly, it is plausible that great power interventionism in the global 
South led to a decrease in the willingness of these targeted states to cede sovereignty to 
inter-governmental bodies, including their regional organizations. I examine perceived 
and actual great power intervention in the three regions as well as regional responses to it. 
 
The changing nature of conflict 
One of the most remarkable developments under study here is the rise of regional conflict 
management mechanisms in Africa. One simple explanation for this might be that 
intrastate conflict became a bigger problem in Africa in the 1990s, that it created negative 
externalities, and that states responded to new problems with new solutions. According to 
Mary Kaldor, the nature of warfare changed in the post-Cold War era, as wars became 
more internal and responsible for more human rights violations.60 This is the ‘new wars’ 
thesis. I test this (partial) alternative explanation in Chapter 2 by measuring interference 
practices relative to ‘interference opportunities’ (domestic disputes rising to a ‘crisis’ 
level) and by comparing average regional scores across time on a measure called Civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Lukes 1974. 
58 Barnett and Duvall 2005. 
59 Gramsci 1971. 
60 Kaldor 1999. 
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Violence Magnitude and Impact. I further address this explanation in Chapter 6 by 
examining the timing of the African norm shift in relation to the so-called ‘new wars.’ 
 
Plan for the Dissertation  
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the repertoire of interference practices regional 
communities use to promote democracy, security, and human rights and systematically 
measures variation across time (1960-2009) and space in the strength or status of the non-
interference norm. I find that non-interference has long been weaker in Africa and Latin 
America than in Southeast Asia, and that this variation became more pronounced from 
the 1980s onward. I also begin to test the functionalist explanation mentioned above by 
measuring interference practices relative to ‘interference opportunities’ (crisis-level 
domestic disputes) and by comparing the magnitude and impact of civil violence across 
time and regions.  
Chapter 3 provides an historical overview of regionalist activity in Latin 
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia, leading up to the establishment of the OAS, OAU, 
and ASEAN. It introduces the regional identity discourses—pan-Americanism and pan-
African transnationalism—that I argue present an enduring challenge to strict sovereignty 
norms over time in Latin America and Africa. 
 Chapters 4-7 examine the long- and short-term factors that produced different 
outcomes in the three regions during the second wave of regionalism. Chapter 4 focuses 
on Latin America, showing how pan-American commitments to democracy and human 
rights were embedded in regional institutions and practices in the post-World War II era, 
how a general shift to authoritarianism and U.S. Cold War interventionism stalled the 
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further development of intrusive regionalism, and how the third wave of democratization 
and post-Cold War rapprochement between the United States and its southern neighbors 
enabled the reinvigoration or renewal of this development. 
The African case is divided into two chapters. Chapter 5 examines the relevance 
of pan-African transnationalism during the 1960s-1980s and related contestation of the 
norm of non-interference during this time. It also discusses the emergence of new 
international policy discourses in the 1980s that were promoted by regional bureaucrats 
in response to economic crisis (and structural adjustment programs) and later used to 
frame the post-Cold War campaign for regional normative reform in Africa. Chapter 6 
presents evidence of Africa’s material and social insecurity vis-à-vis domestic and 
international audiences resulting from of the economic crisis of the 1980s and shows how 
a coordinated regional reform campaign presented intrusive regionalism as a strategy for 
addressing Africa’s problems. This campaign framed its appeals with pan-African 
transnationalism and the emerging international policy discourses outlined in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 7 shows how the norm of non-interference was reaffirmed during the 
1970s and 1980s in Southeast Asia, and how ASEAN entered the 1990s as a ‘success 
story’ due to ASEAN states’ remarkable economic growth and apparent diplomatic 
successes. This success, and Southeast Asia’s relative invulnerability to the third wave of 
democratization, contributed to the strength of non-interference in the region during the 
1990s. The 1997 Asian financial crisis hurt Southeast Asia’s (and ASEAN’s) image and 
rendered its states more vulnerable to international and domestic pressures to 
circumscribe the non-interference norm. Modest normative reform resulted, championed 
by the region’s democracies. 
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Chapter 8 discusses the usefulness of the alternative explanations outlined above 
and considered throughout the dissertation and makes the case that this project offers an 
important contribution to the comparative regionalism literature. 
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Chapter 2 
(Non-)Interference Across Time and Space1 
We often look to the European Union for evidence of the transformation of state 
sovereignty. National borders have dissolved here, and we can now speak of European 
law and European citizenship. But then we’re careful to note that our observations about 
changing sovereignty aren’t globally generalizable—like many ‘things Europe,’ 
European regionalism is sui generis. Even if other regions are, through emulation or 
learning, becoming more like Europe, they are doing so slowly and/or superficially.2 
Until very recently, the bulk of comparative regionalism studies have focused on the 
European Union-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dyad—as the latter 
grouping is considered by many to be the most ‘advanced’ of its kind in the global 
South—and these comparisons generally confirm the dichotomy between developed-
world norms and developing-world norms. ASEAN’s emphasis on informality, 
consensus, and consultation offers a stark contrast to European legalism and is attributed 
to ASEAN states’ ‘jealousy’ of their sovereignty—a supposed condition of 
postcoloniality. The reasoning here is that postcolonial nations have more recently 
acquired statehood, that their statehood is underdeveloped, and that regimes in these 
states enjoy less security vis-à-vis internal and external threats. They are therefore more 
attached to external, juridical sovereignty and create institutions to preserve and promote 
it.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A version of this chapter was published as an article. See: Coe, Brooke. 2015. “Sovereignty Regimes and 
the Norm of Non-Interference in the Global South: Regional and Temporal Variation,” Global Governance 
21(2). 
2 Herbst 2007. 
3 Acharya and Johnston 2007. 
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 As this chapter demonstrates, though, Southeast Asia’s steadfast commitment to 
sovereignty makes it more of an outlier than an exemplar in the global South. Other 
Southern regional groupings—like those in Africa and Latin America—have over time 
introduced more intrusive forms of multilateralism, violating the norm of non-
interference and legalizing this violation through regional declarations and treaties. To 
begin substantiating this key claim, I first offer a recent illustrative example of such 
multilateralism from Africa—the region with the world’s least developed economies and 
state institutions—in order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the nature 
of Third World regionalism outside of Southeast Asia.  
 
Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire (2010) 
Following eight years of civil war, Cote d’Ivoire held a nearly successful presidential 
election in November 2010. The process itself was relatively peaceful,4 featured high 
voter turnout,5 and delivered a clear result: challenger Alassane Ouattara had emerged 
victorious over incumbent Laurent Gbagbo in the second round of voting. President 
Gbagbo, however, refused to step down, generating a four-month post-election crisis 
situation that elicited heavy international and regional6 involvement in the name of 
popular sovereignty and civilian protection. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African 
Union—two regional organizations that count Cote d’Ivoire as a member—were quick to 
respond diplomatically. ECOWAS, the West African sub-regional grouping, convened a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 At least in the first round of voting. 
5 Apuuli 2012, 137. 
6 Regional actors are, of course, international actors, but I generally use the term ‘international’ in this 
dissertation in reference to extraregional international actors and institutions. 
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series of extraordinary sessions where heads of state issued their condemnation of “any 
attempt to usurp the popular will of the people of Cote d’Ivoire,”7 officially recognized 
Outtara’s victory as “representing the freely expressed voice of the Ivorian people,”8 and 
suspended Cote d’Ivoire’s membership from the organization. For its part, the African 
Union—through its Peace and Security Council9—declared its “total rejection” of any 
efforts to “undermine the electoral process and the will of the people,”10 endorsed 
ECOWAS’ statements, and suspended Cote d’Ivoire’s membership “until such time the 
democratically-elected president assumes power.”11  
The African Union Commission chairman proceeded to exert diplomatic pressure 
on Gbagbo by sending special envoys to the country (firstly former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki and later Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga).12 Gbagbo was 
not persuaded, and a discouraged Odinga remarked in a statement to the media that “Cote 
d’Ivoire symbolizes the great tragedy that seems to have befallen Africa, whereby some 
incumbents are not willing to give up power if they lose.”13 The Peace and Security 
Council then formed a High Level Panel on Cote d’Ivoire in January 2011, made up of 
several African heads of state and the president of the ECOWAS Commission.14 This 
panel in turn created a team of experts to investigate the situation further, visiting Cote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ECOWAS 2010a.  
8 ECOWAS 2010b. 
9 The African Union Peace and Security Council is the central institution of the African regional security 
architecture, which also comprises the Chairperson of the African Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the 
Peace Fund, the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee, and the various mechanisms of the 
Regional Economic Communities (e.g. ECOWAS). The Peace and Security Council is “a collective 
security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis 
situations in Africa.” Powell 2005, 11. 
10 African Union Peace and Security Council 2010a. 
11 African Union Peace and Security Council 2010b. 
12 Bassett and Straus 2011, 135. 
13 Quoted in Apuuli 2012, 144. 
14 Bassett and Straus 2011, 135. 
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d’Ivoire and meeting with both factions. It reported its findings and recommendations for 
a resolution to the crisis—a power transfer to Outtara—but Gbagbo ignored these.15  
During this same period, as Gbagbo remained unmoved by the condemnations 
and appeals of the regional community, ECOWAS proceeded to escalate its campaign 
against his obstinacy, organizing another extraordinary session in late-December 2010 
that resulted in a communiqué calling for a travel ban, asset freeze, and “all other forms 
of targeted sanctions imposed by regional institutions and the international community on 
the outgoing president and his associates.”16 The communiqué further stated that, if 
Gbagbo would not comply with its demand to relinquish power, ECOWAS “would be 
left with no alternative but to take other measures including the use of legitimate force to 
achieve the goals of the Ivorian people.”17 As a follow up to this threat, the ECOWAS 
Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff convened two sets of meetings in Abuja and 
Bamako to discuss and make preparations for a possible military intervention.18 
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in Cote d’Ivoire grew increasingly violent 
and complicated. In urban areas, pro-Gbagbo forces attempted to stamp out the 
opposition by targeting demonstrators, Muslims from the north of the country, and West 
African nationals with repressive violence. Conflict in rural areas was characterized by “a 
spiral pattern of reprisal killing, sometimes on a large scale, in which civilians of one 
group are collectively punished for the violence of their co-ethnics.”19 By late March, 
pro-Outtara forces, who had been progressively capturing towns in the west, began 
moving southward and were quickly able to take the capital, Yamoussoukro, on their way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Apuuli 2012, 144. 
16 ECOWAS 2010b. 
17 ECOWAS 2010b. 
18 Apuuli 2012, 142. 
19 Straus 2011, 48. 
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to the commercial capital and largest city, Abidjan. During this offensive, both sides (pro-
Outtara and pro-Gbagbo forces) were responsible for the killing of civilians.20 United 
Nations and French peacekeepers—stationed in country since the beginning of the civil 
war in 2002—were on the ground but lacked a clear mandate. As Outtara forces moved in 
on Abidjan, and Gbagbo attempted to fortify himself there, the cornered president faced 
major military defections, including the defection of his army chief of staff.  On April 1, 
the battle for Abidjan got underway.21 
Due to multiple constraining factors, related to both capacity and political will, 
ECOWAS did not mount a military intervention. Instead, the Authority of the ECOWAS 
Heads of State and Government passed a resolution on March 25, 2011, lamenting “the 
rapidly deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire,” “the 
“wanton violence against civilians leading to unacceptable loss of life and property,” and 
“the deliberate targeting of innocent Ivorians, ECOWAS citizens and other foreigners,” 
and formally appealed to the United Nations Security Council to “strengthen the mandate 
of the United Nations’ Operation in Côte d’Ivoire…enabling the Mission to use all 
necessary means to protect life and property, and to facilitate the immediate transfer of 
power to Mr. Alassane Ouattara.”22 Heeding this call, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1975, which authorized French and United Nations forces “to prevent the use 
of heavy weapons against the civilian population.”23 French and United Nations 
operatives did just that, using helicopter power to take out the heavy weapons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bellamy and Williams 2011, 834. 
21 Bassett and Straus 2011, 138. 
22 ECOWAS 2011. 
23 United Nations Security Council 2011. 
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surrounding the president’s residence. This enabled Outtara’s forces to arrest Gbagbo.24 
Importantly, though, by the time United Nations and French forces intervened, Outtara 
had already assumed control 90 percent of Cote d’Ivoire and was closing in quickly on 
Abidjan. Upon Gbagbo’s arrest, power transferred to Outtara, and, as of 2015, the latter 
remains president of Cote d’Ivoire. 
~~~ 
The 2010-2011 Ivorian crisis offers us several insights into the state of African 
regionalism. Most generally, and most importantly for my purposes, inter-governmental 
organizations at the regional and subregional levels are prepared, at least in some 
circumstances, to interfere forcefully in a domestic dispute against the interests and 
wishes of a de facto ruler. African regional organizations’ stances and actions in this case 
may have surprised some observers who are accustomed to thinking of African leaders as 
constituting a sort of mutual preservation club, interested in protecting each other’s 
sovereignty and enjoying the reciprocity of this elite solidarity. African states’ animosity 
towards the International Criminal Court due to the latter’s supposed ‘targeting’ of 
African leaders comes to mind, for example, as does African leaders’ defense of 
Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, against consistent criticism and condemnation 
from the broader international community for his perpetration of human rights abuses. 
But an understanding of continental politics focusing narrowly on elite solidarity and 
sovereignty protection—the logic of mutual preservation—fails to capture the complexity 
of African regionalism. As noted by Andrew Hurrell, regionalism contains “multiple and 
competing logics.”25 Increasingly, the logic of mutual preservation competes with another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bassett and Strauss 2011, 138. 
25 Hurrell 2007, 130. 
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logic in African regionalism—the logic of regional responsibility. Specifically, this is a 
collective responsibility to promote popular sovereignty, the protection of civilians, and 
other values related to peace, democracy, and human rights. This norm-set has been 
developing over time (through regional law and practices) and has demoted—but not 
displaced—the traditional norm of non-interference within the regional norm hierarchy. 
 The second insight to be gleaned from the Ivorian episode is that there exists a 
range of interference practices (or tools) that are available to—and actually drawn upon 
by—regional actors in their pursuit of resolutions to intrastate crises that threaten peace, 
democracy and/or human rights. In the Ivorian case, regional actors did not, in the end, 
employ a military response (although they requested military intervention by the United 
Nations). Often, an undue focus on the use or non-use of force in crisis situations can 
blind students of intervention to the many other ways that outside actors seek to influence 
1) a regime’s conduct (vis-à-vis domestic actors) and/or 2) the outcome of a domestic 
dispute. The African Union and ECOWAS drew on an impressive repertoire of 
interference practices including diplomatic sanctions (e.g. official condemnation, 
membership suspension), material sanctions (e.g. targeted asset freezes), mediation (e.g. 
special envoy appointments) and civilian deployments (e.g. investigatory commissions), 
and (potentially) military deployments (not used but threatened here). 
And, perhaps contrary to popular conceptions, the application of these tools had 
an impact on the dispute. The interference activities of the African Union and ECOWAS 
were arguably as impactful as those of United Nations (and French) peacekeepers, since 
by the time the latter intervened, Outtara had already come to control 90 percent of the 
country and was closing in on Gbagbo, who himself was rapidly losing control of his own 
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forces. According to Thomas Bassett and Scott Straus, the consistency of the regional 
response mattered, because it “shrank the space for diplomatic maneuver for Gbagbo, a 
consummate and clever bargainer; allowed the Central Bank of West African States to 
cut off Gbagbo's money supply, which weakened Gbagbo's standing with his own 
military and the civilian government; and, crucially, proved essential in obtaining 
unanimous United Nations Security Council approval for military action against 
Gbagbo's positions in Abidjan.”26 This raises the issue of regional gatekeeping—the role 
of regional organizations in legitimizing (or not) interventions by extraregional actors. 
Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams emphasize the gatekeeping role27 of regional 
organizations in their assessment of the international management of the dispute: “In 
particular, the Security Council’s judgment about the election result was explicitly 
conditioned by the prior statements of ECOWAS and the [African Union]; the United 
Nations Secretary General was clearly guided by that regional support; and the specific 
language on the use of force for protection purposes in Resolution 1975 was facilitated by 
ECOWAS’s earlier announcement that force could be a legitimate means of responding 
to the crisis. Without strong regional support it is very unlikely that events would have 
unfolded in this manner.”28  
 This is not to say that African regionalism doesn’t face important limitations, both 
in terms of capacity and political will, and the continued existence of these limitations is 
also a take-away from the Ivorian dispute. Indeed, the eventual United Nations-French 
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intervention added fuel to on-going debates among policy-relevant actors on the 
continent about African regional organizations’ urgent need to increase their 
effectiveness and thereby obviate interventions by extraregional (and especially former 
colonial) powers in the future.29 But African regionalism is all too often dismissed as 
meaningless and unworthy of study because of these limitations when, in fact, the rise of 
the intrusive regionalism has clearly transformed the very nature of sovereignty on the 
continent. As regional actors have assumed partial jurisdiction of domestic governance 
and security issues, non-interference—a core sovereignty norm—has been significantly 
circumscribed. This important shift is underappreciated and puzzling. The erosion of non-
interference over time—and the differential adoption of intrusive regionalism across 
world regions—is this dissertation’s object of study. 
 
Background and Context: Regional Interference in Africa and Latin America 
While the African Union/ECOWAS response to Gbagbo’s illegal retention of power may 
have surprised some, it did not surprise close observers of African politics. Over time, 
and especially in the two decades leading up to this crisis, these organizations had been 
increasingly engaging in the interference practices outlined above, including the actual 
use of military deployment. One fairly well known example is the African Union’s 
attempted management—with an aim to protect civilians—of the conflict in Darfur 
(Sudan). The Darfur conflict has been labeled a genocide by some in the international 
community, and there is broad agreement that crimes against humanity and war crimes 
have been committed here.30 The African Union’s interference activities in this case have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For example, see Leijenaar 2014. 
30 Rankhumise 2006. 
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included, most importantly, mediation between the government of Sudan and rebels 
groups (resulting in an April 2004 ceasefire agreement), the deployment of ceasefire 
observers in June 2004, and the transformation of this observation mission into a 
peacekeeping mission in late 2004. The peacekeeping mission is notable for its explicit 
mandate to protect civilians, a mandate that encountered resistance from the government 
of Sudan but was retained (albeit in a watered down form).31 The Sudanese regime also 
objected to the expansion of the African Union peacekeeping mission in 2005,32 and its 
‘consent’ was achieved through a United Nations Security Council resolution threatening 
sanctions.33 
The African Union (est. 2002) is a more visible and activist organization than its 
predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU, est. 1963), and so there is a 
tendency to contrast African Union interventionism with the OAU’s lack thereof. In fact, 
however, over time, and especially in its last decade of existence (beginning in 1990) the 
OAU had become much more engaged in intrastate crises. For example, in the early 
1990s, the OAU deployed two military observer missions to Rwanda (est. 1991) and to 
Burundi (est. 1993). Both deployments had to be carefully negotiated since the target 
states were resistant. The operation in Burundi was originally rejected by the state and 
only allowed to deploy after extensive negotiations between outside actors and the 
government.34 This demonstrated a new willingness on the part of the OAU to behave 
intrusively. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Powell 2005, 44 
32 From African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I) to AMIS II. 
33 United Nations Security Council 2004. 
34 Rodt 2011, 7-8. 
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In Africa, ECOWAS has been the most (but not only) active sub-regional 
grouping in response to domestic crises in its member states. In 1990, the West African 
organization took on a security function for the first time and intervened militarily in a 
member state, Liberia, in response to its civil war (see Chapter 6). ECOWAS continued 
to carry out interference activities in response to conflict and unconstitutional changes in 
government in its member states throughout the 1990s and beyond. Most coercively, it 
executed a post-coup regime change (reinstating the ousted president by force) in Sierra 
Leone in 1997.35   
 The African regional community is not alone in its increasing willingness to 
violate non-interference in the name of peace, democracy, and human rights. Latin 
America—through the OAS and sub-regional organizations—has also engaged in 
intrusive regionalism more frequently since the second wave of regionalism, especially in 
response to unconstitutional changes in government (like coups d’état). One recent such 
unconstitutional change took place in Honduras in 2009, when the military forced 
Manuel Zelaya—the leftist president who was planning a popular referendum to change 
the constitution and extend his term—out of office and into exile in Costa Rica, an action 
legitimized by the Honduran Supreme Court and National Congress. The new de facto 
government received condemnation from a number of sub-regional organizations36 in 
Latin America as well as from the OAS, who responded by suspending Honduras’s 
membership in the organization and dispatching mediators to aid in the resolution of the 
crisis. The Central American Bank for Economic Integration provisionally froze credits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Malan 1999. 
36 Association of Caribbean States, Caribbean Community, Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUR). 
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to Honduras,37 and the Inter-American Development Bank paused new loans to the 
country.38 These responses did not result in Zelaya’s reinstatement, but the eventual 
signing of the 2011 “Agreement for National Reconciliation and Consolidation of the 
Democratic System in the Republic of Honduras”39 by Zelaya and new president Porfirio 
Lobo Sosa led to an OAS General Assembly decision to lift the membership suspension.  
The OAS response to Zelaya’s ouster found precedent in several similar responses 
to democratic dilemmas in the 1990s and 2000s, sometimes with a more successful 
outcome. In 1993, for example, President Jorge Antonio Serrano of Guatemala executed 
a self-coup (autogolpe), shutting down the congress and removing high court justices, 
among other unconstitutional actions. The OAS convened a same-day meeting of their 
Permanent Council, who called for a meeting of the foreign ministers. The ministers in 
turn condemned Serrano’s autogolpe, dispatched a fact-finding mission to Guatemala, 
and threatened diplomatic and economic sanctions. The combination of OAS pressure 
and domestic opposition resulted in Serrano’s resignation and the peaceful transfer of 
power to a new president, appointed by the Guatemalan congress.40 According to Richard 
Bloomfield, “the stance of the OAS bolstered widespread popular opposition to the coup 
and the threat of economic sanctions probably had a deterrent effect on those who might 
have been tempted to go along with President Serrano’s” self-coup.41  
A 2006 military coup in Thailand resembled in some ways the 2009 Honduran 
crisis discussed above, but the regional response was much different. Like President 
Zelaya, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was a democratically-elected populist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Associated Press 2009. 
38 Farias et al 2009. 
39 Lohaus 2013, 38; OAS 2011. 
40 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, 14-15 
41 Bloomfield 1994, 14. 
	   47 
advancing redistributionist policies. With the support of the conservative middle class, 
some conservative opposition parties, and Thailand’s monarchy, the Royal Thai Army 
deposed Thaksin during his 2006 visit to the United States. Rather than issuing 
statements of concern or attempting to bring about the reinstatement of the ousted leader, 
the Southeast Asian regional organization—ASEAN—quickly offered diplomatic 
recognition to the de facto regime, in line with the norm of non-interference.42 
 
This chapter has thus far attempted to introduce the reader to the ways in which regional 
actors interfere in domestic crises in the name of peace, democracy, and human rights. It 
has also provided some evidence that regional interference varies over time and space. In 
what follows, I will provide further—and more systematic—evidence of this variation by 
tracking regional interference practices and their legalization over time in Africa, Latin 
America, and Southeast Asia.  
 
Cases and Dependent Variable 
Although the Third World is often characterized as a space where Westphalian logics 
continue to carry the day, sovereignty has not remained unchanged in the South, and a 
range of interference practices—from public condemnation to fact-finding missions to 
economic sanctions and peacekeeping missions—have, over time, and especially since 
the second wave of regionalism (see Chapter 1), been increasingly legitimized, 
institutionalized, and put into practice by regional actors as part of state monitoring 
regimes and/or in response to domestic political and military crises. However, just as 
normative orders in the developing world are not static, neither are they monolithic. This 	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is the case despite an important common history of colonization and decolonization. As 
this chapter shows, the norm of non-interference has eroded to a much greater degree in 
Latin America and (especially) Africa than in Southeast Asia.  
 Before I proceed to present evidence of this regional and temporal variation, I will 
first clarify my cases and dependent variable. I compare the status of the norm of non-
interference over time in three regions, which together make up a large portion of the 
global South: Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Since regions are not natural 
units, I use regional intergovernmental organizations to define their boundaries. Latin 
America is defined as those states currently composing the OAS. African Union 
membership defines Africa, as ASEAN membership does Southeast Asia. The one 
exception I make to this rule is that I exclude the United States and Canada from my 
definition of Latin America despite their membership in OAS. In addition to serving as 
proxy for the purposes of defining the cases themselves, these regional organizations are 
also important arenas and actors. That said, this project is interested in regional norms 
more generally, not just organizational norms, and so the practices of other actors—
states, coalitions of states, and sub-regional organizations (e.g. ECOWAS)—are also 
within the scope.  
 Again, my variable of interest is the status of the norm of non-interference. A 
norm is a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”43 It is not 
only a pattern of behavior, then, but a “prescribed pattern of behavior which gives rise to 
normative expectations as to what ought to be done.”44 But how does one ‘measure’ the 
strength or status of an international norm? First, and perhaps obviously, claims about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891. 
44 Hurrell and Macdonald 2013, 69. 
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norm strength make more sense in relative rather than absolute terms. That is, asserting 
that the norm of non-interference is strong or weak only really makes sense if we’re also 
specifying  ‘compared to what?’ Or, ‘compared to where and/or when?’ Second, in order 
to make comparisons across time and/or space and support claims about the relative 
strength and meaning of that norm, it is useful to think about evidence falling into three 
(overlapping) categories relevant to a norm’s status: discourse, law and practice. First, 
how do relevant interpretive communities talk about the norm? Second, what is the legal 
status of the norm and/or practices that violate the norm? Finally, how often and to what 
degree do relevant actors’ practices comply with or violate the norm? Since the norm I 
examine is a prohibition (non-interference), and I argue that it has eroded over time, key 
pieces of evidence in this study include speech, laws and actions that violate the norm or 
promote practices that violate the norm. In this chapter, I analyze law and practices 
systematically, and incorporate speech or discourse as is useful. 
Specifically, I’m interested in the affirmation, legalization, and execution of 
regional interference practices: actions carried out by states and regional organizations—
located in the same region as the target state—that encroach upon domestic political or 
security matters. To qualify as interference, these practices are to some degree intrusive 
and/or critical of and/or materially costly to the target state, seeking to monitor or alter 
state action in some way or affect the outcome of a domestic crisis. I examine activities in 
two categories: regional monitoring regimes, and regional responses to intrastate crisis. 
The former refers to election observation missions and the monitoring activities of 
regional human rights institutions (e.g. the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights). The latter refers to a range of actions (e.g. condemnation, mediation, sanctions, 
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peacekeeping missions) carried out by regional organizations and/or regional states, in 
response to domestic political and military crises, especially unconstitutional changes in 
government, episodes of political violence, and civil conflict.   
 
Table 2.1 Regional Interference Practice Types 
Regional Monitoring Activities Regional Responses to Intra-State Crisis 
 
Election observation  
 
Human rights monitoring  
 
Diplomatic sanctions (condemnation, diplomatic 
non-recognition, membership suspension) 
 
Material sanctions (economic sanctions, military 
sanctions) 
 
Mediation (mediation, conciliation commissions, 
facilitation of negotiations, special envoys) 
 
Rebel support (military assistance to or training of 
rebels, deployment of troops in support of rebels) 
 
Civilian deployment (fact-finding missions, cease-
fire monitoring missions) 
 
Military deployment (military deployment not in 
exclusive and explicit support of the regime in 
power) 
 
 
 My definition and operationalization of interference, then, follows scholars who 
have conceptualized non-interference as a principle of ‘exclusive domestic jurisdiction.’45 
That is, states have exclusive jurisdiction over their domestic affairs, and it is therefore 
inappropriate for outside actors to concern themselves with these affairs. When outside 
actors do inquire about, take positions on, and/or attempt to affect the course of domestic 
events and political processes, this is interference. An important category of exception to 
the prohibition includes interference activities taking place in the explicit support of the 
regime in power (of the target state) against domestic opposition groups. Although these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See, for example, Umozurike 1979. 
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activities have been considered by some to qualify as interference—African states have at 
times decried pro-regime foreign forces on the continent as violators of non-interference 
because they affect the outcome of domestic disputes—more widely accepted 
understandings of non-interference exclude these activities from the prohibition and 
consider it within the rights of a sovereign state to request and receive assistance in this 
way. Violations of non-interference need not be coercive to qualify as interference 
(although regional interference practices have become more coercive over time, as I 
demonstrate below). Interference occurs when outside actors assume jurisdiction over 
domestic affairs in some way. 
The following section examines the norm of non-interference in Latin America, 
Africa and Southeast Asia from the mid-20th century to the present, highlighting key legal 
developments and therefore paying special attention to regional organizations. Next, I 
demonstrate that changes in actual practices have accompanied the legal regimes outlined 
below; that is, regional actors have over time, and especially since the second wave of 
regionalism, increasingly engaged in interference activities—monitoring state practices 
and responding to domestic political and military crises—that challenge state sovereignty 
by assuming partial jurisdiction over domestic concerns. Furthermore, even before the 
second wave of regionalism, variation in the status of non-interference existed across 
space; regionalism was more intrusive in Latin America and Africa than in Southeast 
Asia, even if the differences were less pronounced.  
 
The Rise of Interference: Regional Legal Developments  
Latin America 
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The OAS is the oldest regional organization examined here. The United States and 
twenty Latin American states established it in 1948, culminating decades of pan-
American regionalist activities (see Chapter 3). It currently counts as members all nations 
in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba.46 Although the organization’s founding 
charter47 affirms democracy, human rights, and noninterference as fundamental regional 
norms, the latter largely trumped the others during the 1960s and 1970s. For example, 
unconstitutional changes in government were routinely ignored as they were accepted as 
“part of the standard political repertoire of the region.” 48 In general, these decades were a 
low-point for multilateralism in the region (see Chapter 4). 
Despite this state of affairs, a regional human rights system—governed by OAS 
soft and (eventually) hard law—operated during this period. Unlike the OAU and 
ASEAN, the OAS launched this human rights system at its founding (1948) with the 
adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man49 (predating the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights50 by several months). Although 
not binding, the American Declaration became the source of law for the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, established by the OAS in 1959/1960.51 This was 
followed, ten years later, by the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
a binding legal document.52 This sequence of events sets the Inter-American system apart 
from other regional systems, since its commission was created before a relevant binding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Cuba’s suspension from the OAS was lifted in 2009, but it has not (as of the writing of this dissertation) 
rejoined the organization. 
47 OAS 1948a. 
48 Lutz and Sikkink 2000, 651. 
49 OAS 1948b. 
50 United Nations General Assembly 1948. 
51 The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a resolution approving of the 
creation of a commission in Santiago, Chile in 1959. The OAS Council formally approved the Inter-
American Commission’s statute in 1960.  
52 OAS 1969. 
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convention emerged. When the Convention entered into force in 1978, the Commission 
began to operate on two tiers— using the 1948 American Declaration as its source of law 
vis-à-vis states that had not ratified the Convention and using the Convention as its 
source of law vis-à-vis those states that had ratified it. The entrance into force of the 
Convention also resulted in the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
1979. The Commission has investigatory and state advisory roles and considers petitions 
submitted by individuals, while the Court issues opinions in cases referred to it by the 
Commission or a state party.53 In addition to ratifying the American Convention, a state 
must submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in order for the Court to consider 
cases about that state. Individuals do not bring cases directly to the Court. 
 The legalization of the regional defense of democracy emerged in the 1980s, 
beginning with a 1985 protocol that amended the OAS Charter to establish democracy 
promotion as an “essential purpose” of the organization.54  This was followed by more 
concrete measures, including a 1989 resolution mandating the secretary general to direct 
the development of election monitoring missions.55 According to Craig Arceneaux and 
David Pion-Berlin, “During this time, a consensus was emerging in the OAS that the 
rights of democracy went hand in hand with rights to intervention; the former could not 
flourish without resort to the latter.”56 Regional law adopted in the early 1990s further 
institutionalized these emerging norms by establishing regional procedures for 
responding to unconstitutional changes in government. A 1991 resolution created an 
automatic mechanism by which the OAS secretary general is required to convene the 
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54 OAS 1985, Article 2. 
55 OAS 1989. 
56 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2007, 4. 
	   54 
Permanent Council within ten days of a coup d’état in a member state, investigate the 
event, and “adopt any decisions deemed appropriate.”57 The following year (1992), the 
organization adopted the Washington Protocol, which amended the OAS Charter and 
established a sanctions regime through which a member state experiencing an 
unconstitutional change in government may be suspended from the organization.58 The 
1990s also saw the creation of bodies dedicated to democracy promotion59 and the 
legalization and expansion a regional election-monitoring regime.60 These efforts 
culminated in the adoption in 2001 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter,61 which 
further institutionalized regional responses to unconstitutional changes in government 
including various diplomatic actions and mandatory membership suspension after a set 
period of time. Compared to earlier instruments, the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
provides for a wider range of democracy-promotion tools including preventive diplomacy 
in addition to crisis response.62  
 
Africa 
The Organization of African Unity was formed in 1963 in the midst of decolonization, 
and the language of its founding charter reflects newly independent African states’ 
logical preoccupation with state sovereignty and the elimination of colonialism and 
neocolonialism on the continent.63 The charter also expresses a commitment to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but, unlike the OAS, the OAU did not 	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60 Santa-Cruz 2005, 685. Election monitoring had taken place in an ad hoc manner during the 1960s-1980s. 
61 OAS 2001. 
62 Legler and Tieku 2010, 466. 
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promulgate regional human rights law at this stage. The organization adopted the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981, and this treaty entered into force in 1986, 
providing for the creation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which examines state reports, reviews individual petitions, and produces 
recommendations, among other activities.64  
 The 1990s saw an increase in regional law providing for multilateral interference 
in support of peace, democracy, and human rights. As detailed in Chapter 5, prominent 
African statesmen and former statesmen began frequently making explicit calls in various 
forums in the late 1980s and early 1990s for a regional redefinition of sovereignty and a 
shift away from noninterference on the part of the African community,65 and these calls 
were heeded. Concerning institutionalized responses to internal armed conflict, regional 
and subregional law sets Africa apart from other regions in the global South and global 
North. Based on a 1990 declaration calling for regional solutions to intrastate conflicts,66 
the OAU established in 1993 a new conflict mechanism mandated to address internal 
conflict for the first time.67 Both ECOWAS and the African Union have adopted treaties 
(in 1999 and 2000, respectively) including articles allowing for nonconsensual military 
intervention pursuant to grave circumstances.68 The transformation of the OAU into the 
African Union (completed in 2002) set in motion the spawning of a regional peace and 
security architecture, the most important body of which is the African Union Peace and 
Security Council, which is mandated to carry out a range of interference actions in 
response to political and military crises. 	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Regarding democracy promotion, Thomas Legler and Thomas Kwasi Tieku point 
to the OAU’s endorsement of the 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in 
Development69 as an important discursive shift.70 Beginning in 1997, a series of regional 
decisions and declarations appeared condemning unconstitutional changes in government 
and outlining steps to be taken in response to them. A May 1997 decision of the Council 
of Ministers (‘Harare Decision’) condemned a coup d’état in Sierra Leone and called on 
the international community to refuse diplomatic recognition to the de facto regime.71 A 
July 2000 declaration of the Heads of State and Government (‘Lome Declaration’) 
generalized and expanded the Harare move by outlining anti-coup interference 
mechanisms including OAU membership suspension, nonrecognition of the de facto 
government, fact-finding missions, targeted sanctions, and multilateral mediation 
efforts.72 These mechanisms were most strongly institutionalized in the 2007 African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was partially modeled after the 
2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter. In 1999, Malian President	  Alpha Oumar 
Konaré (then President of the OAU as well) learned of OAS policy of suspending 
governments coming to power unconstitutionally and consulted the exact language of its 
democratic charter to be used in the African version.73 Some have made the case, 
however, that the OAU and AU democracy-promotion regime now goes further than that 
of the OAS because it does not formally require invitation by the targeted country to 
deploy fact-finding missions and election observers.74  
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Finally, in 1998, the OAU adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. It entered into force in 2004, but judges to the Court weren’t appointed until 2006 
and the court didn’t become functional until 2008. The African Court can issue opinions 
under its contentious jurisdiction (in response to applications filed by the African 
Commission, state parties to the Protocol, African intergovernmental organizations, or 
individual citizens of states who have issued a relevant declaration) or its advisory 
jurisdiction (in response to requests for specific legal interpretations made by ratifying 
member states, organs of the African Union, or non-governmental organizations 
recognized by the African Union).75 Sub-regional human rights courts operate in West 
Africa and East Africa as well (see Chapter 6).  
 
Southeast Asia 
Five founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) 
established ASEAN in 1967, and the organization now includes ten member states due to 
the accession of Brunei, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The 1967 
Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s founding document, emphasizes sovereignty-reinforcing 
norms in a way similar to those of the OAS and OAU, but doesn’t mention commitments 
to democracy or human rights.76 The organization’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation further institutionalized noninterference and the principles of what is known 
as the “ASEAN Way,” a set of procedural norms emphasizing informality and consensus 
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as opposed to legalistic, majority vote, confrontational regionalism.77  
The second wave of regionalism did not usher in a move away from non-
interference for the ASEAN community. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was at this time 
that ASEAN states began to more forcefully promote the ASEAN Way, including and 
especially the norm of non-interference, as a viable alternative to Western liberal 
internationalism. We do not find a regional human rights system, democracy promotion 
regime, or conflict management regime emerging in the 1990s in Southeast Asia. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, however, we do see greater intra-ASEAN debate about the 
continued usefulness and appropriateness of the ASEAN Way and non-interference in 
particular as well as some very modest erosion of the norm of non-interference through 
regional legal developments. These developments are not as meaningful as those taking 
place in Latin America and Africa, but they are worthy of investigation (see Chapter 6). 
A 1998 proposal put forward by Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan challenged 
ASEAN’s long-standing rule against the public criticism of a member state’s internal 
affairs. In the first formal and direct challenge to ASEAN’s discursive noninterference, 
Pitsuwan advocated a new policy of “flexible engagement,” which would give ASEAN 
members permission to publicly raise and “collectively discuss” concerns about domestic 
policies if these policies could be shown to have regional implications.78 Flexible 
engagement would not allow for unsolicited comment about domestic policies or 
situations without clear regional implications and would not allow for other kinds of 
interference in domestic affairs. Still, the policy proposal was rejected by ASEAN and, 
instead of “flexible engagement,” the grouping agreed to a watered-down policy of 	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“enhanced interaction” which, according to Alex Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, 
“permitted individual states to comment on their neighbors’ domestic activities if they 
affected regional concerns but reaffirmed the Association’s commitment to non-
interference.”79 
Another initiative surfaced several years later during the drafting of plans for the 
ASEAN Security Community. In 2004, ASEAN committed to the creation of a so-called 
Security Community by 2020 as a way to formalize management of security matters and 
disputes. In the negotiation of the community’s configuration and mandate, the 
Indonesian delegate proposed provisions for an ASEAN peacekeeping force,80 but this 
did not make it into the final Draft Plan adopted at the 2004 ASEAN summit.81 
According to statements made to the press, the other ASEAN members rejected the 
establishment of such a force as an affront to sovereignty.82 
Another policy development relevant to noninterference was the adoption of the 
2007 ASEAN Charter, which espouses a strong commitment to democracy and human 
rights and formally conditions ASEAN membership on adherence to charter standards.83 
While this might qualify as discursive movement away from noninterference, it does not, 
in fact, establish concrete mechanisms of enforcement that would qualify as interference. 
Southeast Asia has not developed a democracy-promotion regime like those in Africa and 
Latin America; the ASEAN Charter does not provide for election monitoring, fact-
finding missions, or an anti-coup sanctions regime. It does provide for a human rights 
body, the Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights established in 2009, but this 	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commission lacks investigative powers,84 setting it apart in an important way from 
African and Latin American human rights institutions. 
Overall, while individual member states have introduced failed or minor 
challenges to ASEAN’s long-running noninterference policy and we see some discursive 
shifts around this norm, the erosion of noninterference at the discursive and policy levels 
in Africa and Latin America has been much more profound. I next examine actual 
practices—acts of interference carried out by states, groups of states, and regional 
organizations—through regional organization monitoring regimes or in response to 
domestic political and military crises.  
First, though, I will the findings of a relevant 2013 study on governance transfer 
from member states to regional organizations. Tanja Börzel, Vera van Hüllen, and Mathis 
Lohaus have examined regional legal instruments in four categories—democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, and good governance—coding several organizations’ bodies of law for 
the degree to which they prescribe precise and detailed standards for member states in 
each category. Although the adoption of law prescribing standards is not the same as 
legalizing the promotion or enforcement of these standards through interference 
practices, it is interesting to note that ASEAN stands out among this group of regional 
organizations (especially compared to the OAS and African Union) for its relative refusal 
to prescribe standards for democracy and human rights.85 
 
The Rise of Interference: Shifts in Practice 
In what follows, I provide qualitative and descriptive quantitative evidence for the rise in 	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two types of regional interference practices: (1) elections and human rights monitoring; 
and (2) domestic crisis management.  
 
Monitoring 
Regional institutions in Africa and Latin America have over time advanced their 
encroachment into member states’ domestic affairs by monitoring of and reporting on 
member states’ human rights situations and elections. The OAS had been monitoring 
elections in an ad-hoc manner since 1962,86 but, before 1989, OAS observation missions 
were rare, small, short term, and not officially mandated by OAS law. The 1989 General 
Assembly resolution mandating the secretary general to direct the development of 
election monitoring missions resulted in a shift in practices, beginning with the 1990 
Nicaraguan election, which was monitored by a joint OAS-United Nations team. Today, 
missions are dispatched systematically and are larger, more sophisticated, and of longer 
duration. In some cases87 OAS observers have produced reports severely critical of an 
electoral process and/or have disputed the outcome.88 Although these missions are 
formally invited, the fact that it has become the norm for states to invite monitors 
arguably indicates that sovereignty has been partially redefined.89 Outside actors are 
assuming jurisdiction over domestic political processes. 
The OAU did not monitor member state elections before the 1990s. Although 
some diplomats involved in the OAU’s dispatch of a small consensual observation 
mission to the 1991 Zambian elections expressed strong reservations about what they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Lohaus 2013, 40. 
87 These cases include: Dominican Republic 1994, Haiti 2000, Peru 2000, and Venezuela 2005. 
88 Lohaus 2013, 41 
89 Santa-Cruz 2005, 684. 
	   62 
understood to be a violation of noninterference, the move set a precedent for routine 
(invited) election monitoring missions on the continent throughout the 1990s.90 Over 
time, the organization shifted away from the “invitation only” policy, and it now 
regularly deploys election monitors without the “express consent” of its member states. 
As Legler and Tieku note, this willingness to get involved in member states’ internal 
affairs without express consent also extends to other interference activities, including 
fact-finding missions and mediation missions.91  
Latin America’s human rights monitoring body, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, has a long history; it has been operating since 1960. The regional body 
tasked with monitoring human rights in Africa, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, began functioning in 1987. This commission began publishing its 
findings under the individual complaints procedure in 1994.92 Although the African 
human rights system by most accounts is considerably weaker than its inter-American 
counterpart, its state monitoring practices have, since the early 1990s, constituted a 
challenge to the noninterference norm.   
ASEAN has only recently (since 2012) begun to coordinate election observers, 
and it is unclear whether this will become a more regular practice. At this point, its 
human rights body does not monitor individual state practices. 
 
Crisis Management 
In this subsection, I analyze patterns of activity in a second category of interference—
regional responses to intrastate crises—over five decades in the three regions (see Tables 	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2.2–2.4 for categories of activity).93 In order to systematically assess patterns, I compare 
regional interference practices over time with reference to regional interference 
opportunities; that is, intrastate disputes rising to a crisis level. To generate my list of 
crisis-level disputes for each decade, I rely on intrastate dispute narratives (“narratives”) 
produced by the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) project (directed 
by Mark Mullenbach).94 These narratives contain information “collected from hundreds 
of different primary and secondary sources” and chronicle domestic-level disputes and 
attempts by external actors to manage these disputes.95 They disaggregate disputes into 
five phases of which preconflict, conflict, and postconflict phases constitute the most 
serious levels of domestic crisis, and so I code disputes in these phases as “crisis-level.” I 
use the same source (the narratives) to code regional responses to these crisis-level 
disputes. Although the DADM is one of many existing data projects interested in 
interference and intervention,96 it is uniquely suited to this inquiry since it offers data on 
intrastate crises not necessarily rising to the level of armed conflict as well as a wide 
range of outsider responses. The DADM narratives do not capture every instance of 
interference, but they are comprehensive enough to provide a good indication of the 
shape of patterns of interference practices over time and space. To analyze trends in the 
rate of regional interference in response to intrastate crisis, I draw on qualitative data 
found in the DADM narratives and secondary sources, as indicated.97
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regional responses to intrastate crises that were not already mentioned in the IDN (i.e., new cases). 
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Response 3 2 5 5 4 
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Figure 2.1: Latin American Crisis Response 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
No response 28 33 37 31 20 
Response 4 9 6 21 21 
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Figure 2.2: African Crisis Response 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
No response 11 13 14 15 14 
Response 3 3 1 0 1 
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Figure 2.3: Southeast Asian Crisis Response 
	   65 
Table 2.3  Types of Regional Crisis Response: Latin America 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Total crisis-level disputes 20 22 18 16 10 
Number of crisis-level disputes eliciting: 
Diplomatic sanctions 3 2 3 4 2 
Material sanctions 1 0 0 2 0 
Rebel support (troops) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Mediation 1 1 2 1 3 
Civilian deployment 1 1 1 3 4 
Military deployment 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 2.4 Types of Regional Crisis Response: Africa 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Total crisis-level disputes 32 42 43 52 41 
Number of crisis-level disputes eliciting: 
Diplomatic sanctions 1 2 0 5 7 
Material sanctions 0 0 0 2 1 
Rebel support (troops) 2 (0) 6 (3) 4 (2) 3(2) 0 (0) 
Mediation 2 4 3 19 18 
Civilian deployment 0 0 0 3 3 
Military deployment 0 1 1 6 4 
 
 
Table 2.5  Types of Regional Crisis Response: Southeast Asia 
 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Total crisis-level disputes 14 16 15 15 15 
Number of crisis-level disputes eliciting: 
Diplomatic sanctions 1 0 0 0 0 
Material sanctions 0 0 0 0 0 
Rebel support (troops) 2 (1) 0 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Mediation 0 0 1 0 1 
Civilian deployment 0 0 0 0 0 
Military deployment 0 0 0 0 1 
 
As Figures 2.1 shows, the number of crisis-level disputes has fallen rather dramatically in 
Latin America since the 1970s, whereas in Africa it steadily increased to a peak in the 
1990s, falling in the 2000s (see Figure 2.2). The crisis level in Southeast Asia remained 
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rather uniform over the decades (and high, relative to the number of countries in the 
region—ten) (see Figure 2.3). The rate of regional response to these crisis-level disputes 
(that is, the percentage of crises eliciting a regional response) increased over time in both 
Latin America and Africa, but actually decreased in Southeast Asia. The increase in Latin 
America was more gradual (beginning in the 1980s) than in Africa, where change 
happened rather abruptly in the 1990s. These trends—together with the trends in regional 
law and monitoring practices outlined above—suggest that the norm of non-interference 
has eroded over time in Latin America and especially Africa, and that the same norm has 
been maintained to a much greater degree in Southeast Asia.  
Tables 2.2 – 2.4 break down regional responses by type, illuminating qualitative 
differences in regional responses to crisis over time and across regions. One pattern to 
note is that regional interference practices in support of rebels took place more often 
during the Cold War period than during the post-Cold War period. These rebel support 
activities were generally carried out unilaterally and without the approval of the relevant 
regional organization. For example, (North) Vietnam actively intervened in support of 
rebels in several Southeast Asian countries during the 1960s and 1970s. These activities 
cannot really be said to reflect regional norms and certainly not ASEAN norms. In 
Africa, we see an increase in interference in the 1970s compared to the 1960s, but much 
of this activity involved clandestine aid to rebels carried out by a state acting alone. Over 
half of these subversive acts were carried out by one state that emerged with an 
interventionist foreign policy beginning in 1969—Libya. Although Libyan President 
Muammar Qaddafi’s relationship with other African leaders was certainly complicated, it 
is telling that following Libya’s military involvement in Chad during the 1970s and 
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1980s, sometimes in support of the government and sometimes in support of the 
opposition, many African states cut off diplomatic ties with Libya.98 Furthermore, no 
regional law lent support to these subversive activities, and they do not constitute 
evidence of a competing norm. The norm of noninterference was arguably principally 
motivated by African states’ desire to prevent this type of subversion or irredentism.  
Regional activities in the 1970s do indicate variation in the strength of non-
interference across regions. This norm is already stronger in Southeast Asia. For 
example, two major unilateral military interventions took place in 1979—Tanzania’s 
intervention in Uganda and Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia—and both resulted in 
the ouster of regimes responsible for the mass murder of civilians, but the regional 
communities in which they took place responded differently to these gross violations of 
non-interference. Uganda’s Idi Amin ruled from 1971 to 1979 and was responsible for 
the killing of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans during his reign. The Tanzania-Uganda 
War of 1979 started as a territorial dispute and escalated into an invasion resulting in the 
installation of a new Ugandan regime. Apart from Libya, no regional states or 
organizations provided Amin material support or came to his defense,99 and, while not 
openly praised, Tanzania’s intervention was met with muted reactions. Some observers 
have suggested that many African leaders were silently relieved that the embarrassing 
despot—who had chaired the OAU in 1975—had now been removed. The OAU summit 
meeting in July 1979 did not condemn the invasion, for example.100  
That same year, Vietnam ousted Cambodian ruler Pol Pot and sent the Khmer 
Rouge into exile, instating a new government. Although the Vietnamese didn’t carry out 	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this intervention in the name of humanitarianism, the Khmer Rouge had engaged in 
genocidal killings resulting in over 1,000,000 deaths during 1975-1979. Despite these 
atrocities, ASEAN’s response to the Vietnamese intervention was a sharp condemnation 
of this violation of the norm of non-interference. For the next decade, ASEAN would be 
preoccupied with its diplomatic campaign—carried out in the name of upholding non-
interference—to remove the Vietnamese-installed ‘puppet regime.’ (See Chapter 6) 
Although a similar intervention did not take place in Latin America in 1979, a 
multilateral response to large-scale human rights violations—including extrajudicial 
killings and systematic torture—did take place in this year. A report on the situation in 
Nicaragua by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights prompted the OAS to 
issue a resolution calling for the “immediate and definitive replacement” of the 
Nicaraguan regime.101 This move was extraordinary for the time period, and I am not 
claiming it to be typical. But, in combination with the human rights and election 
monitoring practices ongoing throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it supports my claim that 
regional variation in the status or strength of non-interference existed before the second 
wave of regionalism.  
In the 1990s and 2000s, regional interference practices in Latin America and 
Africa converged on multilateral peace-, democracy-, and human rights-promoting modes 
of interference, reflecting changes in regional law and occurring in parallel to the rise (or 
expansion) of monitoring regimes. Multilateralism also became more coercive beginning 
in the 1990s, especially in Africa. In this post-Cold War period, we see an increase in 
Latin America and Africa in the imposition of sanctions and the deployment of civilian 
missions (fact-finding and cease-fire monitoring). The former is coercive, and the latter is 	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intrusive, sometimes involving diplomatic pressure to secure access.  
In Africa during this period, we also see a sharp increase in mediation missions 
and military deployments. Importantly, Latin America has retained its norm against 
military intervention. Mediation activities have increased more than any other activity 
type in Africa. This trend constitutes an important challenge to noninterference because 
of the history of states’ aversion to third-party mediation. As Mohammed Omar Maundi 
et al. explain, governments resist mediation because “in one way, it undermines [their] 
authority and in another, legitimizes the insurgency.”102 For example, in 1971, Ethiopian 
emperor Haile Selassie agreed to host negotiations between Sudanese rebels and the 
Sudanese government, but initially he refused to participate in said negotiations in order 
to not be seen as legitimizing the rebels, and so nonstate actors mediated the negotiations. 
According to Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, he may have been motivated by a 
desire to avoid his own secessionists insisting on mediations.103  
Military deployments, like civilian deployments—while usually formally 
consented to by the target state—sometimes involve diplomatic pressure and other forms 
of coercion. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, for example, the 1993 OAU 
peace operation in Burundi was originally rejected by the state and allowed to deploy 
only after extensive negotiations between outside actors and the government.104 The 
Sudanese government opposed the deployment of African Union Mission in Sudan 
peacekeeping forces, and a 2004 UN Security Council resolution threatening sanctions 
against Sudan was necessary to secure consent for African Union Mission in Sudan II.105 
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Finally, some cases included in the DADM data have involved even greater coercion. In 
1998, ECOWAS’s mission to Sierra Leone achieved regime change through force (it 
reinstalled a deposed leader). These activities were simply unthinkable during the 
immediate post-colonization period.  
In Southeast Asia, one instance of regional response to crisis can be found in the 
DADM narratives during the 2000s—a 2004 civilian ceasefire monitoring mission 
(discussed in Chapter 6). In combination with changes taking place in ASEAN at the 
level of regional law outlined above, this suggests that modest erosion of the norm of 
non-interference has taken place in the 2000s. Chapter 6 analyzes this erosion. 
 
Testing a Functionalist Explanation 
If interference practices are simply a function of the level of conflict in a region, then 
there’s little to puzzle about. Above, I measure regional interference activity relative to 
interference opportunities, in order to partially control for interference ‘need.’ To further 
address this alternative argument, I use an index developed by the Center for Systemic 
Peace measuring the ‘magnitude of societal-systemic impact’ of civil and ethnic violence 
and war in a given state in a given year (CIVTOT) to compare the severity of intrastate 
conflict across regions. CIVTOT is a scaled indicator of the destructive impact, or 
magnitude, of the violent episode on the directly affected society or societies on a scale of 
1 (smallest) to 10 (greatest). Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including “state 
capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and 
destruction, population displacement, and episode duration.” I take the mean score for 
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each region for each decade 1960s-2000s, therefore controlling for the number of states 
in a region. Table 2.5 displays the results.  
 
Importantly, civil violence magnitude has been relatively high in the region with the least 
willingness to cede sovereignty—Southeast Asia. 
 
Table 2.5 Civil Violence Magnitude and Impact 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Latin America 0.129 0.511 0.965 0.548 0.243 
Africa 0.440 0.643 0.822 1.030 0.639 
Southeast Asia 2.190 3.011 2.433 1.700 1.000 
ASEAN Five 1.022 2.360 3.160 1.900 1.000 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace ‘Major Episodes of Political Violence’ data set.106 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has established the distinct normative trajectories of the three regions with 
respect to the norm of non-interference. In Latin America, intrusive regionalism 
developed more gradually over time—regional monitoring began in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and a shift towards multilateral conflict resolution and democracy protection got 
underway in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. Latin America has retained its norm 
against the use of military deployments to promote democracy, peace, or human rights. In 
Africa, the introduction of intrusive regionalism took place more abruptly in the 1990s, 
and it has introduced military deployments and other regional mechanisms to respond to 
domestic crises. Even before the second wave of regionalism, non-interference was 
strongest in Southeast Asia, and this contrast became starker from the mid-1980s and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Accessed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. Codebook accessed at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2014.pdf.  
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onward. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we do see some developments in 
law and practice that suggest that there has been modest erosion of non-interference, even 
in Southeast Asia. The following chapters seek to explain these normative trajectories. 
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Chapter 3 
Pan-Movements and the Establishment of Regional Organizations 
This chapter provides an historical overview of the development of regionalism in the 
three cases under study and introduces the regional identity discourses that, I argue, have 
presented an enduring challenge to strict sovereignty norms in Latin America and Africa. 
A (Southeast) Asian version of pan-Americanism—with its strong liberal and legalist 
components—or pan-African transnationalism was not relevant to the founding of 
ASEAN. Instead, the founders of ASEAN shared threat perceptions about communist 
insurgency and a commitment to a developmental-authoritarian state model. These shared 
beliefs and commitments reinforced rather than challenged the norm of non-interference.  
This chapter also considers the role of great power influence and interventionism. 
In Latin America, liberal and legalistic aspects of pan-Americanism predate U.S. 
involvement in regionalism and so can’t be attributed to U.S. influence. Furthermore, 
because the U.S. became a formal participant in hemispheric regionalism, its 
interventionism worked against norms that would dilute sovereignty. In Africa, (former) 
colonial powers opposed radical pan-Africanism, and those states which were most 
concerned about extraregional (neocolonial) intervention were those calling for the 
pooling of African states’ sovereignties to combat this intervention. Finally, although I do 
not find support for a great power influence explanation in the Southeast Asian case, 
great power intervention did contribute indirectly to ASEAN norms. 
 
I. Pan-Americanism & the Formation of the OAS1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Formal regionalism has a longer history in Latin America than in the other two regions, so I devote more 
space to it in this chapter than I do Africa or Southeast Asia. 
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The OAS was established in 1948, but the inter-American system—a set of regional 
institutions and a regional body of law—had existed for decades before this date, first as 
a Latin American project (1820s-1880s) and then as a U.S.-led hemispheric project (from 
1889). Like radical pan-Africanists would later do, early pan-Americanists sought 
political integration—a Spanish-American federation—based on a perceived common 
cultural identity and in order to empower Latin America vis-à-vis Europe and 
(increasingly) the United States. A federation was not achieved, but the development of 
Latin American regional law was an important feature of early pan-Americanism. Later, 
the Latin American states attempted the use their participation in U.S.-led regionalism to 
constrain U.S. hegemony and were, again, partial to legalistic regionalism as a means of 
restricting U.S. interventionism.  
Latin American legal scholarship was primarily concerned with institutionalizing 
sovereignty norms, like non-interference and the maintenance of colonially inherited 
borders. A strong liberal thread ran through this scholarship too, though, and liberal 
values [representative government and (later) human rights] featured consistently in 
diplomatic discourse over the years, even if liberal governance was inconsistently 
practiced by Latin American states. Enlightenment philosophy infused the discourse of 
the independence struggles of the 1820s, and representative government constituted an 
important feature of Latin American identity as distinct from Europe and its monarchies. 
Relatedly, Latin American diplomats subscribed to the idea that representative 
government contributed to inter-state peace.  
At the founding of the OAS (1948), a tension existed between the strong norm of 
non-interference, on the one hand, and norms based on the legalistic and liberal 
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components of the Latin American regional identity, on the other hand. This tension 
manifested in debates about whether the regional community should create intrusive 
institutions to promote democracy and human rights, and also in arguments made by 
diplomats about the appropriate balance between competing regional values. Some 
insisted that democracy promotion and non-interference were not, in fact, incompatible, 
because non-democratic or repressive states were illegitimate and therefore didn’t qualify 
for the right to exclusive domestic jurisdiction.  
The importance and content of pan-Americanism cannot be attributed to the 
influence of the United States, as liberal and legalistic aspects of this identity discourse 
preceded U.S. hegemony in the region. Furthermore, after the United States assumed a 
leadership role in inter-American cooperation, it served as an inconsistent supporter of 
intrusive liberal multilateralism. Finally, the perceived and actual threat of U.S. 
interventionism made Latin American states sensitive to incursions on their sovereignty 
and wary of ceding sovereignty to regional institutions, because the United States was a 
formal participant. This wariness worked against the development of intrusive 
regionalism. 
 
Before hegemony: pan-Hispanism, regional law & liberalism 
Following revolutions in France (1789–1799) and the United States (1765-1783), and as 
Spain was weakened by French occupation during the Napoleonic Wars, the Central and 
South American colonies launched their own struggles for independence in the early 19th 
century. The leaders of these American revolutions—mostly local-born bourgeois men of 
European descent—framed their activities with the same Enlightenment ideas of their 
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French and North American counterparts.2 A pan-Hispanic movement—sometimes 
referred to as the Bolivarian phase of pan-Americanism (1820s-1889) because of the 
leadership of independence leader Simon Bolivar—emerged during the period of these 
Spanish-American independence wars. Bolivar (1783-1830) was a Venezuelan military 
and political leader who contributed to the independence of several former Spanish 
colonies (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and sought to form a 
confederation of Hispanic-American states,3 a project rooted in his desire to put forward a 
united front among the fledgling states against European interventionism.4 
Carlos Stoetzer describes the Bolivarian effort as a “movement for a purely Spanish-
American union, a kind of reconstruction of the old Spanish Empire in America, without 
Spain or the Spanish king, and based on a federal system. This, strictly speaking, is 
rooted in Bolivar’s political vision of the 1820s.”5  
 During this decade of Latin American decolonization and the birth of (Hispanic) 
pan-Americanism (the 1820s), U.S. President James Monroe delivered a message to the 
U.S. Congress in which he declared any future interference by European states in the 
Western Hemisphere to be acts of aggression requiring U.S. intervention to combat them. 
This declaration was later termed the Monroe Doctrine, which came to be synonymous 
with U.S. unilateralism and interventionism in the domestic affairs of its southern 
neighbors, but, at the time (1823), it was neither intended nor received in this way.6 On 
the face of it, Monroe’s message reflected solidarity with Latin America against its 
European oppressors, and Simon Bolivar (and Latin American leaders more generally) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kacowicz 2005, 62. 
3 Shaw 2004. 
4 Kacowicz 2005, 50. 
5 Stoetzer 1993, 1-2. 
6 Mace 1999, 21. 
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initially accepted and even supported the Monroe Doctrine, despite it being declared 
unilaterally, because the United States was not yet a powerful state, let alone a hegemonic 
power. Bolivar expressed gratitude in reaction to the Monroe Doctrine, but he did not 
take the commitment to be a serious one, because the United States did not at the time 
possess the requisite military power to police the region. Furthermore, throughout most of 
the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine was not an important feature of United States 
foreign policy. 7 As discussed below, however, Latin American states would grow 
increasingly wary of the concept of U.S. intervention to combat extra-hemispheric 
intervention—and its implications for their sovereignty—as U.S. economic and military 
power grew (leading up to the turn of the century) and as the Monroe Doctrine became 
more central to this rising power’s foreign policy. 
 In the intervening years before the first U.S.-organized inter-American conference 
(1889), the United States remained fairly isolationist and uninvolved in the pan-American 
movement and absent from pan-American conferences.8 Simon Bolivar convened the 
first such conference in 1826 in Panama, and delegations from Peru, Mexico, Gran 
Colombia (present day Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and Ecuador), and Central 
America (present day Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) 
participated.9 Topics of discussion included the need for cooperation among former 
Spanish colonies and, more specifically, the potential for the development of common 
citizenship and common defense arrangements (a multinational force) to prevent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Crow 1992, 676.  
8 Shaw 2004, 43. 
9 Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay were invited but did not attend. Although Bolivar opposed it, Colombia 
did invite the United States. The latter sent two representatives, but they did not arrive in time for the 
conference. 
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European (especially Spanish) intervention and conquest in the hemisphere.10 Despite the 
failure of a Spanish-American political union, “the idea of a Latin American 
consciousness and identity, of a regional society based on a common history, culture, and 
language, never disappeared.”11 
The newly independent states continued to organize conferences over the next 
several decades and develop a body of regional law.12 Latin America is unique among the 
three regions studied in this dissertation for its early decolonization and subsequent post-
colonial development of a “transnational legal consciousness” among the revolutionary 
elite. This led to the creation of a distinctive body of Latin American regional law as well 
as contributions to global international law.13 Independence from colonial (mostly 
Spanish) rule and the production of law were both elite projects, carried out by the so-
called creoles (like Simon Bolivar and Carlos Calvo, see below), who were South 
American-born but educated in Europe and of European descent. These creole (criollo) 
elite understood regional law as a task that advanced the project of the “completing of 
civilization.”14 Writing on the development of a creole legal consciousness, Liliana 
Obregon explains, “In the nineteenth century, criollo lawyers and intellectuals received 
and articulated international law as part of their nation-building projects and their search 
for recognition and legitimate participation of the new states in the ‘community of 
civilized nations.’”15 Latin American regionalism stands out for its “peculiar legal (or 
legalist) culture.” From independence in the 1820s, these states (later in cooperation with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Snyder 1984, 229. 
11 Kacowicz 2005, 50. 
12 Shaw 2004, 43. 
13 Obregon 2009, 154. 
14 Obregon 2002, 253. 
15 Obregon 2009, 157. 
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the United States) have prioritized legal questions and have progressively constructed a 
“sophisticated and highly developed” regional legal system through the production of 
public and private regional law and through their inter-American institutions. The norm 
of employing legal frameworks instead of the use of force to settle disputes emerged as a 
key component of the discourse of Western hemispheric exceptionalism.16  
Although these treaties went unratified by most of the signatories, and no 
permanent formal institutions were formed, the pan-American diplomatic and legal 
traditions established during this period formed a foundation for future, more formal, 
pan-American institutions. State sovereignty issues—like international recognition, non-
interference, and the sanctity of colonially inherited borders—were of primary concern 
for early Latin American jurists.17  In fact, the global legal norm of uti possidetis juris—
the recognition of colonial boundaries that became standard practice in the post-colonial 
world during the twentieth century—is attributed to the norm entrepreneurship of Latin 
American legal scholars in the nineteenth century.18  Other core principles developed 
during this stage included territorial integrity, arbitration, solidarity, and renunciation of 
war.19 The Calvo Doctrine, another well-known nineteenth-century Latin American legal 
doctrine—advanced by Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo in his International Law of Europe 
and America in Theory and Practice (1868)—declares an alien to be subject to the same 
local laws as a citizen and prohibits the application of diplomatic protections and 
interference—including military intervention—by the alien’s home state in the event of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Kacowicz 2005, 46-47. 
17 Obregon 2009,159. 
18 Dominguez 2007, 90. 
19 Shaw 2004, 44. 
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dispute. The Calvo Doctrine set an important regional legal precedent about 
nonintervention and sovereign equality.20 
Although the regional legal tradition in Latin America is strongly associated with 
sovereignty norms in international relations, with a closer look we can observe “a strong, 
long-lasting, and under-studied tradition of formal support for democracy and human 
rights in the region.”21 For example, in his discussion of a distinct Latin American 
tradition of the idea of human rights, Paolo Carozza describes founding father Simon 
Bolivar—a man “who most clearly embodies the political consciousness of the time”—as 
a devotee of Enlightenment thinkers and especially the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
who inspired his philosophical commitments to constitutionally recognized individual 
liberty, equality, and material security.22 Bolivar’s expressions of Latin American 
exceptionalism contrast its republicanism to Europe’s monarchism.23 Despite the history 
of illiberalism in practice in Latin America, “the consistency with which political leaders, 
elites and public opinion in general have adhered to these principles, such as 
republicanism and the rule of law, represents in itself an important political and social 
fact.”24 On the individual state level, Latin American countries were, for example, early 
abolishers of the death penalty, beginning in the 1860s (decades ahead of any European 
state).25  
As Kathryn Sikkink explains, “Like the United States and France, Spanish 
America was a laboratory for early experiences in democratic rule, and was the first to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Herz 2011, 8. 
21 Kacowicz 2005, 62. 
22 Carozza 2003, 301. 
23 Snyder 1984, 229. 
24 Kacowicz 2005, 62. 
25 Linde 2013, 6. 
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experiment with universal male suffrage. But countries in the region suffered more 
frequent interruptions of these democratic experiments, and thus began to think early 
about how international pressures might enhance democracies in neighboring states.”26 
Early examples of democracy and human rights promotion in pan-American legal 
scholarship and activism includes Chilean Pedro Felix Vicufia’s 1837 pamphlet 
proposing a “Great American Congress” that would work for democracy in the region 
and support popular revolution against dictatorship. “The regional organization would 
intervene on the side of constitutional governments, thus combining physical power with 
moral force.”27 A supporter of Vicufia’s plan and principal designer of Argentina’s 1853 
constitution, Juan Bautista Alberdi further proposed the establishment of an American 
Court empowered to intervene in states to enforce its rulings. “Alberdi believed in 
national sovereignty and nonintervention, but he argued that ultimate sovereignty and 
rights of collective intervention resided with the international community to protect 
humanity and oppose tyranny.”28 These proposals were not enacted, but they constitute 
evidence of the historical importance of debates about the proper balance between non-
interference and liberal values, debates that took place even before the United States 
became involved in pan-Americanism. 
 
Rising U.S. power, U.S.-led regionalism, and growing tensions  
An important shift took place in the 1880s: the United States emerged as the regional 
hegemon and assumed leadership over pan-Americanism, initiating the period (1890-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Sikkink 2014, 392. 
27 Atkins 1989, 228. 
28 Atkins 1989, 228.  
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1933) that would be the “heyday of overt U.S. intervention in Latin America.” 29 As the 
power of the United States on the world stage grew in the late 1800s, and it emerged from 
its civil war (1861-1865), the Monroe Doctrine (1823)—which considered any extra-
hemispheric interference in the affairs of independent Latin American states a threat to 
the United States—became central to U.S. foreign policy.  While Europe was 
‘scrambling’ for control of territory in Africa and Asia, the United States—fueled by the 
Second Industrial Revolution—grew attracted to its southern neighbors’ resources and 
markets.30 Secretary of State James Blaine, who served as secretary of state under 
President Garfield (in 1881) and again in the Harrison administration (1889-1892), was 
instrumental in moving the United States out of its isolationist orientation and towards 
greater international trade and influence on the world stage, especially in the Pacific and 
in Latin America, and his expansionist inclinations resulted in the U.S. annexation of 
Pacific colonies and dominance of the Caribbean. Blaine harbored suspicions of the 
United Kingdom’s and other European powers’ designs on Latin America and believed in 
United States leadership in the Americas. He led the early initiatives for this leadership, 
and his agenda constituted “nothing less that a fundamental reorientation of American 
foreign policy. The United States was now to assume the moral and political stewardship 
of the entire Western Hemisphere.”31 According the Blaine, the Latin American states—
the “younger sisters of this government”—ought to be sheltered by their “strong and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Mares 1997, 205. 
30 Snyder 1984, 231. 
31 Peskin 1979, 82. 
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disinterested” big brother.32 Blaine’s policies, including U.S. leadership of pan-American 
conferences, was a key step toward developing a U.S. sphere of influence in the region.33 
Within a decade of his first attempts to garner support for it within the United 
States, Blaine was able in 1889 to organize the first in a new series of pan-American 
conferences: the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington, 
D.C. The main topic of the 1889 conference was intra-regional trade, as the United States 
interpreted Latin Americans’ reliance on European trading partners as evidence of the 
“resurgent imperialism” of Europe.34 The United States largely controlled agenda-setting 
at this and subsequent conferences, maintaining the focus on economic issues (e.g. 
transportation, communication, finance, commerce, industry, trademarks35) and worked 
to move discussion away from political issues (e.g. sovereign equality and territorial 
integrity) and security (for which it had “already assumed responsibility” for the 
hemisphere).36  
A tension developed between Latin American and U.S. delegations, since Latin 
American states wanted to use pan-Americanism to constrain U.S. power and therefore 
sought to expand conference agendas to discuss political and security matters, especially 
sovereignty issues. Two of the key political and security issues that Latin American states 
attempted to get onto the pan-American agenda, against the interests of the United States, 
were the prohibition of debt collection by force and the peaceful settlement of disputes.37 
Growing U.S. interventionism in the Pacific and Caribbean, including its annexation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Blaine to L.P. Morton, September 5, 1881, in U.S Department of State, Papers Related to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States: 1881 (Washington, 1882), 426-427, quoted in Peskin 1979, 82. 
33 1919 is the “generally recognized date for the inception of U.S. hegemony” (Mares 1997, 202). 
34Scheman 2007, 14. 
35 Snyder 1984, 232. 
36 Shaw 2004, 46. 
37 Mares 1997, 205. 
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Puerto Rico and the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba (both in 1898) heightened 
Latin American concerns and exacerbated this tension. As Louis Snyder describes it, 
“Washington saw its version of pan-Americanism as altruistic, while Latin Americans 
regarded it as North American domination…Pan-Americanism versus pan-Hispanic 
Americanism continued to be an awkward theme at the series of conferences.”38 A treaty 
between the United States and United Kingdom in 1901 provided for the creation of the 
Panama Canal and for sole U.S. control of the canal, further cementing the U.S. 
domination and sphere of influence in the region.  
Three years later, President Theodore Roosevelt announced the Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his 1904 State of the Union Address. This followed 
the 1902-1903 crisis in Venezuela, which highlighted a new threat to the hemisphere, 
from Roosevelt’s perspective: the threat of European powers’ intervening in Latin 
America to recover debts. Latin American countries had, in recent years, been 
accumulating major European debt. The Venezuelan crisis involved a dispute between 
Venezuela on the one hand, and Britain, Germany and Italy on the other. The European 
powers imposed a naval blockade against Venezuela in an effort to recover debts.39 This 
led President Theodore Roosevelt to modify the Monroe Doctrine with his Corollary, 
stating: “Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in American as elsewhere, ultimately require 
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of 
the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however 
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Snyder 1984, 233. 
39 Ricard 2006. 
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international police power.”40 The Corollary would soon be used to justify U.S. 
intervention in response to instability in Latin American countries, and in practice had 
less to do with protecting the hemisphere from Europe than with justifying U.S. 
interventionism generally. With his new interpretation of the doctrine, Roosevelt 
“transformed the Monroe Doctrine from one of nonintervention by European powers to 
one of intervention by the United States.”41 Following this, the United States proceeded 
to intervene in Panama and a number of countries in the Caribbean.42 As an indication of 
the scope of United States interference in the region during the first few decades of the 
20th century, consider a 1924 survey finding that fourteen out of twenty Latin American 
states were experiencing interference from the hegemon “in the form of official direction 
of financial policy or the presence of armed forces.”43 Latin Americans grew more and 
more uneasy with the United States, but institution building continued in the form of 
formal bodies to carry out conference declarations. As Caroline Shaw explains, “To many 
Latin American governments…the value of this new Pan Americanism found in the Inter-
American System was too high to be abandoned because of U.S. dominance.”44 
Despite Latin Americans’ concerns about sovereignty violations, diplomats 
continued to make proposals during this period for regional mechanisms to promote 
democracy and individual rights. In 1907, Ecuadoran diplomat Carlos Tobar proposed 
collective diplomatic non-recognition of governments coming to power through non-
democratic means.45 Although it did not catch on at the time, the Tobar Doctrine would 
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be restated decades later as the Betancourt Doctrine (see Chapter 3) and the non-
recognition norm was institutionalized in the OAS in the early 1990s. One proposal that 
did succeed (for a decade) was in the Central American region was the Central American 
Court of Justice, established in 1907. Very much ahead of its time, the Central American 
Court— purposed with maintaining peace and resolving disagreements among Central 
American states—was the first international tribunal to give individuals standing before 
it. It operated in San Jose, Costa Rica for ten years (1908-1918).46 And, although the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man wouldn’t be adopted until after 
World War II, many treaties relevant to individual rights were passed before this.47 
 
The interwar years: Latin America pushes back 
During the interwar years, Latin American states began to offer more forceful resistance 
to this dominance.48 At the Fifth International Conference of American States (Santiago, 
Chile) in 1923, the pan-Hispanists proposed the creation of an all-American League of 
Nations with a “multilateral Monroe Doctrine” to replace the existing unilateral version, 
but the United States vetoed it, and Latin American delegates denounced it for this. At 
this conference, these states were more successful at putting forth “political” issues for 
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discussion.49 This forcefulness continued at the following conference in 1928, where 
open hostility toward the United States was apparent; unprecedented displays of 
disapproval occurred here: “Crowds in the galleries, roaring approval of critical remarks, 
hissed pro-American speakers.”50 The most important bone of contention was the United 
States’ refusal to adopt resolutions establishing sovereignty norms like non-interference 
and the sovereign equality of states.51 
Again, despite U.S. interventionism and Latin Americans’ interest in 
institutionalizing sovereignty norms, liberal values continued to form part of the language 
of pan-Americanism. During the inter-war period, international human rights promotion 
began to “enter the international scholarly discourse.”52 Already in 1928, Orestes Ferrara 
y Marino, a member of the Cuban delegation to the Sixth International Conference of 
American States (Havana, Cuba), articulated a critique of strict sovereignty norms, 
warning that ‘[i]f we declare in absolute terms that intervention is under no circumstances 
possible, we will be sanctioning all the inhuman acts committed within determined 
frontiers ....’”53 
 
The Good Neighbor policy  
Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933 Good Neighbor Policy (which emphasized nonintervention 
and self-determination) responded to Latin Americans’ increasingly vocalized concerns 
about sovereignty and helped to reestablish productive relationships.54 As a result, at the 
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Seventh International Conference of American States (1933) in Montevideo (Uruguay), 
American states adopted the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, laying out 
“juridical equality of states, nonintervention, peaceful settlement, nonrecognition of 
territorial conquest, and subjection of foreigners to local legal jurisdiction.”55 As noted in 
Chapter 1, this conference marked a crucial turning point: “the dissolution of the standard 
of civilization, replaced by a formal definition of statehood and doctrine of 
recognition.”56 
Progress in the development of democracy and human rights norms also took 
place in the 1930s. At this same Seventh International Conference (1933), delegates 
worked on designing the right to political asylum, which Victor Rodriguez Rescia and 
Marc David Seitles refer to as an “extremely peculiar institution of our inter-American 
system.”57 In 1936, the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and 
Cooperation identified “the existence of a common democracy” as foundational to the 
“political defense” of the Americas.58 During this later half of the decade, “antidictatorial 
elements” became “disillusioned with the practice of opposing European dictators and 
tolerating Latin American ones” and made proposals “subordinate the principle of 
nonintervention to the ideal of democracy.” These did not, however, gain majority 
support.59 
 
The formation of the OAS: institutionalizing normative tensions 
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After the end of World War II and subsequent developments in the international system 
that came along with it, pan-Americanism underwent a “substantial facelift” and the 
inter-American regional project became more “ambitious.”60 In the 1940s, human rights 
and democracy-promotion became an even more important part of the regional order. 
The language of some Latin American diplomats from this period indicates that 
they did not see necessarily a contradiction between non-interference and democracy and 
human rights promotion, and some even advocated that the concept of non-interference 
needed to be ‘harmonized’ with other legal principles so that non-interference did not 
become a shield for crimes committed by repressive states. This was not a total 
consensus, and debates surrounded the balance between non-interference and these 
liberal values. Reluctance to circumscribe non-interference was in large part motivated by 
a fear of United States interventionism, which was by no means an insignificant threat. 
One instance of debate was a 1945 Uruguayan proposal advocating the use of 
regional collective intervention to oppose dictators and promote democracy and human 
rights. Arguing that “[N]on-intervention cannot be converted into a right to invoke one 
principle in order to violate all other principles with immunity,” Uruguayan foreign 
minister Eduardo Rodriguez Larreta advocated multilateral collective action in the 
defense of democracy. The United States and five other Latin American states endorsed 
Larreta’s proposal, but it did not win majority support.  
The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance affirmed democracy 
and human rights, on the one hand, and non-interference on the other hand, stating that 
“the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics is 
essentially related to their democratic ideals and to their will to cooperate” and that 	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“peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international 
recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being 
of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of 
justice and security.”61 
Both non-intervention and human rights/democracy featured prominently in the 
Charter of the Organization of American States (1948) coming out of the Ninth 
International Conference of American States (Bogota, Colombia). This explicit 
recognition of human rights and democracy as primary regional norms distinguishes the 
OAS Charter from the founding documents of ASEAN and the OAU (the latter 
references the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but does not mention democracy). 
The preamble of the OAS Charter states that “the true significance of American solidarity 
and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the 
framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice 
based on respect for the essential rights of man.” In the section outlining ‘principles’ the 
Charter recognizes that “The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which 
are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the 
effective exercise of representative democracy.” Article 13 asserts that “Each State has 
the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this 
free development, the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of 
universal morality.”62  
The 1948 International Conference of American States also produced the 
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international document enumerating a comprehensive list of human rights. As Sikkink 
argues, the language of the draft declaration prepared by the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee provides insights into “how some Latin American jurists were thinking about 
the relationship between sovereignty and human rights” at this stage: 
In view of the widespread denial of these political rights by totalitarian governments in 
recent years it may be well to reinstate the basic theory underlying them. The state is not 
an end in itself, it is only a means to an end; it is not in itself a source of rights but the 
means by which the inherent rights of the individual person may be made practically 
effective. . . . Not only, therefore, are particular governments bound to respect the 
fundamental rights of man, but the state itself is without authority to override them.63 
 
Importantly, the United States did not take the lead on the American Declaration. 
Latin American states were in fact bigger proponents of the international formulation and 
enforcement of rights than was the United States at the time, as evidenced by the fact that 
these smaller, less powerful countries played a key role in getting human rights language 
institutionalized at the global level through the United Nations Charter, a move initially 
opposed by the United States.64  
 
II. Pan-Africanism & the Formation of the OAU 
 Pan-African transnationalism is an identity discourse rooted in the African diaspora that 
presents a challenge to Westphalian sovereignty, because it invokes solidarities among 
peoples rather than states and incorporates the language of universal human rights. In the 
decades leading up to independence, an active pan-African movement constructed and 
promoted this transnationalism. As stated earlier, we might think of pan-African 
transnationalism as situated between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism; Africans 	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are to identify with (and are responsible for) other Africans, even if they are 
geographically very distant and are not formally citizens of the same state.  A central pan-
Africanist project for decades—the campaign against apartheid—originated before the 
formation of the OAU and, as I argue in Chapter 5, contributed in key ways to the erosion 
over time of the norm of non-interference. 
The OAU was established in 1963, immediately following the rapid 
decolonization of most of the continent and culminating a decades-old pan-Africanist 
movement. Its members were very young states. The OAU itself was a compromise 
institution, a merger between a ‘conservative’ bloc (made up of leaders favoring closer 
ties with former colonial powers, especially France, and strict sovereignty norms among 
African states) and a smaller ‘radical’ bloc (those favoring greater independence from 
colonial powers and political integration among African states). The radical pan-
Africanists were intent on combating neocolonialism and Africa’s marginalization. 
Continental unity was, for them, the solution to both problems; it would empower Africa 
vis-à-vis extraregional actors and within the international system. Ceding sovereignty to 
Africa would bolster African sovereignty against extraregional interference and 
domination. The conservative states shared the radical bloc’s concern about 
marginalization, but their preferred strategy was to maintain relationships with—and 
therefore economic support from—Europe. And they were wary of ceding their newly 
won sovereignty to other African states or reconsidering inherited boundaries.  
Delegates present at the 1963 founding summit drew on pan-Africanist discourse 
in asserting their visions for African unity—whether they be minimalist and sovereignty-
reinforcing (at least for the short term), or maximalist and sovereignty-diminishing. I 
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argue that these founding debates and discourses reflect contestation of sovereignty 
norms in Africa, contestation that would endure over time (see Chapter 5). Specifically, 
Westphalian sovereignty was challenged by pan-African transnationalism, and these 
competing ideas and identities were not resolved in 1963. 
The African case does not support a great power influence or interventionism 
explanation, because those states with the closest ties to Western powers were the least 
supportive of radical pan-Africanism, and the radical campaigners framed their call for 
African states to cede sovereignty to the continental community in part as a strategy for 
managing external interference (neocolonialism) and reducing Africa’s marginalization in 
the international sphere.  
 
Diasporan pan-Africanism: the root of transnational solidarities 
Pan-Africanism was both a practical movement for African unity, self-determination and 
other rights, originating in the African diaspora, as well as an identity discourse that 
would remain politically salient in continental politics during the post-colonial period. 
The movement predates decolonization (1950s-1970s) and the establishment of the OAU 
(1963). Frustrated in their struggles for racial equality in the New World, and therefore 
turning attention to the cause of voluntary repatriation to African soil, the ‘Back to 
Africa’ movement first appeared in the U.S., Brazil, and the Caribbean in the early 19th 
century. These initiatives laid some of the intellectual and networking foundation for 
what would become the pan-Africanist movement—a response to the transatlantic slave 
trade and related systems of exploitation.65 
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As notable pan-Africanist W.E.B. Du Bois explained, such movements originated 
outside of the African continent because “Africans in the Diaspora tend to look to Africa 
as one united continent, one unity, mainly because they cannot trace their particular 
roots.”66 A leading black activist and public intellectual in the United States, Du Bois 
(1868-1963) co-founded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) in 1909 and served as a primary organizer of a prominent series of 
international pan-African ‘congresses’ beginning in the interwar years (during the 
diasporan phase of the movement). In the 1950s, he was the target of anti-communist 
persecution in the United States and subsequently moved to Accra, Ghana (in 1961) 
where he been invited by Ghana’s first president—Kwame Nkrumah—to develop an 
encyclopedia on the African diaspora—Encyclopedia Africana. Du Bois died in Ghana in 
1963, a few months after the establishment of the OAU and a year ahead of the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act in the United States. 
The inaugural meeting in Du Bois’ series—the First Pan-African Congress—took 
place in Paris 1919, was attended by 60 delegates (few of them Africans of the 
continent), and was funded, in part, by the NAACP. It purposely ran parallel to the Paris 
Peace Talks held by the Allied victors of World War I.67 More Pan-African Congresses 
followed in 1921, 1923, and 1927, each better attended than the last. These meetings 
produced various declarations and manifestos demanding political and economic rights 
for peoples of the African continent and their descendants abroad. The Fifth Pan-African 
Congress (discussed below) didn’t take place until after World War II.  
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Another prominent (Jamaican) pan-Africanist active during the interwar years, 
Marcus Garvey, was the first to promote the idea of a ‘United States of Africa’: “a nation 
of our own, strong enough to lend protection to the members of the race scattered all over 
the world, and to compel the respect of the nations and the races of the Earth.”68 He 
campaigned both inside and outside Africa in the 1920s, and in response to Garvey's 
‘radical’ activities on the continent, the colonial powers sought to further empower 
Africans who advocated closer relationships with colonial powers over closer 
relationships to other African states. One such figure, Senegalese politician (and first 
black African elected to the French Chamber of Deputies) Blaise Diagne, articulated this 
position by saying that "none of us aspires to see French Africa delivered exclusively to 
the Africans..."69 This rejection of radical pan-Africanism by some African leaders during 
the final decades of colonial rule foretold divisions that would hinder a united pan-
Africanist project among newly independent states in the 1950s and 1960s. According to 
historian Adekunle Ajala, it is nevertheless “indisputable that Garvey's idea of a united 
Africa has become the cardinal point of Pan-Africanism."70 
 
Continental pan-Africanism: the road to the OAU 
Although Garvey’s attempts to organize the continent in the 1920s were frustrated by the 
colonial powers, his vision for a United States of Africa remained influential within the 
movement and was taken up by Ghanaian independence leader and that country’s first 
president, Kwame Nkrumah. While the visibility of the pan-Africanist movement had 
waned in the 1930s as fascism, communism and World War II dominated international 	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politics,71 it regained international prominence in the post-war period and took on new 
emphases. During the inter-war period, African nationalist organizing had emerged, 
especially in British West Africa.72 Nationalist campaigns at first sought greater African 
participation in government and then developed into independence movements.73 The 
Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945 (held in Manchester) was the first of the Congresses 
to be attended by many key African (as opposed to diasporan) leaders. The most 
important of these was Nkrumah, who was educated in the United States in the 1930s and 
1940s and arrived in London after the war to organize with pan-Africanists through the 
pan-African Congress and the West African Students’ Union. He returned to Ghana in 
1947 where he became a political activist and independence leader, serving as prime 
minister of the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) while it was still under British rule, and 
becoming independent Ghana’s first head of state in 1958. He strongly identified with 
African socialism and hoped to see it replace colonialism across Africa. 
Nkrumah identified 1945 as the year pan-Africanism became a “mass movement 
of Africa for the Africans”74 and transitioned away from expressions of “Black 
nationalism” to expressions of “African nationalism.” Indeed, the Manchester Congress 
launched the liberation stage of the movement; as the Cold War got underway and the 
struggle for independence began to see successes, the movement began to separate from 
its diasporan heritage.75 Importantly for my argument, though, the meaning and 
implications of this emerging African nationalism was the subject of explicit debate 
among African independence leaders (most of whom would shortly become heads of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Uzoigwe 2014, 190. 
72 Snyder 1984, 196. 
73 Snyder 1984, 183. 
74 Quoted in Jeng 2012, 140. 
75 Jeng 2012, 140. 
	   97 
state). We might distinguish among three versions of African nationalism advocated by 
these leaders (implying different political arrangements): radical or continental 
nationalism (i.e. the United States of Africa idea); sub-regional nationalism (e.g. the 
proposed East African Federation); and functionalist or statist nationalism (i.e. a system 
of sovereign states working towards greater cooperation).76  
Ghana’s Nkrumah emerged as the most vocal advocate of the radical position, 
calling for immediate political union. He and his allies tended to embrace African 
socialism and were also the most vociferous opponents of neocolonialism. They 
advocated greater African unity in part as a way to encourage the severing of ties 
between individual African states and former colonial powers. Future Tanzanian 
President Julius Nyerere promoted sub-regional nationalism as a more practical 
intermediate step (although he would later assume a more radical stance, calling for more 
immediate continental union, as discussed in Chapter 5). Functionalists tended to be 
leaders of more ‘conservative’ (especially Francophone) states, generally more inclined 
to stronger ties with extra-regional powers and tending towards capitalist economic 
orientations.77  
By the end of the 1950s, a handful of African countries had achieved 
independence (starting with Ghana). The years 1960-1963 saw a cascade of 
decolonization resulting in twenty-five new states. Beginning in the 1950s, President 
Nkrumah campaigned for the United States of Africa project through activities at both the 
sub-regional and continental levels. Initially he pursued West African political unity (as a 
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stepping stone to continental unity) through the short-lived Ghana-Guinea Union of 1958. 
Mali joined the grouping in 1961, but it fell apart within a year.78  
Nkrumah was also a principal organizer of a series of All-African People’s 
Conferences that convened African political parties and trade unions. The resolutions 
produced by these conferences included strong endorsements of the United States of 
Africa idea.79 And, like the Pan-African Congresses organized by Du Bois, the All-
African People’s Conference of 1958 placed “great emphasis on the ‘rights of man’ and 
particularly the right of Africans to have the same opportunities for social and political 
development as the white race.”80 The relevance of transnational solidarities—not just 
inter-state solidarities—is evidenced by the content of these meetings, which became 
progressively radical over time. An All-African People’s Congress Secretariat was 
established in Accra as well as an African Bureau—historian G.N. Uzoigwe refers to 
these together as a “propaganda base for disseminating Pan-African ideas both 
continentally and internationally.”81  
The first All-African Peoples Conference aimed to, among other things, “mobilize 
world opinion against the denial of political rights and fundamental human rights to 
Africans,” and was the first international convention to propose international sanctions 
against South Africa.82 The second Peoples Conference, convened in1960, placed special 
emphasis on the evils of neocolonialism and the threat of ‘balkanization’ created by 
foreign interference and advocated that the “African Personality” be prominent on the 
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international stage.83 The Third All-African People’s Congress (March 1961) produced a 
four-page resolution on neo-colonialism, “a name that was perhaps first given collective 
recognition here.”84  
According to Nkrumah’s vision for Africa’s future, the balkanization of the 
continent could best be avoided, and African socio-economic development achieved, 
though a politically united continent. He and like-minded African leaders85 faced fierce 
opposition, though, from more conservative states that pushed back against supranational 
arrangements that would limit their newly won sovereignty. For example, at a 1959 press 
conference a Nigerian leader stated that “if for many years certain parties have fought for 
their sovereignty, it is unlikely that they will surrender that sovereignty to a nebulous 
organization simply because we feel it necessary to work together.”86 Divisions led to the 
formation of blocs that assembled separately and generated separate organizational 
documents. Ghana and allies formed a group more supportive of the immediate political 
unity of the continent, whereas the more conservative blocs advocated respect for the 
sovereignty of newly independent states and a gradualist approach to African unity.  
This organizing and counter-organizing culminated in a 1963 summit where the 
OAU was founded. The OAU Charter produced through deliberations here did not 
establish a United States of Africa. The OAU might be described as a compromise 
institution, in that it did contain some supranational elements (e.g. a general secretariat). 
The Charter also pledged adherence of its member states to the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a document that it affirmed would “provide a solid 
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foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States.”87 In so doing, the 
OAU’s founding document enshrined liberal values that would later be promoted through 
its regional human rights system and through intrusive regionalism in the 1990s. On the 
whole, though, the Charter emphasized sovereignty norms. Of the seven core principles 
enumerated here, three concern sovereignty explicitly [sovereign equality (Principle 1); 
non-interference (Principle II); territorial integrity (Principle III)] and a fourth condemns 
‘subversive activities on the part of neighboring states” (Principle V).88  
While this outcome might lead us to conclude that Westphalian sovereignty won 
the day and that the question was laid to rest, an examination of the actual content of 
1963 summit speeches suggests otherwise; the question was, in a way, left open. The 
central theme of the summit was the shared goal of “African unity,” and attendees’ 
speeches revealed divergent positions on the meaning of this goal (for the short term). 
This is not surprising given the salience of these debates in African politics in the years 
leading up to the summit, as outlined above. What is surprising, perhaps, is the fact that 
so many of these speakers—even those statesmen rejecting Nkrumah’s vision for 
political unity—paid lip service to political unity of the continent as a long-term goal that 
should be realized after a period of transition.  
Nkrumah distributed his manifesto, “Africa Must Unite,” as the common position 
of the radical group to the 1963 summit. He offered this detailed vision of the United 
States of Africa it as a strategy to counter the “divide and rule” tactics of the European 
powers (especially France). In his address to the assembly, he predictably insisted on the 
urgency of political unity, arguing that “African Unity is, above all, a political kingdom 	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which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of 
Africa will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way around. The United 
States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were the political decisions of 
revolutionary peoples before they became mighty realities of social power and material 
wealth.” He made this case with reference to transnational solidarities and the popular 
sovereignty of the people of Africa, asserting that “if we fail and let this grand and 
historic opportunity slip by then we should give way to greater dissension and division 
among us for which the people of Africa will never forgive us. And the popular and 
progressive forces and movements within Africa will condemn us. I am sure therefore 
that we should not fail them.” Nkrumah also advanced the idea that political unity would 
be necessary to address the threat posed by neocolonialism: “Unless we establish African 
Unity now, we who are sitting here today shall tomorrow be the victims and martyrs of 
neo-colonialism.” 89 
Nkrumah’s calls were not heeded, but his contemporaries did assent to his vision 
as a long-term goal. For his part, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie emphasized the 
necessity of a period of transition: “The union which we seek can only come gradually, 
as the day to day progress which we achieve carries us slowly but inexorably along this 
course. We have before us the examples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R…[W]e recognize 
circumstances for what they are, temporary expedients designed to serve only until we 
have established the conditions which will bring African unity within our reach.”90 This 
sentiment was echoed by similarly-minded states, like Senegalese President Leopold 
Senghor who argued for caution and called for African states to “move forward step by 	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step and stage by stage,” expressing his “fear that we should be heading rapidly for 
disaster if we tried to construct a federation or a even a confederation with its own 
parliament and military command at the first attempt.” In closing, he called on the states 
to accept “some sacrifices,” namely, “By accepting and applying in practice the general 
principles which are the strength of all international institutions: the equality of Member 
States, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, no resorting to violence to settle 
differences, and effective solidarity between all the African States.”91 Cameroon’s 
President Ahmadou Ahidjo similarly argued that “any rigid form of institution would be 
premature at this stage. And so, for the moment, let us have neither Federation or 
Confederation.”92 This language leaves questions about strict sovereignty and exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction open in the long run.93 
 
III. Anti-Communism and the Formation of ASEAN  
ASEAN was established in 1967 by a group of five94 non-communist states, most of 
which had gained independence a decade or more earlier. These states were older than 
the OAU’s founding members but younger than those of the OAS. And, although they 
had experimented with democracy at independence, they were no longer democratic by 
1967. Pan-Asianism was not relevant to ASEAN’s establishment—it had been 	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delegitimized by Japanese imperialism in the 1930s and 1940s; Japan used the language 
of pan-Asianism to frame its territorial conquests as part of a movement for solidarity 
among Asian peoples against the West. As ASEAN’s formation was distant from 
decolonization and the human rights and democracy rhetoric that framed it, these liberal 
discourses were also less salient here than in Africa or Latin America. The ideological 
glue holding ASEAN together from the beginning was a shared commitment to anti-
communism and a developmental-authoritarian state model. Like African and Latin 
American states, internal conflict was the primary threat to state power, but unlike these 
other regions, ASEAN states shared a particular threat perception: communist 
insurgencies supported by a local rising power (China). This common threat was more 
specific than the general problem of insurgency, and this bound the original ASEAN 
members together with a common cause. The original ASEAN members articulated the 
belief that rapid economic development led by strong states would undermine 
communism’s appeal, and that a strong non-interference norm—and bilaterally 
coordinated counter-insurgency efforts—would allow each state to focus on economic 
development without the distraction of inter-state tensions and conflict. Theirs was not a 
liberal or transnational pan-Asian solidarity but a state-centric anti-communist solidarity. 
I argue that the foundational discourses of ASEAN reinforced rather than challenged 
Westphalian sovereignty and the norm of non-interference, which would only grow 
stronger over time (see Chapter 6).  
 Again, the Southeast Asian case does not support a great power influence 
explanation. It is the case that great power interventionism shaped the development of 
ASEAN in indirect ways; Japanese imperialism hastened the demise of pan-Asianism as 
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a political project, superpower rivalry led to the polarization of the region, and perceived 
and actual Chinese support for communist insurgents contributed to elite solidarity 
against domestic challengers and a strong commitment to non-interference within 
ASEAN in order reduce inter-state tensions and allow governments to focus on economic 
development. Still, this response to external intervention and communist insurgency was 
greatly informed by the lack of liberal or transnational identity discourses. Latin 
American and African responses to internal and external threats were different. 
Furthermore, I argue that ASEAN norms were not influenced by the United States or 
China in a more direct way. I do not find evidence of China trying to prevent a more 
intrusive form of regionalism from developing here, and the United States’ attempt to 
establish a Southeast Asian version of North Atlantic Treaty Organization failed because 
regional states wanted more autonomy. 
 
Pan-Asianism and Japanese Imperialism 
A pan-Asianist movement did exist at the level of civil society in the late 19th century and 
early 20th century, and it shared features with its African and American counterparts, but 
pan-Asianism did not progress to culminate in the creation of a continental body like the 
OAU or OAS. Transnational pan-Asianist identity discourses—challenging to the nation-
state and its exclusive jurisdiction of domestic affairs—were not salient by the 1960s in 
Asia generally or Southeast Asia specifically. When the founding members of ASEAN 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) created the association in 
1967, there was no debate over whether states should form a grand federation like the 
United States of Africa idea. ASEAN’s establishment was not the product of a pan-Asian 
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movement, and it didn’t follow decolonization in the region as quickly as did the OAU. 
Any tension between transnational regionalism in (Southeast) Asia and state sovereignty 
had been more fully resolved at the moment of ASEAN’s establishment (1967) than was 
the tension between pan-Africanism and state sovereignty at the OAU’s founding (1963). 
Before I examine the development of Southeast Asian regionalism, I will first discuss the 
broader pan-Asianist movements—some strands of which held sovereignty-challenging 
potential—that failed to reach institutionalization in the formation of a formal continental 
organization (e.g. the OAS or OAU).  
Pan-Asianism didn’t always have an exclusively statist manifestation. Pan-
Asianism existed at the level of transnational civil society—a network of scholars, 
journalists, merchants and lawyers—beginning in the late 19th century, at a time when 
Asia was being “overrun” by outsiders.95 Like pan-Africanism, it had a strong racial 
component, articulated in terms of the need for the “yellow race” to rise up in unity 
against white imperialism and economic exploitation.96 Japan was a central node for 
these activities, but the Japanese state did not embrace pan-Asianism as part of its official 
foreign policy at this stage (or anytime prior to the 1930s) because it was eager to 
maintain good relations with Western powers. As Sven Saaler and Christopher Svpilman 
note in their introduction to an anthology of primary pan-Asian texts, “The popularity of 
transnational Pan-Asianism and the transnational political activities of 
revolutionaries…show that the nation was not, as it is often believed, an absolute and 
unquestioned value in Asia.”97 At least one prominent pan-Asianist, Rabindranath Tagore 
of India (1861-1941), promoted a society-centric version of pan-Asianism “thriv[ing] on 	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ideational and cultural flows as on economic links or political purpose.”98 A writer and 
painter, Tajore won the 1913 Nobel Prize in Literature (he was the first non-European 
person to do so). His version of pan-Asianism opposed the nationalistic sovereign state 
system, but, although he was a celebrated thinker, his anti-nationalism did not gain 
support.99 As historian Prasenjit Duara explains, “[N]ationalist ideologies sought to 
contain and, indeed, domesticate a variety of transnational phenomena in East Asia that 
potentially ran counter to the sovereign interests of the nation-state.”100 
The rise of Japan as a powerful state initially spurred the growth and prominence 
of pan-Asianism (at the transnational level), but Japan’s eventual endorsement and 
employment of a particular brand of pan-Asianism would, with a few decades, bankrupt 
it. Following Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1905), Japan’s new 
status as a great power inspired nationalist movements throughout Asia, and these 
movements “adopted a vision of Asian or Eastern solidarity, potentially under Japanese 
leadership, as a possible path to overcoming Western hegemony.”101 These developments 
did not lead, however to concrete regional political projects102 and, due to the Japanese 
imperialist turn, they would not get a chance to.  
Although the Japanese had been building an empire since the 1890s, and had 
annexed Korea in 1910, its extensive conquest of East Asia didn’t begin until the 1930s. 
It wasn’t until after the 1931 Manchurian incident—which resulted in Japanese 
occupation of Chinese territory—and Japan’s 1933 withdrawal from the League of 
Nations that it began officially promoting pan-Asianism and the idea of Japanese 	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supreme leadership over Asia.103 To carry out its expansionist policies, the Japanese 
Empire “appropriate[ed] an already existing alternative to the Eurocentric world order” 
[pan-Asianism], allowing it “to implement more rigorous and inclusive assimilation 
policies and exhibit a high level of international confidence and self-righteousness in an 
era when imperialism was globally delegitimized.”104 These policies culminated in 1940 
with Japan’s introduction of the concept of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 
to occupied Asian territories. The Co-Prosperity Sphere was to be a hierarchical Asian 
political and economic bloc under the authority of Japan. Among historians, there is a 
strong consensus that “the subservience of pan-Asianism to Japanese militarist 
imperialism doomed its future in the twentieth century,”105 discrediting the movement 
that came before and resulting in the “disappearance of pan-Asian discourse from the 
international relations arena.”106 
 
Decolonization and the Cold War 
The end of World War II left Japan defeated and pan-Asianism irrelevant. As European 
colonial powers—driven out by Japan during the war—returned to Asia, they were met 
by stronger nationalist movements than they had encountered before, and the 
decolonization process, which would be mostly complete by the mid-1960s, began. 
Indonesia declared independence from the Netherlands in 1945, but it would take another 
four years (of violent conflict) for the Dutch to recognize this. The Philippines gained 
independence from the United States in 1946, and this was followed by Burmese 
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independence from Britain (1948) and the defeat of France in Indochina (1954), resulting 
in the division of Vietnam into the communist North and the Bao Dai government’s 
South. British Malaysia and Singapore won independence later, in 1957 and 1965 
respectively, and Brunei remained a British protectorate until 1984. Thailand was never 
formally colonized.  
Independence struggles in Asia coincided with the emergence of the Cold War 
and the application of U.S. containment policy, and Asia soon became a primary 
battleground for Cold War competition. The ‘loss’ of China to communism in 1949—and 
the threat of the same outcome in Indochina—brought the United States’ strategic focus 
to the Asian arena as opposed to other regions in the global South. Alarmed by the rise of 
communist parties (and armed groups) here, and concerned to bolster the strength and 
prosperity of its Western European allies, the United States was not an unambiguous 
supporter of decolonization, sometimes choosing to support colonial powers over 
nationalist groups. As Asian states did gain independence, the United States lobbied them 
to align with the West, aiming to build an anti-communist alliance in order to counter 
Chinese and Soviet influence and expansion.  
That Southeast Asia existed as a front line of the Cold War matters for several 
reasons. First, the Cold War polarized the states in the region into communist and non-
communist blocs. The original ASEAN states were not drawn into regionalism because 
of a shared pan-Asianist identity but rather because of their shared anti-communist 
ideology, and this was more conducive to strict sovereignty norms. Furthermore, the 
threat of communist insurgency in these original ASEAN states provided a justification 
for authoritarianism, and this authoritarianism fostered state-centric regionalism. 
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Relatedly, the shared threat perception about communist insurgency—backed by a rising 
China—contributed to regime-supportive practices among ASEAN states, including 
coordinated counter-insurgency efforts. When ASEAN was formed (1967), the ASEAN 
Five had converged on a common state model and anti-communist orientation. It was also 
during this time that these states were growing concerned about British and especially 
U.S. partial disengagement from the region because of and its implications for their 
security vis-à-vis communist China. Again, since the ASEAN states’ internal security 
concerns overlapped and were linked to a local power (China), these regimes were bound 
together in a way that American and African regimes were not (although they too faced 
insurgency), and this contributed to strong (less contested) sovereignty norms from the 
beginning.  
The Korean War (1950-1953) was the first “major outright war”107 of the post-
World War II period, and a pivotal moment for the development of this alliance. U.S. aid 
programs to the region—including to states in Southeast Asia—were greatly expanded, 
and the war itself “created a ripple of apprehension” in Southeast Asia about the spread 
of communism.108 This combination of increased aid and escalating fear among new 
regimes helped forge the alliance sought by the United States. By the mid-1950s, it had 
managed to form a strong anti-communist coalition of Asian states, including several 
Southeast Asian states.109 U.S. bilateral defense treaties were strongest with Korea, Japan, 
and the Philippines (a former U.S. colony).110 In 1955, the Vietnam War (Second 
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Indochina War) got underway, and troop U.S. presence in the region intensified over the 
next decade.  
There were limits to the anti-communist coalition, however, as evidenced by the 
rejection by most Southeast Asian states of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), “the most important postwar U.S. effort to organize a multilateral collective 
defense organization in the entire Third World.”111 SEATO was established in 1955—on 
the heels of the Geneva Accords settling the First Indochina War—with the purpose of 
containing communism and serving as an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. It never resembled the latter in any meaningful way and quickly proved 
irrelevant. Although headquartered in Bangkok (Thailand), the organization’s 
membership was majority extraregional: the United States, France, Great Britain, New 
Zealand, Australia, Pakistan. The only two Southeast Asian nations to participate, the 
Philippines and Thailand, were those with the strongest ties to the United States. For their 
part, the Indochinese states—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—were barred from entering 
collective defense agreements by the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords. Burma and 
Indonesia, founders of the Non-Aligned Movement—a group of post-colonial states 
seeking to extricate themselves from East-West bloc dynamics—rejected SEATO 
outright as a mechanism to draw post-colonial states into the Cold War. When Malaysia 
and Singapore gained independence, they chose not to join SEATO, despite their solidly 
anti-communist orientations and alliances with the West.  
Pre-ASEAN attempts at indigenous regionalism in Southeast Asia did not 
succeed. Inter-state tensions and conflicts thwarted these efforts, which included 1) the 
Association of Southeast Asia, whose members included the Philippines, Malaysia, and 	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Thailand (although it technically remained in existence 1961-1967, is considered a 
failure) and 2) the Greater Malayan Confederation, comprised of Malaya, the Philippines, 
and Indonesia (it lasted for one month in 1963). Most important among the inter-state 
conflicts thwarting regionalist organizing were those between Malaysia and Indonesia 
(the “Konfrontasi” period) and between Malaysia and the Philippines (a territorial 
dispute).112 Apart from pan-Malay sentiments motivating the Greater Malayan 
Federation, Arfinn Jorgensen-Dahl asserts that “there existed in Southeast Asia no 
indigenous tradition of thinking which conceived of the region in general and the states 
that came to form [ASEAN] in particular as a political, economic, and cultural entity 
which could serve as an ideal alternative to traditional interstates politics and to which 
appeal could be made and from which inspiration could be received.”113 In other words, 
there was no pan-Asianism to build on. 
 
1967: the formation of ASEAN 
It wasn’t until Southeast Asia became sufficiently polarized along Cold War lines and the 
original ASEAN members experienced a common ‘shift to authoritarianism’ that ASEAN 
emerged. ASEAN did not bring together the whole of Southeast Asia but rather a smaller 
group of very like-minded non-communist states, and these five states’ common ideology 
and strategic concerns constituted the foundations of regionalism moving forward. Their 
solidarity wasn’t so much a pan-Asian solidarity as an authoritarian capitalist solidarity. 
The ASEAN Five shared a capitalist orientation and a common fear of communist 
insurgency. The strategic foundations of ASEAN (and its justification for non-	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interference) were not only about regime security (a group of states with a shared interest 
in maintaining power vis-à-vis internal and external threats) but, more specifically, about 
a shared interest in preserving a very specific ‘social order’ (authoritarian capitalism).114 
Indonesia was the largest state in the region and its orientation to regionalism was 
crucial. In 1966, when regime change took place in Indonesia, its foreign policy shifted in 
ways that made a regional organization with Indonesia as a member possible. While 
Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, had focused Indonesia’s foreign policy activities on 
the international level (with major involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and Afro-
Asian cooperation), his replacement, Suharto, shifted focus to regional politics. While 
Sukarno’s focus had been anti-colonialism, Suharto’s focus was anti-communism.115 This 
regime change in Indonesia involved what is considered by some to be one of the worst 
atrocities of the 20th century. In October 1965, General Suharto blamed a failed coup 
attempt on the Indonesian Communist Party and proceeded, with the support of the armed 
forces, to carry out an anti-communist “purge” throughout the country, resulting in the 
estimated deaths of at least over 600,000 alleged communists.116  
 The original ASEAN Five shared the idea that the best way to work against 
communist insurgency was through economic development (in order to undermine 
communism’s appeal), and that interstate conflicts in the sub-region would have to be set 
aside in order to create the conditions for this growth. “All these states had pursued free-
market policies and relied on rapid economic growth to combat communism. They 
perceived a common international threat and saw regional cooperation as an important 
way to combat it…In fact, one of the main catalysts of political cooperation among non-	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communist Southeast Asian countries leading to the formation of ASEAN was the 
development of joint counter-insurgency measures along their common borders.”117 The 
norm of non-interference was emphasized at ASEAN’s founding as a way to prevent 
intra-ASEAN tensions and conflict and to “insulate ASEAN societies from ‘subversive’ 
external influences to help stabilize capitalist social order.”118  Accounting for ASEAN’s 
founding, then prime minister of Singapore has written, “We had a common enemy—the 
communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, China and the 
Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter and deny the communists the 
social and economic conditions for revolutions.”119  
The ASEAN Five shared an economic model, which created further ideological 
affinity. Their emphases were “rapid urban industrial development,” and “openness to the 
world economy” and “close alliances between the state, foreign corporations and 
domestic capitalists.” This common model fostered “a certain ideological commonality 
among them that provided for an important political foundation for ASEAN.”120 
The ASEAN Five also shared a shift away from democracy, and began to 
formulate economic justifications for authoritarianism. Non-interference did not have to 
compete with transnational pan-Asian discourses or liberal ideas about human rights and 
democracy that were more prominent in the African and Latin American cases. “[T]he 
decline of democratic experiments and the rise of authoritarianism… created the political 
basis for a common subregional political and ideological framework….A common thread 
running through the shift towards authoritarianism was its justification by the ruling 
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regimes in terms of communist threat, ethnic unrest and a belief that economic 
development required a certain amount of authoritarian control. And it is this thread that 
provided an important basis for regional cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s, especially 
through the ASEAN framework.”121 Not only was Southeast Asian regionalism not based 
on a pan-Asianist movement with transnational threads, its ideological basis was 
explicitly illiberal. This illiberalism is particularly compatible with non-interference, 
especially considering that the interference regimes that emerge in other regions in the 
1980s and especially 1990s are based, in part, on liberal discourses of human rights and 
democracy promotion. As we might expect, the founding document of ASEAN, the 
Bangkok Declaration is a piece of soft law, reflecting ASEAN states’ wariness of 
formality and legalism, and makes no reference to human rights or democracy.  
The main issue of debate at ASEAN’s founding summit was the question of 
defense alliances with extraregional powers. Indonesia was a strong proponent of self-
reliance and the removal of foreign military bases, whereas the other states were, to 
varying degrees, committed to their defense arrangements with Western powers in order 
to guarantee their own security. In a way, then, this echoes debates at the OAU’s 
founding about regional autonomy versus extraregional (European) support. It differs in a 
critical way, though: no one was advocating the pooling of sovereignties in Southeast 
Asia.  
 
Conclusion 
One important point of variation in the history of regional orders is the importance and 
content of regional identity discourses. Pan-Americanism is characterized in part by a 	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shared commitment to liberal values and the development of regional and international 
law. Even before the formation of the OAS, the promotion of democracy and human 
rights had become an important feature of diplomatic discursive traditions. In the African 
case, pan-Africanism is distinctly transnational in that it emerged from the diaspora, 
served as the common language of the coordinated decolonization movement on the 
continent, and identified the struggle against Africa’s remaining colonial and minority-
led regimes to be one of its central expressions of transnational solidarity, in the name of 
universal human rights but also African ‘brotherhood.’ Regional identity discourses in 
Latin America and Africa were therefore both incompatible with strict interpretations of 
state sovereignty from an early stage. Pan-Asianism, on the other hand, was not important 
to the founding of ASEAN, and sovereignty norms therefore stood on firmer ground from 
the beginning. As I argue in the following case chapters, these regional identity 
discourses had an enduring effect on regional norms leading up to the second wave of 
regionalism in the mid-1980s. 
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Chapter 4 
Latin America  
 
Chapter 3 discussed the emergence in the 19th century of a pan-American identity 
discourse with strong liberal and legalist components, which preceded U.S. leadership in 
the region and existed in conflict with strict interpretations of non-interference. In the 
post-World War II era, intrusive liberal regional traditions became embedded in 
institutions and practices (the Inter-American human rights system and ad hoc election 
observation), and, while the further development of intrusive liberal regionalism was 
stalled by authoritarianism and U.S. interventionism during much of the Cold War 
period, human rights and election monitoring continued.  
The third wave of democratization—which transformed the regime type makeup 
of the hemisphere—removed an important impediment to liberal multilateralism. During 
the interventionist Reagan administration years, Latin American states, which were 
becoming increasingly democratic, worked outside of the OAS framework to support 
peace and democracy in Central America. By the end of the 1980s, Latin America had 
achieved an unprecedentedly high democratic density, and a major shift in U.S. foreign 
policy facilitated rapprochement between the United States and its southern neighbors. 
These changes enabled a reinvigoration (but not origination) of intrusive liberal 
regionalism in the early 1990s, which primarily took the form of a defense-of-democracy 
regime. This supports my argument that the erosion of the norm of non-interference in 
Latin America beginning in the second wave of regionalism can be attributed to 
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historically rooted identity discourses and, in the shorter term, a significant increase in 
the democratic density of the region. 
The United States was a proponent of the OAS defense of democracy regime, and 
this fact might at first glance lend support to power-centric explanations, but, given the 
history presented here, it’s hard to make the case that the changes we see in the 1990s can 
be reduced to U.S. influence. Most importantly, the United States has not been a 
consistent supporter of intrusive human rights and democracy promotion in the region 
and has sometimes worked against efforts to develop intrusive practices, either 
purposefully or indirectly through its own interventionist practices (which made Latin 
American states wary of ceding sovereignty to the regional community).  
Economic uncertainty associated with the end of the Cold War and following the 
economic crisis of the 1980s did, though, enhance Latin American states’ motivation to 
cooperate with the United States on political matters (democracy and human rights) in 
order to improve their relationship with the hegemon and facilitate cooperation on 
economic issues. This offers support to my argument that materially vulnerable states are 
more willing to support intrusive liberal regionalism in the international normative 
context of the late 20th century and beyond. 
 
Post-WWII democracy-promotion proposals & the emergence of state monitoring 
As outlined in Chapter 2, intrusive liberal norms were institutionalized by the OAS in the 
post-war period through the development of monitoring regimes—the Inter-American 
human rights system and the practice of election observation. This was also a period 
(1948-1965) of active OAS debate about regional democracy promotion and the 
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appropriate balance between non-interference and the promotion and protection of pan-
American liberal values. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, these debates had been part of the 
inter-American discourse for decades, but they became more salient after World War II 
as “a consensus began to emerge [at the global level] that human rights and democracy 
would need to be an essential part of the postwar order”1 and because these sentiments 
were particularly strong in Latin America, where the second wave of democratization had 
recently brought to power many center-left governments.2  
Although the argument I present in Chapter 1 about the impact of democratic 
density on intrusive regionalism is most applicable to the context of the late 20th century, 
evidence from the Latin American case suggests that regional regime type composition 
played a role in the decades preceding this. The second wave of democratization wave 
began during World War II. Some of these transitions were relatively short-lived, though, 
falling back into dictatorship by the early 1950s. The late 1950s saw some movement 
back to democracy. Some of these were, again, briefly maintained (e.g. Argentina, Peru), 
while others proved more sustainable over time (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela).3 Overall, 
transitions to democracy, and the orientation of these new democracies vis-à-vis the 
region’s dictatorships, contributed to debates about multilateral democracy-promotion. 
The OAS adopted the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man in 1948, 
approved the statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1960, and 
began dispatching election observation missions in 1962. The timing of these events 
coincide with points of high democratic density in the region. Consider this helpful figure 
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by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán [the authors code countries as either 
authoritarian, competitive semi-democratic (SD), or competitive democratic (D)]: 
 
Figure 4.1 Evolution of Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-20104 
 
Furthermore, contrary to expectations of power-centric explanations, the United States 
did not take a leadership role in the creation of the Inter-American human rights system 
or offer consistent support to those calling for more intrusive defense of democracy 
mechanisms. 
 
Development of a regional human rights system and election monitoring 
As noted elsewhere, the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948) 
produced the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, initiating a process 
that would eventually lead to a binding human rights convention and a regional human 	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rights commission and court (discussed later in the chapter). The American Declaration 
enshrined civil and political rights as well as economic and social rights, and, while it did 
not outline specific mechanisms for enforcement, it did state that,	  “The international 
protection of the rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American 
law” and that the American states “should increasingly strengthen that system in the 
international field as conditions become more favorable.”5 Brazil proposed the creation of 
a regional human rights court at the 1948 summit and the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee was asked to draft a statute, but the Court’s creation was in fact postponed for 
many years as the Juridical Committee could not recommend its creation before the 
establishment of relevant hard law.  
 Not much progress was made on the human rights system front until 1959, when a 
meeting of the foreign ministers was convened. Democratic density had reached a new 
peak (see Figure 4.1), the Cuban revolution had recently taken place, and OAS member 
states were alarmed by the specter of revolution and subversion as well as the human 
rights abuses of the region’s remaining dictatorships (especially those of the repressive 
Dominican regime).6 In part as a response to these concerns, the foreign ministers voted 
to create a human rights commission to enforce the soft law of the 1948 American 
Declaration. In addition, the ministers instructed the Inter-American Council of Jurists to 
develop a binding human rights convention, human rights court, and “other vital 
protective systems.”7 Democratic reforms and the promotion of economic and social 
rights, it was hoped, would help to undermine the appeal of revolutionary movements. 
The OAS Council approved the statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human 	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Rights 1960. Negotiations over a binding convention (providing for a court) began at this 
time, but the convention wouldn’t be adopted for another nine years and the court 
wouldn’t come into being until 1978, when the convention entered into force. The United 
States did not take a leadership position in these negotiations.8 
Despite the non-existence of relevant regional hard law at the time, the 
Commission’s statute laid out for it wide-ranging activities: raising awareness about 
human rights, preparing human rights reports useful to governments, requesting reports 
from governments, and advising the OAS on human rights.9 The investigation of states’ 
human rights practices and preparation of country reports on the human rights situation in 
each member state has been part of the Commission’s activities since its founding, 
although “no single procedural norm exists” to support these investigations. They are 
taken up in response to individual communications, general petitions to the OAS, 
petitions by member states, or as a follow up to other investigations.10 The original 
Commission mandate did not include the reception of individual complaints, but this 
procedure was instituted in 1965 through the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro.11  
Nicaragua introduced a regional election observation proposal to the same 1959 
ministerial meeting that voted for the Inter-American Commission,12 and the foreign 
ministers in turn submitted a proposal to the OAS Council for the dispatch of election 
observers to member states upon request.13 The United States supported this development 
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but did not impose it on its neighbors.14 The OAS sent its first election observation 
mission in 1962. This mission was to Costa Rica, whose government requested observers 
of the OAS Secretary General. The three-member mission that was dispatched reported 
that the “electoral act” took place with “utmost order and without any incident.” The 
following day, the observation team met with the Costa Rican president, thanking him for 
“the trust deposited by the Government of Costa Rica in the OAS, as shown by its request 
for an electoral observation mission.”15  
Over the next few years, the OAS dispatched observers to presidential elections in 
the Dominican Republic (1961 and 1962), Nicaragua (1963), Costa Rica (1962), 
Honduras (1963), Bolivia (1966), Costa Rica (1966), and the Dominican Republic 
(1966).16 The missions to the Dominican Republic were more controversial than the 
inaugural Costa Rican mission since the OAS foreign ministers had previously (in 1960) 
refused to send observers—despite the Dominican Republic’s consent—arguing that “this 
would constitute OAS intervention in the internal affairs of a member state.”17 In 
response to such concerns, an OAS Symposium on Representative Democracy (1961) 
produced a report—“with Latin American sensitivities in mind”—making the case that 
election observation (and human rights investigations by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights) did not constitute a violation of the norm of non-interference, and that 
“countries with a clean democratic record will not object to having impartial observers 
present at the elections held on their territory.” The report further stated that: 
[I]t does not surprise the Symposium to note that dictatorial governments, invoking the 
principle of nonintervention, should impede or obstruct visits by the Inter-American 	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Commission on Human Rights to their territories, or that they should consider requests 
for OAS electoral technical missions as contrary to that principle, and that, thereby, they 
should oppose activities which, as experience has demonstrated, strengthen the system of 
representative democracy.18 
 
Electoral envoys were not simply rubber stampers. A 1963 mission to Honduras 
produced a lengthy report, including recommendations that “would imply comprehensive 
reforms that impact beyond the sphere of the vote” like changes in civil-military relations 
and in the voting method. The observers also commended the government for 
“voluntarily putting at the consideration of the American commonwealth its political 
performance,” given that Honduran elections constituted “a common cause of the 
continental democracy.”19 Despite it being a point of contestation, OAS election 
observation continued in an ad hoc manner, as no regional law officially governed it, 
throughout the Cold War period. 
 
Debate over democracy promotion 
Democracy-promotion was prominent in the regional discourse among state and non-state 
actors. Interestingly, during the late-1940s, the so-called ‘Caribbean Legion’20—an 
informal pro-democracy group of Latin American leaders and (mostly Dominican) 
exiles—was engaged in plots to overthrow dictatorships in the region, especially U.S.-
backed regimes in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. According to 
historian Charles Ameringer, Uruguayan foreign minister Larreta’s failed 1945 proposal 
for multilateral action against dictatorships (see Chapter 3) “emboldened political groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Quoted in Atkins 1997, 126. 
19 Quoted in Santa Cruz 2005, 679. 
20 This was a term used by U.S. journalists 
	   124 
in exile to intensify their revolutionary efforts.”21 In 1947, the Caribbean Legion 
assembled forces in Cuba—with the support of Cuba’s president—planning to invade the 
Dominican Republic by sea and overthrow its dictatorship. The United States convinced 
Cuba to halt it, and the forces did not launch. At this point, Guatemala’s first 
democratically elected president (as of 1944), Juan Jose Arevalo, stepped in to support 
the Legion, providing a space for its members to assemble and organizing the signing of 
the Caribbean Pact,22 which called for the creation of a Democratic Alliance of the 
Caribbean and the overthrow of dictatorships in the region.23 Arevalo maintained his 
sponsorship of the Caribbean Legion during its next two pro-democracy interventions, 
first in support of rebel forces in the Costa Rica civil war, resulting in the successful 
overthrow of the regime there (1948),24 and second in another failed invasion of the 
Dominican Republic (1949).25 This was its last major campaign before its dissolution. 
 At the inter-state level, two approaches to the question of diplomatic recognition 
competed during this period: the Betancourt Doctrine and Estrada Doctrine. Venezuelan 
President Romulo Betancourt followed and promoted a policy—the Betancourt 
Doctrine—of diplomatic non-recognition and the suspension of diplomatic relations with 
military regimes. This policy was to some degree a restatement of earlier versions 
including the 1907 Tobar Doctrine (see Chapter 3) and that found in a 1949 report of the 
Inter-American Juridical Committee (see below).26 Betancourt served two non-
consecutive terms, and in his inaugural speech at the beginning of a second term, in 1959, 
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he famously declared that, “Regimes which do not respect human rights, which violate 
the liberties of their citizens and tyrannize them with political police ought to be 
subjected to a rigorous cordon sanitaire and eradicated by the collective peaceful action 
of the Inter-American juridical community.”27 The president’s sentiments, according to 
Arturo Santa-Cruz, reflected “the mood of the hemisphere”28 and drew upon an inter-
American “stock of interpretive patterns.”29  
But there was not a consensus about the use of diplomatic sanctions to promote 
democracy and human rights. Another code of diplomatic recognition—the Estrada 
Doctrine—endorsed the practice of recognizing any de facto regime, regardless of the 
legality of its ascent to power or its respect for human rights. This policy of continuous 
diplomacy and automatic recognition of new governments had been put forward by 
Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada in 1930 but featured in inter-American debates 
long afterwards. Estrada reasoned that recognition itself did not communicate approval of 
the regime (or the manner in which it came to power) but simply responded to the fact of 
effective control. 30   
 The Ninth International Conference of American States (1948) adopted a 
resolution—“Exercise of the Right of Legation”—that affirmed the Estrada Doctrine, 
calling for continuous diplomatic relations among states in the hemisphere and justifying 
this by asserting that diplomatic recognition of a government in power does not imply 
endorsement of that government’s actions or of how it came to power. The United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Santa Cruz 2005, 676. 
28 Santa Cruz 2005, 676. 
29 Santa Cruz 2005, 676. 
30 Atkins 1989, 228. 
	   126 
advocated for this resolution, demonstrating its inconsistent position on intrusive liberal 
regionalism.31  
The following year, the Inter-American Juridical Committee produced a report 
articulating a different point of view, more in line with would later be called the 
Betancourt Doctrine. The report was commissioned by the Inter-American Conference on 
Problems of War and Peace (1945) and by the Ninth International Conference of 
American States (1948). It concluded that, in order to merit diplomatic recognition by the 
regional community, regimes must fulfill three requirements, including 1) effective 
control of territory “based on the acquiescence of the people manifested in an adequate 
manner,” 2) the ability to meeting international obligations and 3) respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The report went on to argue that territorial control 
alone “is not sufficient to accredit [a government] as a legal regime,” because it is 
“indispensable” that some degree of popular sovereignty be achieved, that “public 
opinion…manifest itself freely and fully" and that the government "duly respect the 
exercise of the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual” in accordance with the 
OAS Charter.32 This report was not adopted by the OAS but received support from like-
minded states. 
Next, in response to conflicts in the Caribbean, the OAS Council debated in 1950 
how to best reconcile, in practice, the values of representative democracy and non-
interference. They ended up adopting a resolution that affirmed the importance of 
representative democracy to the peace and security of the hemisphere but stated that this 
affirmation should not be construed to “authorize any governments to violate inter-	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American commitments relative to the principles of nonintervention.”33 The Tenth Inter-
American Conference (1954) similarly wrestled with the proper balance between liberal 
values and non-interference; states here considered ways to promote human rights while 
continuing to respect sovereignty.34  
At the 1959 ministerial meeting (where ministers voted in favor of the 
establishment of the Inter-American Commission), representatives of Venezuela and the 
new post-revolution Cuban regime argued forcefully for collective action against 
dictatorships, echoing the Uruguayan proposal of 1945 (put forward by foreign minister 
Eduardo Larreta—see Chapter 3). They reasoned that non-intervention should not apply 
to dictators, since the OAS Charter calls for “the consolidation of this continent, within 
the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social 
justice.”35 Like Larreta’s fourteen years earlier, their proposal did not gain majority 
support. More interested in containing communism than supporting transitions to 
democracy, the U.S. ambassador argued that “democratic progress which all of us seek 
requires among other factors a strict compliance with [the] principles of nonintervention 
and collective security…”36  
At this time, the Inter-American Council of Jurists was asked conduct a study on 
the “possible juridical relationship between respect for human rights and the effective 
exercise of representative democracy, and the right to set in motion the machinery of 
American international law in force.”37 The study found human rights and democracy to 
be interrelated and the OAS Charter’s principles to be binding, but it concluded that 	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collective action to restore democracy was not permitted under the Charter.38 Despite this 
setback for intrusive liberal regionalism, the 1959 ministerial meeting did also produce a 
declaration stating that “the existence of antidemocratic regimes is a violation of the 
principles on which the Organization of American States is founded and a danger to 
peace and unity in the hemisphere” and generated, for the first time, a list of specific 
standards of democratic government.39 
Contestation of strict non-interference did not end there.40 Carrying the debate 
forward three years later, a group of delegates representing Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Honduras, and Venezuela issued this statement to the 1962 OAS ministerial meeting: 
“The exercise of representative democracy and respect for human rights has ceased to be 
an internal matter of each state but has become an international obligation.”41 In another 
attempt to resolve the tension between democracy and non-interference, delegates at the 
Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference42 in 1965 adopted a resolution titled 
“Informal Procedure on the Recognition of De Facto Governments,” which called on 
member states to hold informal discussions in the event of an unconstitutional change in 
government, and, taking into consideration the new government’s disposition toward 
holding democratic elections and fulfilling its international obligations, “each individual 
government would decide whether to maintain diplomatic whether to maintain diplomatic 
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relations with the de facto government.”43 “Despite its substantive weakness, the 
resolution reflected a persistent concern about confronting antidemocratic regimes with a 
multilateral approach.”44 
 
Trends working against intrusive liberal regionalism 
Although the promotion of democracy and human rights—through intrusive 
regionalism—figured prominently in inter-American discourse during the first couple 
decades of the post-World War II period, and, although these values were successfully 
institutionalized in some ways (e.g. monitoring regimes), efforts to further institutionalize 
them were thwarted by reversions to non-democracy in OAS member states and 
developments in U.S. foreign policy towards anti-communist interventionism. 
First, between 1948 and 1954, six Latin American democracies fell and became 
military dictatorships, impeding progress on regional democracy-promotion.45 This 
constituted the first of waves of democratic reversals in the post-World War II period (the 
second reverse wave would be even more widespread), as Figure 4.1 illustrates. 
Furthermore, from the mid-1950s, U.S. human rights policy came to be “collapsed into 
anti-communist policy,” and Latin American states were therefore suspicious that 
regional democracy and human rights mechanisms would be coopted by the United States 
as “instruments of pressure and undue interference”46 (although, as noted above, the 
United States was certainly not a consistent supporter of intrusive liberal regionalism 
during the post-war period). During these years, an “ideational marriage” was created 
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between the Monroe Doctrine (as it had been practiced before Roosevelt’s 1933 Good 
Neighbor Policy) and containment. “Thus intervention in Central America and the 
Caribbean was built as a corollary of the principle of non-intervention. The logic behind 
this idea was understanding intervention in terms of the infiltration of alien, hostile, 
ideas.”47 U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan first introduced the strategy of containment in 
1946, arguing that the Soviet Union’s expansionism should be met by force if necessary 
in order to prevent the spread of communism around the world. Kennan’s ideas inspired 
President Harry Truman to articulate the Truman Doctrine of containment the following 
year, and this doctrine provided a foundation for U.S. foreign policy during the next two 
decades (until President Richard Nixon’s shift to a policy of détente in the 1970s). 
Containment principally involved the transfer of economic and military aid to anti-
communist regimes experiencing threats from challengers, regardless of regime type or 
the human rights practices of the incumbent. During the containment period, the United 
States also provided aid to anti-communist challengers of leftist regimes and contributed 
U.S. troops to some conflicts. Unlike Asia, Europe and the Middle East, Latin America 
did not exist in the Soviet Union’s immediate vicinity, but the geographic proximity of 
Latin America—especially Central America and the Caribbean—to the United States set 
it apart from Africa and meant that the states in the region “occupied a special place on 
the U.S. presidents’ lists of what could hurt them.”48 U.S. threat perceptions vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union and its intentions for the Western Hemisphere “catalyzed” its strategic 
interests there.49  
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The United States has long employed pan-American processes and institutions as 
tools for expanding its influence in the hemisphere and furthering its foreign policy goals, 
while its southern neighbors have conversely approached these same institutions, and 
especially the formal legalization of shared principles, as mechanisms to constrain the 
hegemon. The Cold War—and disagreements about what constitutes a security threat— 
exacerbated this divergence of goals and the degree to which the two sides worked at 
cross-purposes. In the immediate post-World War II period, as Cold War logics and 
imperatives came to dominate U.S. foreign policy, Washington worked to expand and 
revise existing pan-American legal instruments in order to make them more flexible and 
therefore amenable to its anti-communist aims. Legal instruments progressively expanded 
the definition of aggression. The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
for example, defined aggression broadly to include activities short of an armed attack.50 
At the Tenth Inter-American Conference (1954), the U.S. secretary of state was 
successful in passing a declaration that identified communist governments as threats to 
the hemisphere and therefore achieved legal support for interventions like those in 
Guatemala (see below) and the others that followed it.51 
 In a 1954 covert operation, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency supported an 
exile rebel group in overthrowing a democratically-elected government in Guatemala that 
had itself just replaced a U.S.-backed dictator earlier that year. The Guatemalan regime 
was in the process of implementing a land reform program that endangered the holdings 
of the United Fruit Company (a U.S. firm). Because of inter-American legal 
developments over the past decade and a half, the United States was able to employ the 	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“normative cloak of an OAS resolution declaring Marxist regimes a threat to peace and 
security” to make this norm-violating move.52 This move foreshadowed U.S. 
interventionism and the spread of autocracy that would characterize the 1960s and 1970s 
in Latin America.  
 The connection made between democracy and anti-communism was further 
manifest in a 1962 OAS resolution—which passed 14-2 with six abstentions—expelling 
Cuba from the organizations because of its “adherence…to Marxism-Leninism” and the 
incompatibility of this orientation with the values of the inter-American system.53 The 
United States used the language of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance to make this case.54	  According to Chilean diplomat Heraldo Munoz, Cuba’s 
expulsion showed that “The Cold War was giving an East-West twist to the promotion of 
democracy doctrine.”55 	  
 
Two ‘reversals’ paralyze multilateralism: military regimes and the Bad Neighbor 
While authoritarianism and U.S. interventionism were already working against the further 
development of intrusive liberal regionalism in the 1950s, both of these factors were 
amplified in the 1960s and 1970s. The second reverse wave of democratization got fully 
underway, and U.S. interventionism paralyzed the OAS, making it largely irrelevant. 
Latin American arguably would have moved towards the kind of intrusive regionalism 
we see in the 1980s and 1990s earlier if it hadn’t been for these two related ‘reversals’ of 
the Cold War period: the reversal of President Roosevelt’s 1933 Good Neighbor policy 
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with the resurgence of U.S. interventionism in Latin America and the reversal of the 
second wave of democratization with the general shift to authoritarianism across the 
region in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
U.S. interventionism and the rise of authoritarian regimes 
The regional hegemon’s Cold War foreign policy shift manifested in two major ways: 1) 
U.S. manipulation and cooptation of OAS processes in pursuit of its containment goals 
and 2) U.S. unilateral interventionism, sometimes resulting in (anti-democratic) regime 
change, contributing to the autocratic wave noted above. U.S. Cold War interventionism 
was responsible for the destabilization of governments it found threatening and the 
preservation of friendly dictatorships, both in order to contain communism. It also 
engaged in activities that fueled existing armed conflicts.56 In the 1960s, at the OAS, the 
United States bullied Latin American states into supporting these interventions, 57 and this 
led to the emergence of “sharply divergent views…between the United States and Latin 
American nations regarding what constituted security threats” and ultimately the 
“progressive estrangement in U.S.-Latin American relations.”58 While Latin American 
states had traditionally seen formal regional institutions as a means of defending 
themselves from the United States, they came to see the OAS a tool of the United 
States.59 
The U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 was an important moment 
with respect to the complicated relationship between the United States and Latin 
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American states.  President Lyndon Johnson made the decision to deploy troops and 
occupy the country because he feared the civil war taking place there would result in the 
creation of a “second Cuba” in the Caribbean. While this intervention was unilateral, 
OAS actions—especially the eventual establishment of an Inter-American Peace Force 
(made up of mostly U.S. forces)—created a perception that the OAS functioned as a tool 
of US interests. According to L. Ronald Scheman, “The resurgence of U.S. unilateralism 
in the Dominican Republic in 1965 broke [a] growing consensus and spawned a period of 
aimlessness” in pan-American regionalism.60 Latin American states feared that the 
institutionalized promotion of human rights and democracy would only create 
opportunities for abuse by the United States.61 For the next two decades, multilateralism 
at the hemispheric level remained largely defunct.62  
Because the norms of democracy and human rights promotion were, according to 
Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “stalled and subordinated to anti-communism and the 
logic of national security doctrines” coups d’état continued to be “part of the standard 
political repertoire” and regional human rights pressure consistently provoked 
accusations of sovereignty violation.63 As the region became increasingly populated by 
authoritarian regimes, the OAS turned a blind eye.64 According to Javier Corrales, the 
paralysis of multilateralism in the region “served Latin American statesmen as 
well…provid[ing] an umbrella for impunity of action for the region’s authoritarians.”65 
The second reverse wave of democratization took place in Latin America beginning with 
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the intervention of Peru’s military in 1962. This was followed by military coups in Brazil 
and Bolivia in 1964, Argentina in 1966, Ecuador in 1972, and Chile and Uruguay in 
1973.66 By the mid-1970s, the authoritarian trend had reached its peak (see Figure 4.1). 
Many of these have been classified as bureaucratic authoritarianism regimes, and Thomas 
Farer describes them thusly: “[G]overnment by a military institution staffed by a 
comparatively well-educated generation of officers and imbued with the economic ideas 
of Milton Friedman and, in many cases—ironically—with the social ideas of the 
antimodernist popes.”67 
As the number of non-democracies in the region expanded, the balance between 
intrusive liberal norms (like democracy-promotion) and the norm of non-interference 
shifted further in favor of the latter. The rate of regional interference in response to 
intrastate crisis during these decades reflects this hands-off tendency (see Chapter 2).  
Unlike the African case and (especially) Southeast Asian case, however, state monitoring 
activities did carry on during these years, through election observation practices and the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The activities of the Commission were 
occasionally quite impactful, since it benefited from a good deal of institutional 
autonomy. For example, individuals elected to the body continued to serve even if a 
regime change took place in their home country.  
The regional human rights system continued to develop during this time, despite 
the paralysis of the OAS itself. In 1969, an Inter-American Specialized Conference on 
Human Rights produced the American Convention on Human Rights. This development 
can be attributed to the momentum of earlier efforts as well as the protagonism of 	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advocate states (e.g. Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela). Again, the United States 
did not take a leadership role and did not in fact ratify the Convention. The American 
Convention reiterated and extended the rights laid out in the 1948 American Declaration 
on the Rights and Duties of Man and clarified the procedures and competences of the 
Commission, whose membership consists of seven jurists (whom the OAS Council elects 
to four-year terms).68 The American Convention also called for the creation of an Inter-
American Court on Human Rights, which was established when American Convention 
entered into force (after sufficient ratification) in 1978. The American Convention also 
created a new role for the Commission. According to the division of labor established by 
the Convention, the Commission “collects information and advises member states, but 
most importantly responds to petitions filed by individuals,” while the Court “delivers 
judgments in contentious cases whenever the [Commission] decides that a petitions 
merits further attention, but an agreement could not be reached.”69 
 
Cross-cutting trends in the 1970s 
The 1970s was in some ways a paradoxical decade for regionalism, U.S.-Latin American 
relations, and liberal norms. On the one hand, as stated above, multilateralism became 
less relevant, and Cold War tensions and the growing preponderance of authoritarian 
regimes continued to stifle liberal regional norms. The proportion of democracies to non-
democracies hit its nadir in the mid-1970s (see Figure 4.1), and Latin American states 
had come to see the OAS as a tool of the United States. Because of the paralysis of the 
hemispheric body, the United States—disinterested in multilateralism generally and in 	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the OAS specifically—increasingly conducted its diplomatic affairs bilaterally.70 The 
Nixon administration’s turn away from the Alliance for Progress program, which he 
allowed to “die out,”71 is evidence of this shift. The Kennedy administration had 
established the Alliance—an economic cooperation program—during a period of high 
U.S. interest in hemispheric multilateralism. Democracy promotion was an initial part o 
the Alliance, but gave way when it came into conflict with anti-communism. The United 
States continued to promote democracy inconsistently, sometimes working to destabilize 
democratically elected governments—like that of Salvador Allende (the leftist president 
of Chile from 1970 to 1973)—and supporting authoritarian regimes—like that of 
Augusto Pinochet (who came to power after Allende’s overthrow in 1973). 
 On the other hand, some characteristics of the international atmosphere during 
this decade were favorable to forces committed to the strengthening of liberal norms 
(regionally and globally) and even contributed to the Third Wave of democratization 
beginning in the late 1970s. Richard Nixon’s détente policy dialed back Cold War 
tensions, opening up space for the prioritization of foreign policy goals not tied to Cold 
War threats. 72 When Jimmy Carter took office, he made human rights promotion a 
central feature of his administration’s foreign policy, even reversing the U.S. stance on 
the Pinochet regime. Although the United States had previously supported Pinochet, 
under Carter it condemned his regime’s human rights violations and imposed diplomatic, 
economic and military sanctions in an effort to bring about improvements. These actions 
“helped to consolidate the international political isolation” of Pinochet.73 At the global 
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level, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights both entered into force in 1976.74 
Related to these developments was the emergence of the international human rights 
movement and the rise of human rights non-governmental organizations at the global and 
regional levels, and, among regions in the global South, Latin America was the forefront 
of this organizational proliferation. The spread of military dictatorships and their 
repressive practices inspired the formation of these groups; the 1973 Chilean coup was, in 
particular, a “watershed event” in this regard.75 Accordingly, the early human rights 
movement focused on gross human rights violations perpetrated by military dictatorships, 
especially violations of physical integrity rights like freedom from torture, political 
imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing.76 
As noted above, in this atmosphere, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights—due to its institutional autonomy—managed to actively monitor member states’ 
human rights situations and contributed to the growing international salience of human 
rights violations as a political issue. “As the functioning of the overall Inter-American 
System declined in the 1970s to the late 1980s, the most positive area of activity was the 
increasing role and influence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.”77 
Despite the predominance of authoritarian governments in the region, the promotion of 
the norm of non-interference by these governments, and the decline of the OAS itself, the 
Commission operated in an intrusive way and is notable for its contribution to 
burgeoning transnational human rights activism during the 1970s. As authoritarianism 
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spread, the Commission worked to uncover and publicize the violations of human 
rights—especially physical integrity rights—carried out by these regimes. This 
demonstrates the importance of the history of intrusive liberal regionalism in Latin 
America, as well as certain aspects of the international political climate, since the 
activities of the Commission were not a function of the interests or ideologies of most of 
the OAS member state regimes at the time. As Thomas Farer observes, “Enumerating 
with vivid detail the terrorist methods of many governments, the commission regularly 
reaffirmed the founding liberal democratic premises of the OAS at a time when they 
seemed at odds with the convictions, hardly less than the practices, of many member state 
governments.”78 Monica Herz echoes this assessment of the Commission’s activist and 
semi-autonomous role, pointing to its adoption of “positions critical to mass and 
systematic violations of human rights by Latin American dictatorships, in particular 
forced disappearance,” and its attention to “the situation of specific victims, although it 
did not have a mandate to do so, requesting information from member states, carrying out 
onsite visits and producing reports.”79 	  
  
The Third Wave of democratization & renewed pan-Americanism 
As a reminder, I argue that erosion of the norm of non-interference in Latin America 
beginning in the second wave of regionalism can be attributed to historically rooted 
identity discourses and, in the shorter term, a significant increase in the democratic 
density of the region. It’s also the case that a shift in U.S. foreign policy away from anti-
communism removed an impediment to developing intrusive regionalism at the level of 	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the OAS—the threat of U.S. anti-communist cooptation of OAS processes in the name of 
human rights and democracy. It’s not that the United States imposed intrusive liberal 
regionalism on its neighbors, then, but that a change in its foreign policy priorities 
enabled the reinvigoration of the development of multilateralism based on historically 
rooted identity discourses that had already been embedded in regional institutions and 
practices. 
Latin America is unique among the three regions studied in this dissertation 
because of the widespread democratization that occurred here in the 1980s (and because 
fewer of its democracies have undergone backsliding). The global Third Wave of 
democratization that began in Southern Europe in 1974 reached South America by the 
end of the decade. In quick succession, military regimes transferred power to civilian 
governments in Ecuador (1979), Peru (1980), Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), Uruguay 
(1984), and Brazil (1985). Central America experienced a similar trend with transitions in 
Honduras (1982), El Salvador (1984), and Guatemala (1985).80  Mexico experienced 
some liberalization in the late 1980s, and democratic governments were elected in Chile 
in 1989 and in Haiti and Nicaragua in 1990 (again, see Figure 4.1).  
A confluence of domestic, regional, and international factors contributed to this 
wave, including shifting perceptions about the legitimacy of authoritarianism, and the 
activities of the international human rights movement and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights were part of this shift.81 Whereas the second reverse wave 
in the 1960s and 1970s (a shift to authoritarianism) had thwarted the further development 
of intrusive liberal regionalism in the region, democratization in the 1980s enabled the 	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renewal of multilateral initiatives to promote democracy and human rights. Another 
development, though, constrained this renewal from at the level of the OAS: the 
resurgence of U.S. interventionism in Central America under the Reagan administration. 
Latin American democracies turned to pan-Hispanism—pan-Americanism excluding the 
United Sates—and created multilateral venues outside of the OAS in order to “us[e] their 
newly won shared democracy to oppose U.S. initiatives in Central America and work for 
peace.”82  
As discussed in Chapter 1, John Pevehouse has shown that regional organizations 
with higher “democratic density”—a greater percentage of democratic states—are more 
likely to promote and protect democracy through stronger enforcement mechanisms.83 
This explanation is distinct from—but complementary to—Andrew Moravcsik’s “lock-
in” theory of delegation to regional organizations. Moravcsik argues that newly 
established (recently transitioned) democracies are more likely to promote intrusive 
regional institutions because these institutions may help to protect them from non-
democratic domestic rivals.84 In the Latin American case, new democracies “willingly 
promoted some loss of their sovereignty in exchange for the reassurance of helping to 
‘lock-in’ their new democratic constitutional orders by creating an international line of 
defense against the enemies of democracy.”85 They were likely also motivated by a desire 
to promote a democratic image internationally and domestically to distance themselves 
from previous (authoritarian) regimes.86  
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As authoritarian regimes across the region increasingly gave way to elected 
governments, the new club of democracies that emerged moved to revitalize 
multilateralism based on liberal values. But alarmed by the resurgence of U.S. 
interventionism, and eager to resist and balance against it, Latin American states did not 
immediately return to the OAS as a primary site of this revitalization. By the 1980s, the 
United States had “adopted an essentially unilateralist foreign policy, both globally and 
regionally.”87 The Reagan administration provided financial and military support to the 
Contra rebels against the leftist Sandinista government in Guatemala, actions the 
International Court of Justice later ruled to be in violation of international law 
(Nicaragua v. United States). The United States meanwhile supported the anti-communist 
governments of El Salvador and Guatemala in their wars against leftist insurgents, where 
both cases involved widespread human rights violations carried out by all sides. In 1983, 
the United States invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada in order to oust a military 
regime there, and, in 1989, the Bush administration invaded Panama and deposed its 
leader, General Manuel Noriega, with whom U.S. relations had deteriorated.  
Latin American states responded to the problem of civil war in Central America 
by forming new groupings and processes outside the OAS framework, like the Rio Group 
and the Esquipulas Process. The Rio Group was established in 1986 to find negotiated 
solutions to the conflicts of the isthmus.  Its participants were mostly democracies: 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (participants Mexico and 
Panama had not yet transitioned to democracy). Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay 
became members in 1990 (all had transitioned to democracy). The first goal of the group 
was to revive peace talks in Central America (this task was soon transferred to the 	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Esquipulas Process), and the next goal became democracy promotion on a wider scale.88 
Like the OAS would in 1991 (see below), the Rio Group established democracy as a 
membership requirement and enforced this requirement through diplomatic sanctions in 
the 1990s.89  
The Esquipulas Process was a diplomatic initiative of Costa Rican President 
Oscar Arias aimed at achieving ceasefires, transitional justice processes, elections and 
demilitarization. Costa Rica was at this a point a well-established democracy. Randall 
Parish and Mark Peceny contrast the approach in the 1980s of the U.S., who “used the 
promotion of democracy in Central America as part of a counter-insurgency strategy to 
defeat leftist guerrillas and governments,” with that of President Arias, who “used 
democracy promotion as a means to resolve the region’s civil wars and limit U.S. 
hegemony in the region.”90 Andrew Hurrell considers these regionalist activities that 
exclude the United States to be constitutive of a resurgence of the phase of regionalism 
that predates U.S. involvement (what others have identified as pan-Hispanism).91 In Arie 
Kacowicz’s similar evaluation, the initiatives of the Rio Group harkens back to the 
Bolivarianism of the 19th century, which had been displaced by U.S.-led pan-
Americanism but reemerged in these multilateral peacemaking efforts operating outside 
of the inter-American system.92  
 
Although Latin America states sought venues outside of the OAS for their return 
to multilateralism, some activity within the OAS is worthy of note, especially that which 
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laid a foundation for the emergence of a defense-of-democracy regime in the early 1990s. 
Importantly, the OAS Assembly amended the organization’s charter in 1985 with the 
Cartagena Protocol, which established democracy promotion as an explicit obligation of 
the OAS, thus “elevating the external advancement of representative democracy in terms 
of the inter-American system’s hierarchy of purpose.”93 Argentina, as new democracy as 
of 1983, was an “important proponent” of the 1985 Cartagena Protocol. Thomas Legler 
and Thomas Kwasi Tieku cite Argentina’s leadership on the protocol as evidence in 
support of Moravcsik’s lock-in thesis.94 
Along with democratization came the growth of human rights non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the consolidation of human rights networks during the 1980s, 
and this also contributed to the development and effectiveness of intrusive liberal 
regionalism. NGOs lobbied governments and collaborated with regional institutions in 
order to increase monitoring, criticism and other pressures on repressive Latin American 
regimes.95  
 
Unprecedented regional democratic density and shifting U.S. foreign policy 
The events constituting the end of the Cold War resulted in a transformation of U.S. 
foreign policy and coincided with the culmination of the Third Wave of democratization 
in Latin America (see Figure 4.1), removing the two impediments to the development of 
intrusive liberal regionalism in the preceding decades. Developments in the 1990s 
constituted a major sea change with respect to the norm of non-interference; the long-
contested prohibition was effectively redefined to exclude peaceful multilateral activities 	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promoting security, democracy and human rights, especially when targeting non-
democratic states. These developments principally included the expansion of election 
monitoring, the creation of an anti-coup d’état regime within the OAS and the 
deployment of multidimensional civilian peace missions. Democratization and 
rapprochement between the United States and its southern neighbors enabled this norm 
shift, but democracy and human rights promotion were not norms created out of thin 
air—old traditions and debates were renewed or revitalized to produce this shift.  
 
1990: the Unit for Democracy Promotion and the Nicaraguan elections 
The 1985 Cartagena Protocol recognized democracy promotion as an official obligation 
of the OAS, but it did not specify actions to be taken by the organization to fulfill this 
obligation. In the early late 1980s and early 1990s, the OAS Assembly produced a series 
of declarations and resolutions spelling out these specific actions. First, in late 1989, an 
Assembly resolution called for the more regular deployment of election observation 
missions. Several months later, in November 1990, the OAS created an official Unit for 
Democracy Promotion, an institution whose activities, in addition to oversight of election 
observation missions, have been as varied as, for example, “furthering the peace process 
in Guatemala, reintegrating combatants in Nicaragua, training and shaping young 
democratic leaders, [and] promoting effective local government.”96 
That same year, the OAS and United Nations jointly observed the Nicaraguan 
elections, in a case that, according to Arturo Santa Cruz, was “the largest and most 
comprehensive electoral observation missions ever in a sovereign country” and “proved 
crucial to the institutionalization of electoral observation” internationally. It built on OAS 	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traditions—since the organization had been monitoring elections on an ad hoc basis since 
1962, but it was also a new phase of election monitoring. The United Nations was a bit 
wary of sending observers, as “[i]t did not want to set the precedent of intervening in 
what was still considered a purely domestic issue.” The OAS did not share this 
reluctance, and the head of the Nicaraguan Supreme Electoral Council at the time 
attributed the organization’s comfort with the practice to the fact that it ‘was used to 
monitoring elections.’” Still, the Nicaraguan election mission marked the beginning of 
something new, since those coming before it in the region had been “limited in time, 
limited in objectives, limited in capacity, in technical terms,” according to one OAS 
spokesperson. For example, while the first such mission to Costa Rica (1962) had been 
composed of only three officials whose mandate was limited temporally and in scope, the 
1990 mission counted 433 observers who monitored “the whole electoral process in 
detail.”97  
 
The Santiago Commitment, Resolution 1080, and the Washington Protocol 
In 1991, the OAS moved forward with more coercive forms of democracy promotion, 
establishing a regional anti-coup regime. As noted in Chapter 2, the 1991 summit in 
Santiago (Chile) produced the “Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of 
the Inter-American System,” which commits the OAS to “adopt efficacious, timely, and 
expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of representative 
democracy,”98 and Resolution 1080 on “Representative Democracy,” which calls for a 
meeting of the OAS Permanent Council (which in turn convenes either a meeting of the 	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foreign ministers or a special session of the General Assembly) in response to an 
unconstitutional change in government in order to investigate the situation and to decide 
which actions to take. Importantly, this resolution sets up an automatic and rapid 
response (the meeting must be convened within ten days) and gives the ministers or 
delegates latitude in their response (they are to “adopt any decisions deemed 
appropriate”). 99  The 1992 Protocol of Washington (which entered into force in 1997) 
develops the anti-coup regime further by specifying that member states experiencing 
unconstitutional changes in government may be suspended from the OAS.100 During the 
1990s, sub-regional organizations in the hemisphere [e.g. the Andean Group, the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)] 
also adopted mechanisms to respond to unconstitutional changes in government.101 
Chile, which had held democratic elections in 1989, was a key proponent of the 
Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080 and the Santiago Declaration. 102 Then 
Chilean ambassador to the OAS, Heraldo Munoz, has attributed the successful adoption 
of these legal instruments to democracies’ desire to self-fortify, writing that there was “a 
common desire, particularly among the nations of Latin America, to safeguard and 
consolidate the newly regained democracies against lingering authoritarianism after long 
periods of dictatorship.”103 Former U.S. diplomat Richard Bloomfield also emphasizes 
the importance of regime type to the Latin American norm shift: “The 1991 decision by 
the members of the OAS actually to do something about threats to democracy was the 
culmination of the wave of democratization that swept over Latin America in the 1980s, 	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when the dictatorships that had dominated the region for the previous two decades proved 
themselves incompetent to deal with the grave problems facing their societies.”104 Later, 
in 2001, the OAS adopted an Inter-American Democratic Charter, further elaborating and 
institutionalizing regional democracy promotion mechanisms. It happens that the 
proposal for the Democratic Charter came from Peru’s newly democratic which “wanted 
to make sure that nobody would ever again be able to get away with the creeping 
authoritarianism practiced by the Fujimori government.”105 Again, democracies have 
played a crucial role in promoting intrusive liberal regionalism. 
The predominance of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s wasn’t the only 
factor holding back the development of intrusive liberal regionalism during the 1960s-
1980s; U.S. unilateralism and cooptation of multilateralism for interventionist purposes 
was also a major impediment. The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered U.S. 
foreign policy objectives and strategies as well as Latin American states’ assessment of 
their northern neighbor and their orientation to it. The implications of this shift to the 
Latin American regional order were manifold. While U.S. hegemony did not of course 
disappear at this juncture—and the potential for U.S. dominance of regional institutions 
remained—the disappearance of the communist threat dissolved the principal rationale 
for Washington’s unilateral interventionism and attempts to coopt OAS processes during 
the preceding four decades.  The United States had been inconsistent at best in its 
commitment to liberal norms—since anti-communism often proved to be the overriding 
logic of its foreign policy—but it would now be able to become achieve greater 
consistency as a liberal power. A hemisphere-wide consensus in favor of representative 	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democracy and free market capitalism at the end of the Cold War created the common 
ground necessary for cooperation, and the promise of a less threatening (less 
interventionist) hegemon facilitated a rapprochement between north and south.  
Heraldo Munoz affirms the importance of the shift in U.S. foreign policy, writing 
that “the passing of [the Cold War] sharply reduced the risk that resolutions authorizing 
hemispheric action in favor of democracy could be treated as licenses for the pursuit of 
political ends related loosely, if at all, to the consolidation and preservation of 
representative democracy.”106 In a 1994 piece, diplomatic historian and foreign policy 
scholar Richard Ullman echoes this, saying that Washington officials will no longer “be 
able to plausibly justify military assistance to repressive Latin American regimes by 
claiming that a lack of aid would allow Moscow another foothold in the hemisphere.”107 
In other words, hypocrisy became less sustainable, and so more consistent democracy-
promoting behaviors became possible. 
Another factor motivating Latin American states to build closer relationships with 
the United States was the economic uncertainty associated with the end of the Cold War 
and the threat of economic marginalization. While this uncertainty proved to be a much 
more important factor to the African norm shift (as African countries were much worse 
off economically and did not experience the kind of democratization that Latin America 
did), it does factor into regional developments in the Western hemisphere as well. Latin 
America experienced major economic crisis in the 1980s with low growth rates (low 
compared to Southeast Asia, higher than Africa: see Figure 1.2). The threat of political 
and economic marginalization associated with the end of the Cold War—especially the 	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diversion of investment to Central and Eastern Europe—increased Latin American states’ 
motivation to strengthen their relationship with the United States through cooperation on 
issues of common concern, like democracy, human rights, and economic liberalization. 
As Andrew Hurrell assessed the situation in 1994, “Though publicly applauded, the 
collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe has led to an acute fear of 
marginalization. Latin American governments have tended to see themselves as 
competing with the newly democratic states of Eastern and Central Europe for a limited 
pool of aid, loans, foreign investment, and technology.”108 Writing in 1992 on the 
positive reception of Latin American states to President Bush’s 1990 Enterprise for the 
Americas proposal (a regional economic cooperation initiative), Peter Hakim of the Inter-
American Dialogue group explains that “The timing of the initiative was, in fact, as 
important as its substance. The waning of the Cold War and the crumbling of 
communism in Eastern Europe a year earlier had produced new anxieties in Latin 
America. Many in the region feared that their countries, mostly still plagued by massive 
debt and deep depression, would become politically and economically marginal in the 
rapidly changing global context.”109 
Since “maintaining access” to the northern neighbor was “of dominant 
importance” to economically uncertain Latin American states, these states had a “strong 
incentive to prevent friction on noneconomic issues from disrupting economic 
relations.”110 This provided added impetus for cooperation on democracy-promotion at 
the level of the OAS, and may have motivated some more reluctant states to support (or 
at least acquiesce to) the circumscription of the non-interference norm. A group of what 	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Richard Bloomfield has labeled “non-interventionists” (as opposed to “activists” like 
Chile)—including Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Brazil—were indeed wary of adopting 
Resolution 1080, but these states voted in favor of it because they “did not want to be 
seen as to be ‘against democracy.’”111 
Finally, and importantly for the central argument of the dissertation, Heraldo 
Munoz has also emphasized that, although Resolution 1080 and the Santiago 
Commitment were “milestones,” they are only “the most recent expressions of a long-
term trend toward the affirmation of democratic principles and purposes contained in the 
OAS Charter and countless other declarations, resolutions and measures adopted by the 
hemispheric organization.”112 Indeed, the Santiago Commitment’s full title includes the 
phrase “Renewal of the Inter-American System.” As Chapter 3 and the first section of 
this chapter show, there is a long history of liberal pan-American norms existing in 
tension with strict sovereignty. 
 
Multidimensional civilian missions in the 1990s 
The OAS increasingly involved itself in the internal crises of its member states in the 
1990s, in response to unconstitutional changes in government and/or episodes of political 
violence.  Conflicts came to be “increasingly viewed as threats to the hemisphere’s peace 
and solidarity.”113 The OAS built its repertoire of responses to crisis and conflict through 
practice, and these response activities included, for example, diverse monitoring activities 
(election observation, investigation and reporting on human rights conditions, “internal 
verification” of peace accords, monitoring of “ongoing political processes and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Bloomfield 1994a, 18. 
112 Munoz 1998, 2. 
113 Vaky 1993, 43. 
	   152 
commitments,” short-term fact-finding missions, et cetera), mediation missions, and 
diplomatic and economic sanctions.114 Civilians rather than military personnel have 
staffed missions on the ground,115 as OAS member states harbor an “historical and deep-
seated fear” that any legitimization of the use of force might be coopted by the United 
States to impose its political will in the region.116 The Rio Group, a “particularly 
important prodemocracy agent,” has rejected the use of force to protect democracy.117 
 Two early examples of post-Cold War OAS civilian deployments show the 
multidimensionality of these missions. First, the International Commission for Support 
and Verification in Nicaragua (1990-1997) was a peace mission primarily managed by 
the OAS but with the support of the United Nations. This commission worked to 
demobilize combatants and repatriate Nicaraguans residing in neighboring countries. It 
also delivered food and other supplies to 120,000 people and “monitored the security 
rights and guarantees that had been given to the former Nicaraguan Resistance” fighters. 
It mediated between the Nicaraguan government and the Catholic Church and 
investigated violations of human rights.118 Despite the civilian status of the mission, then, 
it was highly intrusive by Cold War understandings of state sovereignty. 
 A second early civilian mission of note was a joint OAS-United Nations 
undertaking - the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (1993-2000). After a coup d’état 
ousted the democratically elected government in Haiti, the OAS, pursuant to Resolution 
1080, convened a meeting, condemned the coup, demanded the reinstatement of the 
legitimate government, and applied diplomatic and economic sanctions. The military 	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regime in Haiti was unmoved, so the OAS and the United Nations negotiated for the right 
to deploy a civilian mission to monitor human rights in the country and engage in 
political consultations. In 1994, a multinational military force led by the United States 
and authorized by the United Nations (outside of the OAS framework) succeeded in 
reinstating the former regime. The OAS-United Nations International Civilian Mission 
returned after this reinstatement and expanded its role to include “electoral observation, 
humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply 
and the economic recovery” efforts.119 
 
The limits of democratic density: backlash against the Inter-American Commission 
In 2013, several OAS member states attempted to weaken the powers of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in response to actions the Commission had 
taken against them. For example, Brazil proposed that the Commission’s ability to order 
‘precautionary measures’ be taken away. Such measures allow for the issuance of 
directives “before examining the merits of an individual case, in order to prevent 
irreparable damage to fundamental rights.”120 For example, in 2012, the Commission 
ordered that Brazil cease construction on the Belo Monte Dam, because of the damage 
the dam would do to lands upon which indigenous people depended. In addition to Brazil, 
some other states made similar proposals to curb Commission powers. However, a 
coalition of civil society organizations based in Latin and North America—	  Center for the 
Study of Law, Justice and Society (Dejusticia), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales 
(CELS), Institute for Legal Defense (IDL), Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), and 	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Fundar—countered these efforts by lobbying governments, raising awareness through 
media outreach, and maintaining a presence at OAS meetings on the subject. This 
coalition was successful in preventing the removal of Commission powers.121 
 This backlash against the Inter-American Commission (by democratic 
governments) suggests that there are limits to the explanatory power, in the long run, of 
democratic density for the strength of human rights monitoring. Specifically, once many 
highly repressive regimes no longer exist in the region, regional human rights bodies 
allocate more of their attention to the human rights practices of regional democracies, 
which may result in push back, as in this case. On the other hand, Latin America’s civil 
society organizations are arguably more able to affect regional policy precisely because 
they operate in democracies. In sum, then, enduring high democratic density may have 
paradoxical effects on certain kinds of intrusive regionalism—like human rights 
monitoring and enforcement—in the long term.  
 
Conclusion 
Democratization renewed regional liberalism and, in combination with the 
rapprochement between the United States and Latin America—facilitated by the end of 
the Cold War—provided for the development of regional mechanisms to promote 
democracy, peace, and human rights in the 1990s and beyond. These mechanisms built 
upon intrusive liberal regional traditions based on a pan-American identity discourse that 
became embedded in institutions and practices in the post-World War II era. High 
democratic density was not achieved in Africa or Southeast Asia, but, as Chapters 6-7 
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show, democratic states played key roles in promoting intrusive regionalism in both of 
these regions as well. 
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Chapter 5  
Africa: Part I 
Chapter 3 introduced pan-African transnationalism and made the case that this identity 
discourse presents a challenge to Westphalian sovereignty in Africa. In the present 
chapter, I argue that sovereignty norms remained contested beyond the formation of the 
OAU and that the importance of pan-African transnationalism endured, contributing to 
the erosion of the legitimacy of non-interference over time. A central pan-Africanist post-
colonial undertaking—the continental campaign against apartheid South Africa—helped 
to undercut the norm of non-interference by exposing the OAU to charges of hypocrisy.  
The second section of the chapter discusses the emergence in the 1980s of new 
international policy discourses—human-centrism, popular participation in development, 
and holistic problem-solving—that arose in response to the economic crisis of this decade 
and to the structural adjustment programs imposed on struggling African countries by 
international financial institutions. In combination with pan-African transnationalism, 
these discourses provided African proponents of intrusive regionalism with discursive 
tools that helped them to successfully frame the reform of African institutions as a 
strategy for managing problems associated with regional economic crisis. Chapter 6 picks 
up with this reform campaign and its result—the rise of interference practices beginning 
in the early 1990s. 
 This chapter presents two main challenges to a great power influence explanation. 
First, it provides evidence that the norm of non-interference was contested in Africa in 
the 1960s and 1970s before the incorporation of human rights into Western states 
bilateral foreign policies took place in the late 1970s. Second, it demonstrates the role of 
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regional actors—particularly Executive Secretary Adebayo Adedeji of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa—in the emergence of international policy discourses in 
the 1980s that built the foundation for the human security paradigm, which called on the 
international community to redefine security and sovereignty. 
 
Contestation of sovereignty norms: 1960s-1980s 
Debates over diplomatic recognition in the 1960s 
Disputes among OAU members in the mid 1960s about the diplomatic recognition of 
African governments revealed contestation about strict sovereignty norms. Regimes 
coming to power through coups d’état and/or propped up by extraregional powers did not 
enjoy universal diplomatic recognition on the continent during these initial years. Some 
states pushed for the non-recognition of what they considered to be neocolonial 
governments. This manifested itself in the OAU’s approach to the Congo crisis (1960-
65), since many heads of state considered the regime in power to be a ‘neo-colonialist 
puppet’ installed by outside powers and therefore undeserving of freedom from non-
interference.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo won independence from Belgium in 
1960, but, with Belgian support, Moise Tshombe led a secession movement of the 
mineral-rich Katanga province. This move was not successful, but Congo’s prime 
minister was assassinated during the course of this stage of the conflict. Later, in 1964, 
Tsombe attempted another power grab, this time for the whole of the country, and, with 
the backing of the United States, Belgium, and foreign mercenaries from Rhodesia and 
South Africa, he succeeded. Fighting continued, and the OAU struggled to find it’s 
proper role in relation to this internal conflict. At one point, the continental organization 	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established an ad hoc commission that has been described as ‘bold’ for the time, since its 
final report recommended, against the Tsombe regime’s wishes, that a rebel group be 
given a seat at the negotiation table.2 Although this did not come to pass, the 
recommendation itself was a violation of non-interference and controversial.  
Two years later, some African leaders also accused coup-makers in Ghana (who 
ousted Kwame Nkrumah while he was visiting China) of coming to power through 
interference by extra-regional powers and, in response, imposed diplomatic sanctions 
against the new regime, calling for similar actions to be taken by the OAU. Rumors 
circulated that Western powers had aided Nkrumah’s challengers. In the end, though, 
those African states in favor of diplomatic recognition based on control of territory alone 
(and corresponding observance of a strict interpretation of non-interference) won the day 
on this question, and the OAU generally followed this policy thereafter.3 After 
Nkrumah’s ouster in 1966, he lived in exile until his death in 1972.  This expulsion of the 
continent’s leading radical pan-Africanist, combined with the seeming settlement of the 
regime recognition question in 1966, might lead us to believe that radical pan-
Africanism, and associated contestation over Westphalian sovereignty, would die out. It 
did not.  
 
Nkrumah’s intellectual successors 
Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere (1965-1985) became more radicalized after 
Nkrumah’s ouster, “assuming the mantle of Nkrumah’s militancy.”4 During the lead-up 
to the establishment of the OAU, Julius Nyerere had advocated sub-regional unions over 	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3 Kufuor 2002, 375. 
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of the immediate formation of a continental union. A dispute developed between Nyerere 
and Nkrumah who, after the 1961 failure of the West African union, took the position 
that sub-regional organizing would undermine rather than encourage continental unity. In 
1963, Nyerere took a moderate position on African unity (relative to Nkrumah’s) at the 
OAU summit and then accused Nkrumah of contributing to the failure of the East African 
Federation through sabotage. As evidenced through his speeches and writings from 1966 
onwards, though, the Tanzanian president was not satisfied with the form of African 
unity taken by the OAU and sought to move things forward towards the long-term goal of 
pooled sovereignties.   
Nyerere’s famous “Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist” address to a 1966 assembly at 
the University of Zambia captures well the challenge that transnational solidarities 
present to the kind of nationalism associated with Westphalian statehood based on 
colonial borders. He delivered this speech at the invitation of Zambian President Kenneth 
Kaunda, and used the opportunity to reflect on the unattained vision of pan-Africanism. 
He opened the speech with reference to the failure of Africans to achieve political unity, 
lamenting that “we are a long way from achieving the thing we originally set out to 
achieve, and I believe there is danger that we might now voluntarily surrender our 
greatest dream of all.” The core message of the speech was an acknowledgement of the 
difficulty of reconciling competing demands: “I do not believe the answer is easy. Indeed 
I believe that a real dilemma faces the Pan-Africanist. On the one hand is the fact that 
Pan-Africanism demands an African consciousness and an African loyalty; on the other 
hand is the fact that each Pan-Africanist must also concern himself with the freedom and 
development of one of the nations of Africa. These things can conflict. Let us be honest 
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and admit that they have already conflicted.” Nyerere did not advocate immediate 
continental unity here, then, but urged his audience not to be complacent: “But it is not 
enough for African states to cooperate in dealing with particular problems. We must 
deliberately move to unity.” He predicted that a time would come when “separate 
sovereignties” would cause progress on regional integration to plateau, “and thus damage 
our real hopes for Africa.” He insisted that, when that time comes, “we shall have to take 
the plunge into a merger of our international sovereignties.”5 
In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars and regional bureaucrats proposed versions of 
Nkrumah’s United States of Africa plan, which he had laid out in his 1963 publication 
“Africa Must Unite.” In 1974, Senegalese scholar and prominent opposition leader 
Cheikh Anta Diop wrote a book proposing a federal political system in Africa. Frustrated 
with OAU member states’ refusal to cede sovereignty, he insisted that common security 
and economic problems could not be addressed outside of continental African political 
unity. He proposed a common African language, political unification, a common 
industrial infrastructure, and a common army.6 Later, OAU Secretary-General Edem 
Kodjo (1978-1983) proposed a follow-up to the federal blueprints of Nkrumah (1963) 
and Diop (1974) in 1985. His main concern was Africa’s marginalization, and he called 
Africans to “resolutely fight against the preservation of the artificial boundaries that 
divide them in favor of African unity…”7 In his proposal, African states would first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nyerere gave the speech “The Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist” to the University of University of Zambia 
on July 13, 1965. It is printed in Langley 1979. 
6 Martin 2002, 260. 
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integrate—economically and politically—at the sub-regional level, leading to an eventual 
United States of Africa.8  
 
Pan-African Transnationalism 
Post-Nkrumah challenges to Westphalian sovereignty in Africa were not restricted to 
proposals for formal political union put forward by prominent Africans. More important 
were the direct criticisms (outlined below) leveled at the African regional community for 
its failure to interfere in the domestic affairs of OAU member states in response to gross 
violations of the rights and security of their citizens. These criticisms, articulated most 
prominently (but not exclusively) by Julius Nyerere during the 1960s and 1970s, were 
often framed with reference to transnational solidarities (among African people rather 
than among African states).  
The anti-apartheid campaign was central, up until 1994, to the pan-Africanist 
project. Writing in 1967, I. William Zartman described Africa as “highly 
sentimentalized”  “identification area” in the discourse of African international politics. 
And this “sentimentalization,” he argued, was deployed most visibly in service of the 
continental anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid struggle.9 Critics often made use of an 
important contradiction in OAU policy in order to push for circumscription of the non-
interference norm: its interference in South African affairs in the name of transnational 
African solidarity and human rights protection, on the one hand, and its unwillingness to 
criticize other African states’ atrocities in the name of non-interference, on the other 
hand. Official criticism of and sanctions leveled against minority-regime states like South 	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Africa opened up the African community to charges of hypocrisy when they failed to 
interfere in these ways in independent African states whose regimes carried out atrocities 
against their own people.10  
According to international legal scholar Rachel Murray, the human rights-related 
concerns of the OAU were, from the beginning, centered on two issues: self-
determination (to be achieved through the complete decolonization of the continent) and 
apartheid/racial discrimination in southern Africa.11 When the OAU was established, 
portions of Africa remained under colonial or white minority regimes, and the 
elimination of these regimes remained a primary focus of the organization for three 
decades. It adopted resolutions on decolonization, formed a Liberation Committee 
(materially supporting liberation movements), led international sanctions against South 
Africa, and worked to keep these issues on the United Nations General Assembly agenda. 
Later developments in regional human rights and democracy-promotion policy in part 
grew out of earlier regional efforts against colonialism and apartheid because these 
problems were framed in the language of human rights.  For example, while the OAU 
Charter’s (1963) only reference to human rights is its affirmation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Lusaka Manifesto: A Policy Statement for 
Decolonization in Respect of Southern Africa (1969) states that “All men are equal, and 
have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of color, race, religion or sex. 
We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate as equal members of 
society, in their own government.”12  
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Central African States. See Murray 2004, 15. 
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Furthermore, OAU resolutions condemning colonial and apartheid regimes 
employed the language of human rights to denounce detainee abuse, unfair trials, 
undemocratic constitutions, racial discrimination, property damage, et cetera. That the 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid movements were “seen as a struggle for democracy and 
human rights” provided foundation for the OAU to eventually take up these concepts 
more broadly.13 According to Christopher Clapham, “In bringing their outrage to the 
attention of an external and especially Western audience, however, African governments 
and other anti-apartheid campaigners both explicitly breached the frontiers of juridical 
sovereignty and raised issues relating to their own states. Once the human rights records 
of African-ruled states started to attract external attention, it was correspondingly harder 
to claim the protection of sovereign statehood.”14 
Paul D. Williams similarly identifies “the OAU’s willingness to condemn the 
internal arrangements of European minority regimes such as those in Rhodesia and South 
Africa while its members remained silent in the face of abuses committed by African 
governments” as a contradiction in the OAU’s security culture that would eventually 
contribute to institutional reform.15 Relatedly, Elin Hellquist links the OAU pro-
democracy sanctions regime that emerged in the 1990s to the organization’s history of 
imposing anti-apartheid sanctions on South Africa.16 
The year following Nyerere’s “Dilemma of a Pan-Africanist Speech” saw the 
beginning of a two and a half year conflict in Nigeria, the Biafran War (1967-70). 
Following a series of military coups, the Eastern region attempted to secede and declared 
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independence as the state of Biafra, leading to a civil war responsible for over two 
million civilian deaths.17 The OAU’s response to this conflict was in keeping with the 
norm of non-interference, as the OAU commission charged with supporting its settlement 
was explicitly mandated to support the Nigerian government and did not even 
acknowledge the Biafran side by name. This official OAU policy—a strongly pro-regime 
mandate—masked divisions and debate, however, among member states about the 
OAU’s proper role in response to internal conflict and human suffering. Four states 
extended diplomatic recognition and even aid to Biafra. The foreign minister of the Ivory 
Coast criticized the OAU for “playing the role of Pontius Pilate in such a crisis on the 
pretext of defending a principle [non-interference] … It would be cowardly and 
hypocritical not to intervene in such a sad affair.”18 Sierra Leone attributed the inability 
of outsider actors to facilitate negotiations between the parties to the OAU’s pro-regime 
mandate, based on the norm of non-interference.19 Finally, Nyerere spoke out about OAU 
inaction in response to the Biafran War, invoking the tension between state-centered 
regionalism and transnational solidarities: “The OAU is not a trade union of African 
heads of state. Therefore, if it is to retain the respect and support of the people of Africa, 
it must be concerned about the lives of the people of Africa. We must not just concern 
ourselves with our survival as heads of state; we must even be more concerned about 
peace and justice in Africa…”20 In this way, the Tanzanian president not only criticized 
OAU policy on the Biafran conflict in particular, but made a broader point about the 
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purposes of pan-African cooperation and the objects of pan-African responsibility 
(people over states). 
General Idi Amin came to power in Uganda following a 1971 coup d’état, and his 
regime grew infamous over the course of the next decade for atrocities committed against 
its citizens. According to Claude Welch, Amin’s practices and Julius Nyerere’s 
“increasingly sharp criticisms” of them pushed the OAU to become more willing to 
“delve into the domestic practices of member states.”21 During this time, Julius Nyerere 
called upon the OAU many times to condemn Amin’s massive violations of human 
rights, sometime referring to the OAU’s need to maintain its moral authority in order to 
criticize South Africa’s abuses, saying, for example, “Amin…has killed more Africans 
than the Boers under apartheid rule.”22  
 A group of four states—Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia—
boycotted a 1975 OAU meeting in protest of Amin’s upcoming succession to the post of 
Chairman of the OAU (summit hosts are automatically named Chairman). They cited 
Amin’s “apparent disregard for human life” as justification for the protest. A July 1975 
statement issued by the government of Tanzania lays out the case for boycott and restates 
Nyerere’s earlier appeals for the prioritization of transnational solidarity over state 
solidarity: 
“[The OAU] is an organization of States but its purpose is the service of the people of 
Africa- all the people... It is not surprising therefore that the whole of Africa cries out 
against the atrocities of the colonial and racist States. Individually as Africans, and 
through the OAU, we condemn the murderous acts of these regimes on every possible 
occasion and in every possible forum... But when massacres, oppression and torture are 
used against Africans in the independent States of Africa … [T]he OAU acts like a trade 
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union of the current Heads of State and Government, with solidarity reflected in silence if 
not in open support for each other.”23 
 
The statement goes on to point out that “The reasons given by African leaders for their 
silence about these things is the non-interference clause in the OAU Charter” and to 
criticize the hypocrisy of this reasoning: 
“But why is it good for States to condemn apartheid and bad for them to condemn 
massacres which are committed by independent African Governments? …	  We have come 
to our decision [to boycott the meeting in Kampala] because we are convinced that the 
[OAU] will deserve the condemnation of the world and of the peoples of Africa as an 
organization of hypocrites if it acquiesces, or appears to acquiesce, in the murders and 
massacres which have been perpetrated by the present Uganda Government.”24 
 
 
The 1975 boycott did not succeed in preventing Amin from assuming the chairmanship, 
but, as Claude Welch writes in 1981, it did help to ‘narrow the gap’ between the attention 
paid by regional actors to the practices of South Africa and that paid to the domestic 
practices of fellow OAU member states. According to Welch, OAU states had “begun to 
[look] increasingly at each others' records in fostering basic liberties. What was broached 
in 1975, with Tanzanian criticisms of Ugandan practices, was broadened by the 1979 
O.A.U. summit to a unanimous resolution” to draft a regional human rights charter (see 
below).25 
In 1986, newly elected Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni echoed this 
reasoning in his first address to the OAU Heads of State and Government, relaying his 
“deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent while tyrants killed [three quarters 
of a million Ugandans]” in order to “supposedly” maintain respect for the non-
interference principle, despite the existence of “explicit law” at the regional and global 	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levels “that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life.” Non-interference, he 
argued, “should never be used as a cloak to shield genocide from just censure,” lest it 
“undermine our moral authority to condemn the excesses of others, especially South 
Africa’s racist regime.”26  
 
Signs of norm erosion: 1978-1982 
Developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s foreshadowed the 1990s norm shift. At 
this point we find some evidence that this contestation at the discursive level may be 
translating into changes at the level of law and practice as well as discourse.  First, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Tanzania’s 1979 invasion of Amin’s Uganda, while not praised, was 
met with muted reactions. Some observers have suggested that many African leaders 
were silently relieved that the embarrassing despot had been removed. The OAU summit 
meeting in July of that year did not condemn the invasion, for example. 27  
An important discursive shift on the issue of the African refugee problem took 
place in 1979; a regional conference on refugees was held and many African speakers for 
the first time openly acknowledged that independent African states contributed 
significantly to refugee flows.28 The refugee crisis, a consistent feature of independent 
Africa, was for many years attributed to the policies of minority and racist regimes. 
According to C.O.C Amate, “[M]any African speakers on the issue on the platform of the 
OAU tended to speak as if all the refugees in Africa originated from the territories that 
were still under colonial and white minority regimes. It was for many years part of the 
rhetoric of these African speakers to put all the blame…on [these] governments long after 	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this could not be supported by any statistical evidence.”29 If the OAU hadn’t for years 
been drawing attention to refugee flows as a means of criticizing South Africa and others, 
it may not have been forced, in a way, to eventually examine intrastate problems in 
independent African states that were contributing to refugee flows. 
Also in 1979, after nearly two decades of calls for a regional human rights body 
from the transnational legal community, the OAU’s Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government commissioned a working group to draft an African human rights charter. 
The establishment of a regional human rights system “mark[ed] a radical departure from 
the OAU policy of the 1970s whereby issues pertaining to human rights were seen as 
internal affairs of member states.” 30 The first calls for a regional body tasked with the 
promotion and protection of human rights came in 1961 from participants at a rule-of-law 
themed conference of lawyers and other legal professionals in Lagos, Nigeria (sponsored 
by the International Commission of Jurists).  This event sparked a series of other 
conferences, seminars and colloquia sponsored by the International Commission of 
Jurists and/or United Nations over the next two decades.31  These were typically attended 
by jurists representing African nations, representatives of international and non-
governmental organizations, and delegates from countries outside Africa present as 
observers.  It was not until 1979, however, that the OAU Assembly commissioned a 
working group to draft an African human rights charter.  A version of this charter was 
passed by the OAU in 1981 and entered into force in 1986 after achieving sufficient 
ratifications (27).  The charter itself established a regional human rights Commission 
tasked with the protection and promotion of human rights.  The Commission came into 	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being in 1986.  The charter did not establish a regional court (this would take place in 
1998—see Chapter 6).  The omission of a court is one difference between the African 
system as established in 1981 and other regional systems existing at the time (the 
European and Inter-American systems).  Other key differences include the enumeration 
of individual ‘duties’ in addition to ‘rights,’32 provisions for group (peoples’) rights, and 
a greater emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights than found in other regional 
charters.  
Finally, the OAU mounted its first peacekeeping mission in Chad in 1981, and 
this operation (or rather set of operations) was exceptional for the Cold War period. The 
Chadian civil war began in the 1960s, but the OAU didn’t take any action to try to 
resolve it until the late 1970s, when it retroactively offered diplomatic support to a 
Nigerian peacekeeping operation there. The OAU became more concerned with the civil 
war when a proposed union between Chad and Libya was announced in 1981. This 
alarmed African states because of Libya’s extensive interventionism on the continent. 
Although the OAU peacekeeping mission (1981-1982) was mandated in a peace 
agreement to which the Chadian government was party, meaning the deployment was 
technically consensual, the neutrality of the force itself was unprecedented and faced 
resistance from the government of Chad, who expected the OAU forces to fight on the 
side of the government.33 The mission is generally considered a failure—it was “fraught 
with problems from the outset,” including insufficient force size, financial shortcomings, 
and logistical problems stemming from an imprecise mandate.34 The OAU was in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The ‘duties’ provisions distinguish the African human rights charter from the European human rights 
convention but not from the American version, which does include duties. 
33 May and Massey 1998, 52-53. 
34 Berman and Sams 2000, 53. 
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uncharted territory, as it had not experience with peacekeeping and was unsure of how to 
proceed in a way that would be in least violation of the non-interference norm. During the 
rest of the decade, economic problems preoccupied African regionalism, but in the early 
1990s, the idea of regional security governance would resurface.  
 
Economic crisis and the emergence of new international policy discourses 
This section provides important context for Chapter 6 by discussing the development in 
the 1980s of regional and international policy discourses: those linking democracy, 
human rights, and security, on the one hand, to economic development, on the other 
hand, and those promoting human-centered concepts of development and security. These 
policy discourses emerged at the global and especially regional levels from push-back 
against structural adjustment programs imposed on struggling African countries in the 
1980s. The regional reform campaign of the early 1990s would draw on this language 
and these ideas to frame its proposals and make the case that regional management of 
domestic political and security matters would contribute to economic recovery and 
combat Afro-pessimism and Africa’s marginalization. 
  
The ‘Lost Decade’: economic crisis in the 1980s  
Although African states initially experienced relatively fast economic growth in the 
1960s, by the end of the 1970s, it was apparent that the approaches to development taken 
since independence had not delivered positive results for African economies.35 A world 
recession compounded existing problems and created new ones, resulted in a severe 
economic crisis on the continent beginning in the early 1980s. While other developing 	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regions, like Latin America, experienced crisis as well, sub-Saharan Africa suffered the 
worst. Although Latin American debt was higher in absolute terms, African debt as a 
proportion of national income was much higher. Prominent among the external adverse 
factors confronting Africa included a fall in prices primary commodities prices, 
ballooning external debt, and general decline in resource flows to the continent.36 
Environmental conditions leading to severe drought in some countries exacerbated these 
problems. Between 1980 and 1988, the continent’s average GDP per capita fell by 25% 
and income per capita by 30%.37 The 1980s are referred to as the Lost Decade for 
Africa.38 In response to economic crisis in (especially sub-Saharan) African countries, the 
International Monetary Fund offered loan packages under the condition that these states 
undergo economic adjustment (structural adjustment programs), a set of neoliberal 
policies including especially deregulation, privatization, free trade and fiscal austerity. 
Unsurprisingly, economic concerns soon became the primary focus of the OAU, 
and this decade saw many African economic treaties and entire summits devoted to 
economic crisis. This preoccupation shows up in both speeches and OAU declarations. 
This resulted in a series of OAU and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) legal instruments aimed at economic development.39 The ECA was established by 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1958 to promote economic 
integration and development. Its membership consists of African states, so it is uniquely 
positioned as both a regional arm of the United Nations and an advocate for African 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ECA 1989, i. 
37 Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara 1990, 26-27. 
38 See Deng and Zartman 2002, 106. 
39 For example, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Priority Program for Economic Recovery (1985), the 
Common Position on External Debt (1987), the Khartoum Declaration on Human Centered Development 
(1988), and the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990). 
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priorities. By the middle of the 1980s, African states came to understand the economic 
situation on the continent to be “a real emergency that had to be addressed urgently and 
vigorously,”40 and they attempted to address it at the international level (see below) and 
at the regional level through organizations like the OAU, ECA, ECOWAS and the 
African Development Bank. 
Under pressure from African states and others, the United Nations General 
Assembly held a Special Session on Africa’s Economic and Social Crisis in 1986.41 
According to ECA officials, the session “afforded the continent a unique opportunity to 
put its case before the international community with a view to mobilizing international 
support for its efforts to surmount the crisis. Never before had a special session of the 
United Nations General Assembly been organized to discuss the problem of any one 
particular region of the world.”42 This unprecedented special session resulted in the 
launch of the United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development 1986-90 in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program and 
the ECA. 
 
New policy discourses emerge in response to crisis and adjustment 
African policy processes in response to economic crisis and structural adjustment 
programs produced new policy discourses. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the social impact 
of International Monetary Fund-imposed structural adjustment became an object of 
criticism from many sources (academics and bureaucrats, regional and global actors), and 
African institutions and processes were central to this push back and the search for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ake 1996, 26. 
41 Ake 1996, 26. 
42 Rasheed and Sarr 1991, 28. 
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alternative approaches to crisis management and development. The primary criticism 
leveled at structural adjustment is that it was not designed with attention to the ‘human 
dimension’ of development and that its implementation therefore brought a destructive 
social impact. At the global level, United Nations Children’s Fund is often credited for 
bringing this criticism into international focus, especially with its 1987 report 
“Adjustment with a Human Face,” which outlined the programs’ negative effects on 
health and education outcomes.43 In the spring of 1989, Pakistani economist Mahbub Ul 
Haq proposed the idea of an annual report focused on ‘human development’ to the 
Administrator of the United Nations Development Program. The first such report came 
out in 1990. Haq has written that “The late 1980s were ripe for a counter-offensive. It 
was becoming obvious in several countries that human lives were shriveling even as 
economic production was expanding…The human costs of structural adjustment 
programmes … had been extremely harsh. That prompted questions about the human 
face of adjustment … At the same time, the strong forces of democracy started sweeping 
across many lands…raising new aspirations for people-centred development models.”44  
This ‘counter-offensive’ was especially active at the regional level in Africa, 
especially through the ECA. As a follow-up to the implementation of the United Nations 
Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, and in 
collaboration with other UN agencies, the ECA’s Executive Secretary Adebayo Adedeji 
organized a series of international conferences on Africa’s economic situation (in 1987, 
1988, and 1990) as well as the development of the 1989 “African Alternative Framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Cornia et al 1987. 
44 Haq 1995, pages 24-25. 
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to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation.”45 
Professor Adedeji held the Executive Secretary position from 1978 to 1991, before which 
he served in the Nigerian government as the federal commissioner for economic 
development and reconstruction. During his career as economic commissioner, he led 
negotiations among the West African states to form a sub-regional grouping and is 
therefore known as the ‘father’ of ECOWAS, an organization formed in 1975. 
The speeches given at and statements produced by ECA conferences in the late 
1980s critique orthodox structural adjustment from many angles and constitute evidence 
of the emergence of three inter-related policy discourses: human-centrism, popular 
participation in development, and holistic problem solving46 (see Table 5.1). The 
emergence of these discourses is important because the regional reform campaign of the 
early 1990s would draw upon this language and these ideas to make the case that 
intrusive regionalism to promote peace, democracy, and human rights would help create 
the conditions for economic development, improve Africa’s image in the world, and 
attract investment and resources to the continent. These discourses also fed into the rise 
of the ‘human security’ paradigm among academics and practitioners in the 1990s. The 
human security concept presents a challenge to traditional notions of national security 
and state sovereignty.47 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 International Conference on Africa: The Challenge of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development 
(1987, Abuja). The International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa’s Recovery and 
Development (1988, Khartoum). The International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery 
and Development Process in Africa (1990, Arusha). 
46 “Human-centrism” and “holistic problem-solving” are my terms. 
47 Economist Mahbub ul Haq is credited with popularizing the concept of human security in United Nations 
Development Program's 1994 Human Development Report. 
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Table 5.1 Emerging International Policy Discourses 
Policy Discourse  Content Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) Critique 
Relevance to 1990s 
Norm Shift 
Human-Centrism Human well being as 
primary policy 
objective; Protection 
of vulnerable 
populations 
SAPs are inattentive to 
social impact 
The human as referent of 
security; human security 
over national sovereignty 
(the shift from non-
interference to ‘non-
indifference’)  
Popular Participation 
in Development 
Grassroots initiatives, 
democratization, 
popular buy-in, 
political reform 
SAPs are imposed top-
down (and from outside) 
against the will of the 
masses  
Democracy and human 
rights promotion 
Holistic Problem-
Solving 
Interrelation among 
problems previously 
addressed separately 
SAPs fail because they are 
narrowly targeted at 
macroeconomic indicators 
Security and democracy as 
development prerequisites  
 
Human-centrism was the focus of United Nations Children’s Fund’s “Adjustment with a 
Human Face” report and the impetus behind the launch of the United Nations 
Development Program’s Human Development Report. The idea is that public policy 
should be designed to promote and protect the well being of humans (especially 
‘vulnerable populations’), in the short- and long-term. The concept of ‘human security’—
which became an international policy buzzword after Mahbub Ul Haq devoted the 1994 
Human Development report to it and is central to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle 
that emerged in the late 1990s—melds together human-centrism and holistic problem-
solving (see below).  Popular participation in development promotes grassroots 
development initiatives and democratic policy-making processes, emphasizing the 
importance of popular participation as both a ‘means’ (to better and more sustainable 
development policy) and an ‘end’ (as a human right). Those calling for popular 
participation did so in part as a response to structural adjustment policies that they 
critiqued for being imposed top-down and from outside, against the popular will. The 
Third Wave of democratization and a rising international human rights movement—and 
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the related emphasis on democracy and human rights in Western foreign-policy 
making—reinforced these ideas. Holistic problem-solving is the most important of the 
three for the later regional reform campaign. It pushes back against the structural 
adjustment programs’ narrow focus on macroeconomic indicators and calls for policy-
making that recognizes the multidimensionality of underdevelopment and the relationship 
between the economic, political, security, social, and cultural spheres.  
The first ECA conference on African development (1987), co-sponsored by the 
OAU and the African Development Bank, broadly considered the “Challenge of 
Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development” and produced the “Abuja Statement 
on Long-Term Development in Africa,” which was subsequently endorsed by the ECA 
Council of Ministers (representatives of African states). The Abuja Statement draws 
attention to the problem of Africa’s marginalization:  “In a situation where rapid changes 
are taking place in the geopolitical and technological world order…One of the major 
challenges that faces Africa is how to sustain international public interest on Africa’s 
long-term development though continuous and effective communication that will reach 
all levels of society.”  
The Abuja Statement also promotes popular participation in government by 
linking “a viable development strategy” to “the democratization of the African society 
and increased accountability of those entrusted with power” and identifying these 
conditions as “vital for the mobilization of greater participation.” It emphasizes human-
centrism by declaring “the need to minimize the adverse social impact of [structural 
adjustment] measures and to take into account the human dimension of adjustment” and 
holistic problem solving by asserting that “peace, security and stability are necessary pre-
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conditions for Africa’s development” and that “the political, social, administrative and 
cultural dimensions that are conducive to long-term development must be created to 
ensure the success and sustainability of the development process.”48 
The sequel to the 1987 Abuja conference, the “International Conference on the 
Human Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development,” took place the 
following year (1988) in Khartoum, and emphasized the same themes as Abuja did. It 
produced the “Khartoum Declaration Towards a Human-Focused Approach to Socio-
Economic Recovery and Development in Africa,” (endorsed by the ECA Council of 
Ministers) which identifies the “human condition” as “the only final measure of 
development” stating that “a basic test for all stabilization, adjustment, and development 
programs is whether they will improve the human condition…or worsen it” and that 
“economic issues have overshadowed social concerns and have prevented African 
countries from according the needed centrality of the human dimension and the human 
factor.” It goes on to emphasize holistic problem-solving, asserting that “survival and 
rehabilitation assistance to the most vulnerable groups is an importance element in 
reversing production losses,” that “progress in advancing the human condition in Africa 
depends on the structure, pattern and political context of socio-economic development,” 
and further that this political context “has been marred, for more than two decades, by 
instability, war, intolerance, restrictions on the freedom and human rights of individuals 
and groups…”49   
The Khartoum Declaration also foreshadows calls for regional solutions to these 
interrelated problems with statements like “Governments in each sub-region should 	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devise policies and plans for collectively dealing with the root causes of problems of 
refugees and displaced persons” and “Regional organizations should accord the highest 
priority to the human dimension in the design and implementation of the recovery and 
development programs of the continent, including the resolution of regional conflicts so 
that scarce resources are further saved to protect the human dimension.”50  
During the same year as the Khartoum conference (1988), and with the financial 
support of the United Nations Development Program, ECA Executive Secretary Adebayo 
Adedeji initiated the development of the “African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation,” which his 
team produced in January 1989. This initiative fit into a tense inter-institutional conflict 
between the ECA and the Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank).51 The African Ministers of Economic Planning and Development adopted 
the Alternative Framework in April 1989. Like the Abuja and Khartoum statements, this 
framework is critical of orthodox structural adjustment: “The impact of [structural 
adjustment programs] on well-being…has been the subject of considerable discussion 
and debate as attested by…studies carried out by the [International Monetary Fund] and 
World Bank, and by the [International Labor Organization] and [United Nations 
Children’s Fund]…It is not surprising…that there is an agonizing reappraisal and 
rethinking on the part of many, including the Bretton Woods institutions themselves…”52  
The framework also picks up on the policy discourses discussed above, including 
human-centrism (“Above all, at the center of the alternative framework is the human 
dimension”), popular participation in development (“…as a human-centered framework, 	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[the framework] implies full democratization of all aspects of economic and social 
activities in all stages from decision-making to implementation”), and holistic problem-
solving (“…this quintessential human aspect of development underlies all other 
objectives that Africa will have to pursue, be they economic, social, cultural or 
political.”) All of this is then linked to combating marginalization: “…the [framework] 
should constitute a basis for constructive dialogue between African countries and their 
development partners in the implementation of financing of country programs…[T]he 
resources provided by the international community…urgently must be augmented…”53 
 
Conclusion 
In part because of the political salience of pan-African transnationalism, sovereignty 
remained contested after the formation of the OAU, and the norm of non-interference 
eroded over time. In combination with the global ascendance of liberalism and the 
emergence in the 1980s of international policy discourses that built the foundation for the 
human security paradigm, pan-African transnationalism made regional actors’ response 
to the economic crisis of the 1980s and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world—the 
development of intrusive regionalism (see Chapter 6)—possible and even likely. 
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Chapter 6 
Africa: Part II 
Africa experienced unprecedented and unparalleled economic crisis in the 1980s. As I 
argue in Chapter 1, poor economic performance makes states (and groups of states) 
materially and socially vulnerable, since it increases their material needs, reduces their 
legitimacy vis-à-vis domestic and international audiences, contributes to an image of 
dysfunction (in the eyes of investors and the international community), and draws 
attention to/calls into question existing practices (of individual states and of regions as 
collective actors). 
In the African case, at the close of this decade of crisis, the Cold War ended, and 
this major global structural shift only exacerbated Africa’s vulnerabilities: it introduced 
rival recipients for international aid and investment (Central and Eastern European 
states); it ended superpower clientelism based on East-West competition; it increased the 
attachment of (liberal) political conditionalities to Western loans and aid; and it brought a 
wave of domestic protest (a response to economic crisis and a ‘demonstration effect’1 of 
global liberalization and democratization trends).  
In explicit response to the economic crisis and the events constituting the end of 
the Cold War—and drawing on the language of pan-African transnationalism and the 
emerging international policy discourses discussed in Chapter 5—a regional reform 
campaign was launched in the early 1990s by the secretariats of the OAU and the ECA in 
collaboration with a civil society organization headed by a former Nigerian military 
leader—Olusegun Obasanjo. The campaign called for a redefinition of sovereignty in 
Africa and for the creation of intrusive regional institutions to manage domestic 	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governance and security problems. The logic of these proposals was this: in order to 
combat and compensate for Africa’s (and the OAU’s) image of dysfunction and 
indifference to human suffering, to attract international investment and resources, and to 
create the conditions for economic development, Africa must take collective 
responsibility for the problems of the continent and, through its regional institutions, 
promote peace and democracy.  
This was not an obvious or necessary response to economic crisis, domestic 
protest, and the threat of international economic and political marginalization. It was 1) 
the international ascendance of liberalism, 2) the emergence of policy discourses 
emphasizing the ‘human dimension’ of policy outcomes and the contribution of 
democracy and security to economic development, and 3) the enduring political relevance 
of pan-African transnationalism that made this response possible and even likely. These 
features of the regional and international ideational context informed the causal beliefs 
and legitimacy-seeking strategies of African states and regional bureaucrats. 
As a result of the regional reform campaign, African states adopted law affirming 
a regional role for democracy promotion and creating a conflict management mechanism 
mandated to address intrastate conflict. A new slogan—“the shift from non-interference 
to non-indifference”—accompanied these moves. And this wasn’t just rhetoric—a rise in 
regional interference practices accompanied developments in discourse and law in the 
early 1990s. 
 As the 1990s progressed, this normative shift accelerated. In the late 1990s, 
several key developments took place, including the introduction of an OAU anti-coup 
regime, the replacement of the OAU with the more interventionist African Union, and the 
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adoption of a protocol providing for a regional human rights court. These developments 
should be seen as both a continuation of processes originating in the early 1990s—
promoted by some of the same key players and framed in the same logics and appeal to 
pan-African transnationalism—as well as the result of gradual political liberalization and 
(some) democratization in Africa. Liberalization opened up space for civil society groups 
to pressure regional and subregional bodies to become more intrusive and the newly 
democratized South Africa became a major protagonist for regional reform. 
 An explanation focusing on great power influence has some purchase here. First, 
the dominance of liberal internationalism shaped African legitimation strategies 
(although, as I argue in Chapter 8, we shouldn’t see this as a doctrine emanating 
exclusively from the ‘developed world’). Second, powerful states and international 
financial institutions began to increasingly apply political reform conditionalities to loans 
and aid, worsening African states’ material vulnerability. Relatedly, I find at least one 
example of donor pressure for states to accept intrusive multilateralism (in the form of 
election observers). However, most great power pressure seems to be directed at domestic 
reforms, not regional practices. That African states would pursue intrusive regionalism as 
a strategy to manage economic crisis and related problems points to the importance of 
collective identity, collective image consciousness (vis-à-vis domestic and international 
audiences, especially investors) and a desire to manage this collective image.    
With respect to the changing nature of conflict, I find that important 
developments in discourse, law and practice relevant to non-interference took place 
immediately following the end of the Cold War, and before the ‘new wars’ trend could be 
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identified, and this finding does not support an explanation based on the level of civil 
conflict. 
 
Major problems facing African states in the 1980s and 1990s 
Africa’s material needs, international image problem, and marginalization 
As Chapter 5 discussed, Africa’s economic situation in the 1980s and into the 1990s was 
dire. Additionally, and relatedly, throughout the 1980s and especially during the 1989-
1991 period, African states and regional bureaucrats increasingly articulated concerns 
about Africa’s image abroad and the consequences of this negative image, mainly the 
further economic and political marginalization of the continent. Conflict, poverty, 
disease, instability, and governance issues dominated headlines and painted the entire 
continent with one brush despite empirical variation. Crises in some African states 
created a negative externality—a bad image—for all African states. Image consciousness 
is a clear theme in regional venue speeches during this decade, where states and regional 
bureaucrats lamented “the image of Africa as a backward continent,”2 and the problem of 
“bad publicity.”3 
In a statement at a 1988 conference organized by the African Leadership Forum 
(a civil society group organized by a former Nigerian leader—see below) titled “For 
Improving the Economic and Social Situation in Africa,” ECA Executive Secretary 
Adebayo Adedeji raised concerns about Europe’s increasingly “inward-looking” 
orientation as it moved towards a single market4 (scheduled for 1992), warning that “By 
1992, Europe is going to be even more unfriendly as far as Africa is concerned…Thus, 	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3 OAU 1984, 10. 
4 The 1986 Single European Act called for a single market by 31 December 1992.  
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Africa will become even more marginalized in the 1990s.”5 During the discussion period, 
Adedeji expanded on this point: “There is a complete and cynical change in the attitude 
of the international community towards the development process, implying that since in 
any case developing countries will never make it, why should one bother about them? 
When I recently met two US Congressmen, both wondered why more American 
taxpayers’ money should be devoted to the development of Africa…In 1986, the 
countries of the world agreed for the first time at a special session of the UN General 
Assembly that something had to be done to improve the situation of Africa. Yet, just 
three months later, the USA reduced its Official Development Assistance to Africa by 40 
per cent in spite of all pleas…”6 Later in the session he called for Africa to “get our house 
in order to attract the foreign aid we need to get ourselves out of the woods.”7 
The events of 1989-1991 exacerbated Africa’s material and social vulnerability 
that originated in the economic crisis of the 1980s. The events that constituted the end of 
the Cold War—starting with regime changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 
ending with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991—amplified and made more 
urgent African policy-relevant actors’ existing interrelated concerns about economic 
underdevelopment, international image, and marginalization. Concerns included 
superpower disengagement (cutting off client states) and changing relations with France; 
increase in political conditionalities to Western loans and aid; the acceleration of regional 
economic integration projects (e.g. the progression toward the European Single Market); 
and, most importantly, the diversion of trade and investment to Central and Eastern 
European.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 African Leadership Forum 1988, 19. 
6 African Leadership Forum 1988, 39.	  
7 African Leadership Forum 1988, 43. 
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 That African states should respond to the end of the Cold War with apprehension 
is perhaps counterintuitive considering the devastation caused by superpower-sponsored 
proxy wars during the Cold War period. Also, at the global level, the end of the Cold War 
was celebrated as an event that would usher in a new world order of peace and prosperity 
(although disillusionment about this promise set in within a half decade). But African 
states did respond to the events of 1989-1991 with apprehension, articulating concerns 
about the continent’s economic and political marginalization in the post-Cold War period. 
Specifically, the content of speeches, declarations and reports at venues such as African 
Leadership Forum events and the OAU reveal these articulated concerns. Some examples 
provide illustration. 
  For example, in April 1990, the newly-established African Leadership Forum 
convened a high-level experts meeting with the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development in Paris “on the implications of the events in Eastern Europe.” As then-
Prime Minister of Mozambique Mario Machuno recalls: 
The sheer enormity of the political, strategic, economic and social upheavals resulting 
from the disappearance of the Cold War was bound to redefine the entire global power 
configuration, with significant spin-offs and reverberations for the future of our 
continent, Africa. The collapse of communism meant not only the termination of the Cold 
War; it also signified the preponderance of liberal democracy and market economy on a 
global scale. The participants at the Paris meeting, however, sensed that the end of the 
Cold War also had ominous consequences for Africa. With the cessation of the Cold War 
now, would Africa now be left in the cold and be on its own?8  
 
The language of the outcome document of the 1990 Paris conference ties concerns about 
marginalization to international perceptions about Africa: 
Perceptions on political instability are perhaps the greatest impediments to FDI in Africa. 
…To a large measure, the present level of FDI in Africa is also a reflection of certain 
negative, but not necessarily correct perceptions of Africa by potential investors … it 
should be emphasized that the pervasive negative perception of Africa seems to have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Machungo 2000, page 4  
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eclipsed, considerably, foreign direct investment opportunities in Africa. The negative 
perceptions Western investors tend to have concerning Africa as a whole combine to 
create a rather unpromising situation. African Governments should therefore combat 
these negative perceptions concerning the overall investment climate on the continent. 
This may have to be done at the level of individual countries, the OAU and international 
organizations.” 9 
 
Domestic protest and civil society movements 
The economic crisis left African states with major revenue shortages, balance of payment 
problems and mountains of debt to service.10 The associated inability of these states to 
meet their domestic commitments—including the provision of public services and the 
maintenance of public works, administration, and infrastructure—“thoroughly 
undermined…their legitimacy and efficacy.”11 The implementation of structural 
adjustment programs’ austerity measures further reduced public sector employment and 
public services, including education, health, and security services. Without adequate 
“distributive resources,” African leaders found themselves increasingly unable to 
“maintain control of clientelist networks” and sustain acquiescence from the masses, 
whose living conditions had seriously worsened.12 Superpower disengagement from the 
continent and weakening ties between France and Francophone states left certain regimes 
with even fewer relative resources. 
  As Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle detail in their book, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, an unprecedented wave of popular economic protest swept the 
continent. These protests followed a common pattern, beginning with student 
demonstrations and then incorporating more sectors of society and becoming increasingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 African Leadership Forum 1990, 8, 22 
10 Dharam and Hewitt de Alcantara 1990, 26. 
11 Dharam and Hewitt de Alcantara 1990, 28. 
12 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 100. 
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politicized. Coalitions formed between urban groups. In countries with strong labor 
unions, general strikes were enforced. Governments initially responded with either 
repression or minor concessions. This was ineffective. “Spurred by deepening economic 
distress and reacting against heavy-handed government tactics, protesters began to insist 
on political change. For the first time, narrow economic interests were superseded by 
widespread calls for the ejection of national leaders and the reintroduction of plural 
politics.”13 Protest took aim at the one-party state, and African governments responded to 
this escalation with liberalizing reforms, including the introduction of civil liberties, to 
“palliate the need for real democratization.” According to the authors, violating human 
rights had become more costly at this time because of the international and regional 
normative context—evidenced by the widespread ratification of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights—and the associated increase in attention paid to violations.14  
In many countries, the liberalization trend was followed by constitutional reforms, 
and then the announcement of multiparty elections. Despite the trend of holding 
multiparty elections, though, democratization in Africa proved incomplete and reversible. 
Just as many incumbents survived these elections as didn’t, and many candidates were 
drawn from the same social and political milieu as those in power. As Figure 6.1 shows, 
average democracy scores increased in Africa after 1989, but they plateaued in the 0-2 
range on the Polity IV scale (on the border of ‘closed anocracy’ and ‘open anocracy’) by 
the late 1990s. Today, Africa is populated by a mix of closed and open anocracies as well 
as some democracies in the 6-9 range. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 104. 
14 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 108-109. 
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace15 
 
In parallel to these domestic protests, national and transnational African NGOs 
were working to influence the OAU and sub-regional organizations to become more 
‘people-centered’ (open themselves to civil society participation) and to promote 
democracy, human rights and security through regional mechanisms. One non-
governmental organization—unusual in that it was founded by a former head of state and 
included civil society, regional bureaucrat, and state actor participation—was the African 
Leadership Forum. In collaboration with the OAU and ECA Secretariats, the African 
Leadership Forum organized the Kampala Forum of 1991, bringing together over 500 
participants including representatives of NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, and 
OAU member states, and producing the Kampala Document, a framework for the 
regional promotion and protection of democracy, human rights, security, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Data accessed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
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development. Although the OAU did not adopt the Kampala Document, many of its 
central ideas were reflected in declarations that were adopted. A couple years later, 
regional civil society groups in West Africa were successful in getting ECOWAS 
member states to include provisions for civil society participation—to allow regional 
groups to “observe public meetings, make presentations, and circulate documents”—in 
the 1993 treaty that replaced the organization’s 1975 founding charter.16 
Governments in Africa were more vulnerable to domestic and transnational 
pressure at this time because of their economic problems, and supporting regional 
democracy-, human rights-, and peace-promotion was one way to legitimate themselves 
to domestic audiences (in addition to international audiences).   The 1990 Declaration on 
the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes 
Taking Place in the World, which, as I argue below, marked an important turning point in 
the process of regional normative reform, calls on the OAU Secretary General, in its final 
paragraph to “to ensure the widest possible dissemination of this Declaration and to 
sensitize African public opinion and the international community on its content,”17 
suggesting that the adoption of the declaration was in part a legitimation strategy.   
 
The regional reform campaign 
Beginning in 1989, the heads of three African organizations—the African Leadership 
Forum, the OAU, and the ECA—campaigned to reform the continent’s regional norms 
and institutions through their various platforms and in collaboration with one another. 
They appealed for changes to sovereignty norms in Africa and for the development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Alter et al 2013, 743-745. 
17 OAU 1990b. 
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regional institutions mandated to manage domestic-level governance and security 
problems. They framed these appeals as a response to economic crisis and international 
marginalization, drawing on the emerging regional policy discourses discussed in 
Chapter 5 and pan-African transnationalism to make their case. The framing of the 
campaign—how proponents attempted to convince other policy relevant actors—is 
important, because it clues us into shared values and understandings of the African 
regional community. Martha Finnemore has argued that justification “speaks directly to 
normative context,” because when states justify their actions “they are drawing on and 
articulating shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other 
publics…”18 The framing of the reform campaign was, in a way, a justification for a 
proposal, and as such, reveals something about the content of social structures.  
First, as noted above, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo launched the 
African Leadership Forum in 1988. Obasanjo had been the military ruler of Nigeria from 
1976 to 1979 when he became the first Nigerian military head of state to hand over power 
to a civilian government. Civilian rule didn’t last long in Nigeria, though, and a series of 
military regimes ruled from 1983 to 1999, during which time Obasanjo was active in 
regional politics and served in various United Nations positions. During the Abacha 
regime (1993-1998), Obasanjo criticized the government for human rights violations and 
was imprisoned in 1995 for allegedly participating in a coup attempt. In 1999, he won the 
presidency in a democratic election and held office until 2007.  
 The African Leadership Forum’s 1988 inaugural program in Ota (Nigeria) was 
titled “For Improving the Economic and Social Situation in Africa.” Obasanjo proposed 
the Forum to be a series of meetings, the purpose of which was “to enhance the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Finnemore 1996, 159. 
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knowledge and awareness of current and young, potential African leaders, placing special 
emphasis on diagnosing apparent failures of the past; on understanding multiple 
dimensions and complex interrelations of local, national, regional and global problems, 
and on seeking possible approaches to solutions.”19  
The African Leadership Forum continued to convene conferences of state and 
non-state actors; these meetings were framed as opportunities for interested parties to 
consider and debate strategies for responding to the new post-Cold War global 
environment in light of Africa’s dire economic situation. African Leadership Forum 
conferences provided a platform for some of the first prominent examples of explicit calls 
for a redefinition of sovereignty in Africa and for the development of intrusive regional 
institutions.20 For example, in a speech at one of these conferences, Obasanjo remarked: 
An urgent aspect of security need is a re-definition of the concept of security and 
sovereignty. For instance, we must ask why does sovereignty seem to confer absolute 
immunity on any government who commits genocide and monumental crimes of 
destruction and elimination of a particular section of its population for political, religious, 
cultural or social reasons? …We need a regional security based on common and 
collective security rather than one-sided national security… Our regional 
organization…must have effective conflict prevention and conflict resolution capability, 
including mediation, peace-making, peace-keeping and reconciliation.21 
 
Ugandan President Museveni’s speech at the same forum echoed these sentiments: 
Internal wars have taken a heavy toll in Africa in the last thirty years; serious abuses of 
human rights have accompanied these wars; but because they were internal affairs, the 
OAU is helpless. …If the European countries can surrender some of their sovereignty for 
further development, African states can similarly surrender some sovereignty for greater 
security, both at the intra and inter-state levels...22 
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20 Obasanjo and Mosha 1993. 
21 Obasanjo and Mosha 1993, 260-61. 
22 Obasanjo and Mosha 1993, 266. 
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The most well-known conference of the African Leadership Forum series was the 1991 
Kampala Forum that produced the Kampala Document (mentioned above), whose central 
theme is holistic problem-solving, makes the case that “the serious and multifarious 
problems which are crippling Africa’s economic survival and progress” require collective 
responses at the regional level.23 It establishes behavioral standards for African 
governments based on a “common humanity” and calls for regional mechanisms to 
manage intrastate conflict. The document also stresses the themes of human-centrism and 
popular participation in development, and it articulates an expansive definition of security 
in line with what would come to be termed ‘human security.’24 The Kampala initiative 
received support from the OAU and ECA secretariats.  
The second major player in the reform campaign was the OAU Secretariat. The 
newly appointed Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim (1989-2001) both actively 
supported the African Leadership Forum and carried out similar efforts within the OAU 
itself, promoting an African redefinition of sovereignty and related reforms of the OAU 
in order to make it more effective in managing intrastate conflict and political crises as 
well as promoting human rights and good governance, all with the economic crisis and 
Africa’s place in the world in mind. Secretary Salim’s career has spanned a wide variety 
of diplomatic and other governmental positions in Tanzania (including Prime Minister, 
1984-1985), in the United Nations, and in African institutions (including African Union 
Special Envoy to the Darfur Conflict 2004-2008).25   
In his 1990 New Year’s message, Salim taps into the theme of holistic problem-
solving, making an explicit connection between insecurity and underdevelopment—he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Obasanjo and Mosha 1993, 310 (emphasis mine). 
24 Hussien 2011, 218. 
25 United Nations 2002. 
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refers to the “huge losses in material and human terms” caused by internal conflicts, 
which “further deprive the continent of the previous energies and resources which should 
be used in the socio-economic upliftment which is sorely needed by the peoples of 
Africa”—and dedicating the OAU to contribute to conflict resolution.26  
That same year, Salim presented a critical report to the OAU Assembly titled 
“Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World and Their Implications for Africa: 
Proposals For an African Response.”27 In it he expressed the same concerns as those of 
the African Leadership Forum’s 1990 Paris conference participants, including, for 
example: the loss of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries as “traditional partners” 
for African states; the diversion of resources—especially foreign direct investment—
from Africa to Eastern Europe; potential price competition between Africa and Eastern 
Europe for Western European markets; and the global trend toward the establishment of 
trading and economic blocs—especially the planned Single European Market for 1992—
and associated trade diversion from Africa.  
Salim’s report went on to draw attention to the problem of intrastate conflict and 
the OAU’s inability to manage it, due to the “lack of legal mechanisms.” He proposed a 
more active role for the OAU in conflict prevention, management and resolution 
supported by a reinterpretation of the non-interference principle.28  While the report 
mainly concerns the threat of economic marginalization, it forcefully promotes regional 
conflict management: 
The necessity to speedily bring to a halt all the fratricidal conflicts, to establish peace and 
to harness available resources to build an enabling environment for development remains 
an inescapable duty of African governments. The problem of conflict resolution within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 OAU 1989, 4. 
27 OAU 1990a. 
28 OAU 1990a, 4, 14-15. 
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the framework of the OAU deserves a lot more consideration than ever before. To this 
end, member states should recommit themselves to peaceful resolution of all conflicts, 
internal or interstate, within the spirit of African solidarity and brotherhood and enable to 
Organization to play a more active role in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution…[t]he principle of non-interference…should…not be construed to mean or 
used to justify indifference on the part of the OAU.29 
 
The third principal voice of the reform campaign was the ECA Secretary General, 
Adebayo Adedeji. In February 1990, the ECA convened the International Conference on 
Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process, producing the African 
Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. The Charter, 
which newly appointed OAU Secretary General Salim helped develop,30 emphasizes the 
increasing seriousness of the marginalization problem, noting that “This Conference has 
taken place during a period when the world continues to witness tumultuous changes in 
Eastern Europe,” and “…given the current world political and economic situation, Africa 
is becoming further marginalized in world affairs, both geopolitically and 
economically.”31 The Charter stresses holistic problem-solving and popular participation 
in development, asserting that “We are united in our conviction that the crisis currently 
engulfing Africa is not only an economic crisis but also a human, legal, political and 
social crisis…At the same time the political context of socio-economic development has 
been characterized, in many instances, by an over-centralization of power and 
impediments to the effective participation of the overwhelming majority of the people in 
social, political, and economic development.”32 
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31 OAU 1990c. 
32 OAU 1990c. 
	   195 
As some examples have already suggested, the economic crisis (and related 
concerns) principally drove the reform campaign, the framing of which drew heavily on 
policy discourses that emerged from policy processes responding to the so-called Lost 
Decade of the 1980s and to the imposition of structural adjustment programs on African 
economies. What is also clear is that Africa’s collective image or reputation constituted a 
major concern, and reform of regional institutions was pitched as a solution. Obasanjo’s 
speech at the 1991 Kampala conference reflected these concerns. He argued that “The 
image of Africa portrayed by the outside media is one of endless disasters, diseases, 
senseless wars, corruption and mismanagement. It is essentially the image we presented. 
Our situation is now treated more by silence and neglect than by effective response…We 
have to project positive thinking and a positive image of Africa.” He followed these 
words with a discussion of the urgent need for a redefinition of security and state 
sovereignty (quoted above).33  
The regional reform campaign was also framed as a pan-African transnationalist 
project. As Bjorn Moller puts it, pan-Africanism remains a “Foucauldian ‘regime of 
truth’” that compels African states “into a symbolic competition with each other, each 
trying to surpass the others in terms of pan-African credentials and necessitating a 
framing of political objectives … as incremental steps towards the pan-African ideal.”34 
Writing in support of the creation of a intra-state conflict management mechanism, OAU 
Secretary General Salim wrote in his June 1992 OAU Report of the Secretary General on 
Conflicts in Africa that “Given that every African is his brother’s keeper, and that our 
borders are at best artificial, we in Africa need to use our own cultural and social 	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relationships to interpret the principle of non-intervention in such a way that we are able 
to apply it to our advantage in conflict prevention and resolution.”35  
In his speech at the 1991 African Leadership Forum conference in Kampala, in 
which he calls for normative reform in Africa, former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere 
made explicit reference to the 1963 OAU summit and the historical “mistake” of making 
it an organization of states instead of African peoples:  
 
When we met in Addis Ababa in 1963 to establish the [OAU], I think we made a 
mistake…We were, all of us who met there, leaders of political organizations. Already a 
coup had taken place in Togo; and you may want to know that is one of the explanations 
of the strict rule of non-interference …But as I say, we were all political leaders who met 
there, but unlike the founders of the [UN], we did not say ‘we the peoples of Africa.’ 
…[W]e made it an organization of independent states, not an organization of peoples of 
Africa…”36 
 
At the same venue, President Museveni of Uganda referred to the idea of continental 
security mechanism (something once championed by radical pan-Africanists) as one that 
had “unfortunately, remained as mere dream.” He followed this by stating that “It was 
understandable that at the time the charter of the [OAU] was written, the newly 
independent states guarded their newly one sovereignty jealously. Sovereignty became a 
sacred cow and many crimes have been committed in its name.”37 In his Kampala speech, 
Adedeji also tied the goal of sovereignty ceding to a return to pan-Africanism: “But 
above all, the solidarity and spirit of Pan-Africanism, which made the struggle for the 
independence of one country the struggle of all countries in Africa, would have been 
recaptured, and we can then all see in the need for economic development, co-operation 
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and integration of Africa a common cause for action.”38 For his part, OAU General 
Secretary Salim Ahmed Salim called upon Africa to “revisit the past and rekindle the 
spirit of Pan-Africanism of the 1950s.”39 
 
Results of the reform campaign 
The African Leadership Forum presented the Kampala Document to the OAU General 
Assembly and hoped that it would be integrated into OAU frameworks, but it was 
considered many times without adoption. The OAU did, however, adopt other 
declarations reflecting the ideas of the Kampala Movement. At its June 1990 summit, the 
OAU Heads of States and Government endorsed the ECA’s African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation,40 which identifies national political 
reforms to be undertaken in order to achieve sustainable economic development, 
including greater freedoms of association and expression and other rights; greater 
“political accountability of leadership at all levels measured by the use of checks and 
balances”; greater “representation of the people and their organizations in national 
bodies”; et cetera. Although it did not establish any enforcement mechanisms, it did 
affirm a role for the regional community in promoting these goals and proposed (but, 
again, did not establish) regional monitoring mechanisms.41 According to Thomas Legler 
and Thomas Kwasi Tieku, this Charter is notable for “introduc[ing] the language of 
democracy promotion into African multilateralism.”42 Adebayo Adedeji identifies the 
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Charter’s endorsement as the first “explicit recognition” by the African regional 
community that the continent’s economic crisis has political origins.43   
At the 1990 summit, the heads of state also adopted the Declaration on the 
Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking 
Place in the World,44 directly responding to Secretary General’s critical report published 
earlier that year. This declaration affirmed that the troubling concerns outlined by Salim 
“constitute major factors which should guide Africa’s collective thinking about the 
challenges and options before her in the 1990s in view of the real threat of 
marginalization on the continent.” The document focused on the precarious nature of 
Africa’s “socio-economic situation,” but then linked this to domestic governance and 
security problems. It was the first Assembly declaration to make an explicit connection 
between economic development and intrastate conflict management, concluding that “it 
is only through the creation of stable conditions” that Africa can achieve development, 
and vowing to “work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the 
conflicts on our continent.”45   
According to former Nigerian Ambassador Sam Ibok, the 1990 Declaration 
“marked a decisive turning point for us in Africa” because the OAU for the first time 
recognized that internal conflicts demanded “a more dynamic approach, given the 
African preoccupations with concepts such as sovereignty and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states, as enshrined in the OAU Charter.”46 The Declaration 
“provoked” a debate among African leaders about the relationship among governance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Obasanjo and Mosha 1993, 294. 
44 OAU 1990b. 
45 OAU 1990b. 
46 Ibok 2000, 3. 
	   199 
conflict and economic development, “set the stage for a review of past OAU approaches 
to conflict resolution,” and brought about an “improved environment, which no doubt 
facilitated the extensive consultations” carried out between Secretary General Salim and 
member states about the creation of a permanent conflict management mechanism 
(established in 1993).47 In a 1993 address, Salim echoed the importance of the 1990 
Declaration as a critical juncture leading up to the establishment of the conflict 
mechanism, stating that the former’s adoption reflected and facilitated a “fundamental 
transformation in how our countries view conflicts—those within and among states. 
There is now a qualitative change of attitude and perception. Increasingly there is 
agreement that we should not for any reason remain aloof and indifferent to acute human 
suffering.”48  
Following the 1990 Declaration, Salim proceeded to consult with member states 
about operationalizing a regional conflict management role, and in 1992 generated a 
report providing recommendations for the specifics of a conflict management 
mechanism. In 1993, the heads of state adopted a declaration formally establishing a 
permanent Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. This 
mechanism not only replaced the organization’s defunct Mechanism for Mediation, 
Arbitration and Conciliation (provided for by the 1963 OAU Charter) but, importantly for 
the purposes of this investigation, expanded its competences to include intrastate (as well 
as interstate) conflict.49 “Rather remarkably for an organization that hitherto has avoided 
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involvement in internal conflicts, the new OAU Mechanism has a clear mandate to 
concern itself with such conflicts.”50  
The 1990-1993 period saw an important rise in regional interference practices: the 
OAU dispatched its first election observation mission, the African Commission for 
Human and People’s Rights began publishing country reports, mediation became a 
prominent tool of the OAU, two OAU military missions were deployed, and ECOWAS 
took on a security function for the first time, intervening militarily in the Liberian civil 
war. This trend in practices—along with their legalization—accelerated over the course 
of the decade.  
 
OAU Missions 
First, the OAU did not monitor member state elections during the Cold War period. As 
the former Heard of the OAU Conflict Management Division has written, “It must be 
emphasized that prior to 1990, nobody ever imagined that any member State of the OAU 
would ever invite the OAU Secretary General to send a team of people to observe 
elections in a sovereign state.”51 Although some diplomats involved in the OAU’s 
dispatch of a small observation mission to the 1991 Zambian elections expressed strong 
reservations about what they understood to be a violation of non-interference, the move 
set a precedent for routine election monitoring missions on the continent throughout the 
1990s.52 Zambia held these elections in 1991 in response to popular protests.53 Pressure 
from the donor community was also a factor here—with the end of the Cold War, it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Martin 2002, 197. 
51 Bakwesegha 1995, cited in Berman and Sams 2000, 57. 
52 Garber 1993, 55-6. 
53 Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 104-114. 
	   201 
more important for states seeking development assistance to “show willingness to 
observe human rights…and hold genuinely competitive elections.”54 Donor pressure also 
factored into the decision to permit regional and international observation teams to 
monitor electoral processes. “African governments initially displayed extreme reluctance 
to accept this innovation, but usually relented in the end, often in an effort to align 
themselves with donor preferences.”55  
In Chapter 2 I make the case that the non-interference norm constrained mediation 
activities during the Cold War period but that regional mediation activity (in response to 
African domestic crises) increased several-fold in the 1990s. While only two crisis-level 
internal disputes elicited mediation from regional actors in the 1980s (out of 43 such 
disputes), 19 out of 52 disputes elicited mediation from regional actors in the 1990s. This 
trend took off in the early 1990s; regional actors responded to eight crises with mediation 
in the years 1990-1993, some multiple times. Furthermore, regional actors responded to 
six crises with military deployment during the decade, and three of these took place in the 
1990-1993 period. Two were OAU deployments, one to Rwanda (established in 1991) 
and one to Burundi (established in 1993). I present an overview of these two here. 
In the Rwandan case, Secretary Salim “seized upon” the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front’s rebellion in 1990 “as an important test case by which to test the preparedness of 
Organization to embark on a new, more interventionist path.”56 The rebel group entered 
Rwanda from across the border in Uganda, resulting in an outbreak of conflict and 
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population displacement as the conflict spread.57 Salim held meetings with the Tutsi-led 
rebels and the Hutu government, as well as regional leaders, producing a 1991 agreement 
providing for the deployment of a Military Observer Team. Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire 
(now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) agreed to provide troops, but, because 
Rwanda perceived these countries to be biased, another agreement was brokered later that 
year for a different observer group (the Neutral Military Observer Group), this time 
constituted by troops from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe. This peacekeeping 
force monitored a four-kilometer neutral zone and reported violations by both sides of a 
1992 ceasefire agreement. Salim arranged for an expanded Neutral Military Observer 
Group II in 1992, but, because of its limited capacity, this mission was integrated into the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda in 1993. Throughout the 1990-1993 
period, the OAU and individual African states (Zaire and Tanzania) were actively 
engaged in the peace process as mediators.58 In the wake of the 1994 genocide in that 
country, the OAU commissioned an investigation of the events leading up to it, and the 
resulting 296-page report places particular blame on the United Nations Security Council 
for being able but unwilling to prevent the atrocities.59 
In 1993, civil war broke out in neighboring Burundi following the first multiparty 
elections in thirty years and the subsequent assassination of the newly elected Hutu 
president by Tutsi extremists. Seeing the missions to Rwanda as constituting a “useful 
precedent,” the OAU decided to send a peacekeeping mission—the Observer Mission in 
Burundi. It was approved under the organization’s new Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, but it encountered an obstacle in the 	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government of Burundi, as the Burundian military was strongly opposed to the 
deployment.60 The OAU was able to negotiate for Burundi’s consent, but for a 
considerably smaller force than was originally planned. Tunisia commanded this force 
(deployed in 1994), which was composed of observers from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Guinea, Mali, Niger and Tunisia. It was withdrawn in 1996 following a coup d’état. 
Seven countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Congo-Kinshasa, Kenya, Rwanda, and 
Zambia) imposed economic and military sanctions against the government in response to 
the coup, and individual African leaders remained active in mediation roles.61 
 
ECOWAS Missions 
In 1990, one of the continent’s regional economic communities, ECOWAS, took on a 
security function for the first time and intervened militarily in a member state, Liberia, in 
response to its civil war. The creation and deployment of the ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group was indicative of, and probably helped to push forward, the shift away from strict 
adherence to non-interference in Africa. ECOWAS was formed in 1975 to promote 
economic integration, and its founding treaty contained no security-related provisions. Its 
1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression introduced security issues to the grouping, and its 
1981 Protocol Related to Mutual Assistance on Defense provided for the creation of a 
security framework including a joint standby force (to respond to inter-state conflict), but 
this architecture was not in fact established, and the defense protocol wasn’t invoked until 
the 1990 Liberian situation.62 
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The 1990 deployment to Liberia was an “improvised response” and had no basis 
in ECOWAS law—since the civil war was an internal conflict—but the 1981 defense 
protocol was nonetheless referenced in the decision to deploy. Although it was illegal, 
“humanitarian imperative and concerns about the war’s destabilizing effects” on the 
region motivated the grouping, led by Nigeria (the clear sub-regional hegemon), to carry 
out the intervention.63 The ECOWAS Monitoring Group intervened several months after 
a rebel group—the National Patriotic Front of Liberia—first launched its offensive 
against the government, but the intervention did not work to prop up that government but 
rather facilitated the installation of the Interim Government of National Unity. Since the 
Interim Government “laid claim to power when [the president] and the rump of his 
government still occupied the presidential mansion,” the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
was essentially allied with one rebel faction in its effort to counter another rebel faction.64 
The ECOWAS decision to create and deploy a force to Liberia garnered it praise from 
other African states and from then-OAU Secretary General Salim.65 Many pointed to 
ECOWAS as an example for other sub-regional groupings and for the OAU itself to take 
on new functions. For example, in his 1991 speech at the African Leadership Forum’s 
Kampala Forum (which he hosted), Ugandan President Museveni pointed to the 
ECOWAS mission as a sign of progress towards regional solutions to domestic security 
problems:  
Already we have made an impressive beginning. The regional economic organizations 
are making some progress. ECOWAS has gone a step further by trying to take in stride 
the tragedy that struck a member country, Liberia, through its [Monitoring Group]. The 
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ECOWAS experiment could indeed be emulated…[and] should be congratulated for 
having prevented a bad situation from getting worse.66  
 
According to Karen Alter et al, “Subsequent military missions to quell civil wars 
and armed conflicts in Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 1999, and Cote d’Ivoire 
and Liberia in 2003 increased the political salience of security and humanitarian activities 
in ECOWAS,” contributing to the adoption of the 1999 Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security. This protocol authorizes ECOWAS to intervene in the event of mass atrocities 
without the consent of a member state.67  
 
Further Institutional Development in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s 
In the late 1990s, some important regional institutional developments occurred that 
accelerated the process of normative change presented above. These include the 
establishment of an OAU anti-coup regime, the replacement of the OAU with the more 
intrusive African Union, and the adoption of a protocol providing for a regional human 
rights court (and later the establishment of this court as well as sub-regional human rights 
courts). These developments should be seen as part of a continuation of earlier 
developments, promoted by some of the same key players (e.g. Obasanjo and Salim) and 
similarly framed as part of a strategy to address economic underdevelopment and 
international national marginalization, drawing upon pan-Africanist transnationalism and 
emerging human-centered and holistic policy discourses. 
 These developments also reflect some important changes on the continent, 	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including gradual political liberalization (see Figure 6.1), which opened space for civil 
society organizing (e.g. to push for regional human rights courts), and the 
democratization of a powerful state with leadership aspirations, South Africa. Post-
apartheid South Africa, as a new democracy, has been a strong proponent of intrusive 
liberal regionalism, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Obasanjo returns to regional politics 
After becoming a prominent civil society leader in the 1980s and early 1990s (as 
discussed above), Obasanjo was imprisoned during the dictatorship of Sani Abacha 
(1993-1998) for his criticism of the regime’s human rights abuses and for his alleged 
participation in an attempted coup. Abacha’s death in 1998 led to Obasanjo’s release. He 
ran for president in the 1999 elections—the first held in sixteen years—and scored a 
decisive victory. Drawing directly on the work of the African Leadership Forum from the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, Obasanjo pushed for the further development of intrusive 
regional institutions on the continent to promote democracy, human rights, peace, and 
development. In addition to carrying forth his policies priorities from the Kampala 
Movement, Obasanjo also wanted to see reforms at the OAU that would “make it the 
primary institution for resolving conflicts in Africa,” since ECOWAS—and therefore 
Nigeria—had become burdened by its peacekeeping role in West Africa.68  
 
Post-apartheid South African foreign policy 
When Nelson Mandela took office in 1994, ending decades of apartheid and minority rule 
in South Africa, his administration immediately worked to reorient South African foreign 	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policy, seeking to reintegrate the former pariah state into international and African 
society and end its isolation. Mandela was quick to establish democracy and human rights 
as central pillars of this new foreign policy, along with neoliberal economics. Regional 
democracy promotion was, for the new South Africa, a way to both enhance its own 
democratic image on the world stage (a new source of soft power) and to work toward a 
more democratic continent. The international image of Africa as populated by repressive 
and non-democratic regimes, the Mandela administration reasoned, contributed to the 
continent’s economic marginalization, and this hurt South Africa’s economy. According 
to Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko’s 1998 assessment, “In a globalizing world, the need for 
Africa to shed its Hobbesian image remains pressing. The success of a negotiated 
political settlement followed by the democratic election of a black-led government has 
seen an African country, South Africa, elevated to an unprecedented status in the eyes of 
the world’s powerful.69 
Mandela reasoned that, as South Africa was “one of the most isolated states on 
earth,” recovery would require “developing those policies which will be necessary to take 
South Africa into the new world order as a responsible global citizen.”70 As an African 
nation, its position was especially precarious in the post-Cold War period, since 
international attention to Eastern Europe “increased Africa's marginalization and 
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weakened the continent's economic position.”71 He identified human rights, democracy, 
international law, peace, pan-Africanism, and development based on “regional and 
international economic cooperation in an interdependent world” as the pillars of his 
foreign policy,72 and particularly emphasized human rights.73 Tying the history of 
domestic politics in South Africa and the values of the African National Congress to 
international politics and the new South African foreign policy, he declared that because 
“the anti-apartheid campaign was the most important human rights crusade of the post-
World War II era,” it follows that “South Africa will not be indifferent to the rights of 
others.”74 Further tying the South African struggle to global struggles, he explained that, 
since “Only true democracy can guarantee rights,” the African National Congress took up 
arms in order to bring democracy and therefore rights to the people of South Africa. “We 
have always embraced the cry for democracy across the world and South Africa will 
therefore be at the forefront of global efforts to promote and foster democratic systems of 
government.”75 Mandela’s foreign minister echoed this connection between the history of 
apartheid and the new South Africa’s foreign policy in a speech delivered to a 1994 
meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, saying “human rights are the cornerstone of our 
government policy and we shall not hesitate to carry the message to the far corners of the 
world. We have suffered too much ourselves not to do so.”76  
In a 1994 address to the U.S. Congress, Mandela picked up on themes from the 
early 1990s African reform campaign, stating “in an age such as this...much revision will 	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have to be done of ideas that have seemed as stable as the rocks, including such concepts 
as sovereignty and national interest.”77 Mandela also stressed pan-Africanism in 
pronouncements of foreign policy, declaring in his famous “Because I Am African” 
speech that “In forging links with our neighbors, the [African National Congress] will 
draw on an African tradition, of which we are a part, of promoting greater continental 
unity.”78 
This was not just talk. Mandela indeed became an outspoken critic of fellow 
African leaders for their undemocratic and repressive practices.79 And, following an 
August 1994 military coup in neighboring Lesotho that toppled a democratically elected 
government, Mandela spearheaded mediation efforts and threatened economic sanctions 
against the de facto regime. Meanwhile, the South African military engaged in exercises 
along the Lesotho border meant to communicate the threat of military intervention. These 
initiatives resulted in the reinstatement of the deposed leader.80  
Mandela was succeeded in 1999 by his vice president, Thabo Mbeki, who carried 
forward Mandela’s liberal internationalism—with a stated long-term objective of creating 
an Africa “characterised by the establishment of democratic systems in all our 
countries”81—in an effort to develop South Africa’s democratic image and to work 
against the continent’s negative international image, ultimately with the aim to attract 
investment to South Africa (and Africa more broadly). Because the African continent’s 
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international reputation regarding the protection of rights—including property rights—
was “tainted,” the ruling party in South Africa was motivated to seek out ways to 
improve this collective image.82 Early on in his term, Mbeki vehemently criticized one-
party and personal rule on the continent, even encouraging citizens of African countries 
to “resist all tyranny,” because “[i]n Africa, the people must govern.”83 
In July 1998, Mbeki introduced his idea for an ‘African Renaissance’ initiative to 
a gathering of African leaders. Broadly speaking, the African Renaissance is about the 
revitalization of African polities and economies. 84 The doctrine shares much with the 
African Leadership Forum’s Kampala Document (1991)—it is, according to the South 
African Foreign Affairs Department, a “holistic vision…aimed at promoting peace, 
prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership and good 
governance.”85 It is furthermore a manifestation of the leader’s “grand design to re-invent 
South Africa as a global trading state with strong regional and continental interests,” 
thereby translating South Africa’s “international profile” into “tangible material pay-
offs.”86 Just because there are strong material incentives for promoting peace, democracy, 
and human rights on the continent doesn’t mean these leaders aren’t also promoting these 
things for their own sake. These are not mutually exclusive motivations. One South 
Africa analyst with ties to the South African regime reportedly stated in the late 1990s 
that Mbeki “takes Africa seriously and he is emotionally and intellectually committed to 
prove Afro-pessimism wrong.”87 	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The anti-coup regime 
In line with the policy objectives outlined above, South Africa was a lead proponent, in 
collaboration with OAU General Secretary Salim, of regional mechanisms to respond to 
unconstitutional changes in government. These efforts resulted in regional law outlined in 
Chapter 2, including a May 1997 decision of the Council of Ministers (‘Harare Decision’) 
condemning a coup d’état in Sierra Leone and calling on the international community to 
refuse diplomatic recognition to the de facto regime,88 a July 2000 declaration of the 
Heads of State and Government (‘Lome Declaration’) which generalized and expanded 
the Harare move by outlining anti-coup interference mechanisms including OAU 
membership suspension, nonrecognition of the de facto government, fact-finding 
missions, targeted sanctions, and multilateral mediation efforts, 89 and the 2007 African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which more strongly institutionalized 
these mechanisms.90 
 
The replacement of the OAU with the African Union 
The limitations of the current system helped move Africa towards the creation of this new 
regional body. First, the Rwandan genocide (1994), in which approximately 800,000 
people were killed in 100 days, exposed the incapacity of the regional community (as 
well as the global community, for that matter) to prevent mass atrocity. The OAU was 
unprepared to manage the conflict, due to limitations related to finances, the OAU’s 
mandate, and willingness of member states to contribute forces. The OAU had set up an 	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African Peace Fund in 1993 to facilitate international donations. In July 1995, the OAU 
heads of state decided to create an Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in 
Africa, and, in 1996, held a planning seminar for the system.91 But money wasn’t the 
only issue. By the late 1990s, analysts called for “serious reforms and reorganization” of 
the OAU, including a revised charter and a strengthened general secretariat,92 in order to 
give regional institutions the tools needed to manage governance and security on the 
continent. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Constitutive Act of the African Union is innovative in 
part because it includes a provision mandating the Union to intervene, militarily and non-
consensually, in a member state pursuant to grave circumstances like the commission of 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.93 The replacement of the OAU with 
the African Union also involved the creation of an African Peer Review Mechanism to 
monitor state practices with respect to governance, and the creation of a Peace and 
Security architecture with broad competences. The content of the African Union’s 
mandate reflects proposals put forward by Mbeki and Obasanjo, who were more so allied 
than competing with one another. A rival proposal by Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi would 
have involved greater continental integration, aimed at protecting Africa from outside 
interference. Both sides promoted their plans as the fulfillment of the vision of the 
OAU’s pan-Africanist founding fathers. Bjorn Moller partially credits Mbeki and 
Obasanjo’s success in “rhetorically outmanoeuvr[ing] the obstinate defenders of the 
former principles of sovereignty and non-interference such as Libya and its allies” to 
their ability to frame “their favoured policies in the discursive garments of pan-	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Africanism, thus ‘out-casablancking the neo-Casablancans.’”94 The Casablanca Group 
was the radical pan-Africanist bloc headed by Kwame Nkrumah in the late 1950s. I 
disagree that Gaddafi’s plan would have kept sovereignty norms in tact, as I explain 
below, but it is the case that the Libyan leader’s aim was to prevent the further 
development of intrusive liberal regionalism. 
According to Thomas Kwasi Tieku, South Africa’s push for a new continental 
body had been, since Nelson Mandela’s administration, “at the core” of post-apartheid 
South Africa’s principal goal of “improv[ing] the image of Africa in order to attract 
foreign investment and make the new South Africa an important global trading nation.”95  
At the 1999 OAU summit in Algeria, Obasanjo and Mbeki both put forward OAU reform 
packages based on their similar regional policy platforms, the Kampala Document and 
the African Renaissance, respectively. Both proposals aimed to broaden the OAU’s 
mandate and capacity in its promotion of democracy, human rights, and intrastate 
security, employing a “comprehensive concept of security including ‘human security.’”96  
At this point, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, a long-time opponent of efforts to water 
down the non-interference norm including the reform campaign of the early 1990s, 
sensed that Nigeria and South Africa were quickly moving to take control of the OAU 
agenda. He therefore proposed to host an extraordinary summit in Sirte (Libya) later that 
year. The summit indeed took place, and Gaddafi introduced his own reform proposal 
here. Drawing on the legacy of Nkrumah, he used the language of the “United States of 
Africa” to propose a form of political integration including a continental presidency, a 
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joint military force, and a common African currency.97 Gaddafi’s proposal indeed drew 
on Nkrumah’s vision (if cynically) and would have implied pooling of sovereignties. It is 
distinct from the other proposals, however, in its aim to protect African states from 
certain kinds of interference and rejected liberal internationalism.  As Antonia Witt 
explains, Obasanjo and Mbeki’s proposals were in line with a vision of a ‘People’s 
Union,’ a community of values based on rule of law, popular and transparent governance, 
democratic leadership, and respect for human rights. Gaddafi’s plan was to create a 
‘Defense Union’ to present a common front against neocolonialism. By the late 1990s, 
then, the debate about sovereignty in Africa had evolved from simply a question of if 
sovereignty should be ceded to the regional community to also include the question of 
upon which normative grounds sovereignty is ceded.98  
The Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted at the 1999 Sirte summit was a 
great disappointment to Gaddafi as it enshrined the liberal norms and interventionist 
priorities of Nigeria and South Africa.  
 
Regional and Sub-Regional Human Rights Courts 
As noted in Chapter 5, the adoption of the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights—which provided for the creation of the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights—in part responded to two decades of calls from the transnational legal 
community for a regional human rights system. It would take almost two more decades 
before the adoption of a 1998 Protocol to the African Charter providing for the African 
Court of Human and People’s Rights (African Court), and another decade after that to see 	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the court become functional. African civil society groups were active in pushing for the 
African court during the 1990s.99  The court is mandated to make binding decisions about 
human rights violations in Africa (see Chapter 2). For example, in 2013, the court ruled 
that the government of Tanzania had violated the right to free association by banning 
independent candidates from elections and ordered the government to remedy the 
violation through legislation.100  
 Civil society groups were also active in lobbying for the Community Court of 
Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court—est. 
1993) to assume jurisdiction over human rights complaints (in 2005). Karen Alter et al 
attribute their success to the 1993 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West 
African States, which provided for civil society participation in ECOWAS (mentioned 
above) and to the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, which “underscored the 
importance of protecting human rights,” “put regional intervention on a firmer legal 
footing,” and “contributed to a growing mobilization around human rights in West 
Africa” (also mentioned above).101 The ECOWAS Court is remarkable in that individuals 
have standing before it and there is no requirement that they exhaust domestic remedies. 
In 2008, it ruled that the government of Niger had violated a woman’s rights by not 
protecting her from being sold into slavery and ordered Niger to compensate her 
$19,000.102  
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The (Regional) Responsibility to Protect and the 2005 World Summit 
International developments related to the emerging doctrine of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) reveals both Africa’s leadership on regional R2P and continued debate 
among African states about the meaning of sovereignty and security. In general, 
democratic regimes are more likely to support the idea of sovereignty as responsibility. 
As mentioned elsewhere, Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act can 
be labeled a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provision. R2P was first put forward by a 
Canadian government sponsored commission (International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty) in September 2000.103  A watered-down104 version of R2P was 
subsequently spelled out in the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome 
Document105 and, after intense debate, this Outcome Document’s “protection clause” 
achieved United Nations endorsement in the form of a Security Council resolution 
“reaffirming” World Summit R2P provisions in 2006.106 It was not an easily won victory 
for R2P advocates and exposed a great deal of disagreement and some firm opponents, 
but it was a victory nonetheless.107   
In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, the African Union held an 
Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of March 2005, in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, and here produced another document with R2P implications: the “Ezulwini 
Consensus.”108 In this report, the African Union lays out its position on R2P, which is one 
of support.  Specifically, it calls on the international community to recognize the primary 	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role that regional organizations can and should play in R2P, to finance these 
organizations’ operations, and to empower organizations like the African Union to take 
action when the United Nations Security Council is undermining R2P.  It proposes that in 
certain urgent situations it might be necessary to obtain United Nations Security Council 
approval for military intervention “after the fact.”109  
However, African delegates’ speeches at the World Summit reveal continued 
disagreement over issues of sovereignty and security. In Antonia Witt’s analysis of 
debate at the 2005 World Summit, she notes that eighteen African delegates directly 
addressed the issues of “sovereignty, responsibilities of states, or new notions of 
security.” She argues that these speeches indicate the existence of two “opposing 
frames”—one that conceives of sovereignty as responsibility and one that conceives of 
sovereignty as possession. Components of the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ frame 
include “states bear a performative responsibility that constrains sovereignty,” “security 
refers to human well-being,” and “responsibility is transferable and consequential.” 
Components of the ‘sovereignty as possession’ frame include “states need to be 
functional,” “states function in the interest of the people they represent,” and “security 
refers to the state’s ability to perform.”110 In general, the group affirming the first frame 
tends to be more democratic (although not all in this group are democratic) and the group 
affirming the second frame is exclusively non-democratic. 
In 2009 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report, 
“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,”111 which again reaffirmed the 2005 
Outcome Document version of the doctrine and advanced certain specific proposals for 	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implementation including building stronger United Nations early-warning mechanisms.  
It also put forward the ‘three-pillar’ approach to R2P where Pillar 1 involves state-level 
responsibilities, Pillar 2 international assistance in capacity building, and Pillar 3 
international intervention as last resort.112  This report was the subject of a summer 2009 
United Nations General Assembly plenary debate that revealed a fairly broad consensus 
of approval around the report’s contents,113 as well as lingering concerns among 
detractors and supporters alike about, among other things, the role of the Security 
Council and the potential for abuse by great powers.114  
There has been a good deal of talk in forums that take up the issue of the R2P 
about its regional implementation. R2P carried out by regional security organizations 
might help allay some fears about R2P’s use as an imperialist tool of the West.  And, 
although R2P officially requires United Nations Security Council approval for all 
military interventions, it is reasonable to suggest that such an intervention bypassing the 
Security Council might be seen as more legitimate if carried out by a regional community 
rather than by the United States, for example. The African Union’s position on the matter 
supports this view. 
During the 2009 United Nations General Assembly plenary meeting debating the 
merits of the secretary-general’s R2P implementation report, a prominent theme proved 
to be the need for international support of regional organizations and their standby forces 
in order to most effectively support the three Pillars.  Although such statements were 
delivered by representations of Member States from diverse regions, much attention was 
given to the developments of R2P inspired institutions in Africa, specifically African 	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Union institutions.115 The African Union is held up as the most promising example of 
R2P institutionalization at the regional level.  
 
Conclusion 
Africa responded to its devastating economic crisis of the 1980s—and associated material 
and social vulnerability—with the development of intrusive regional institutions to 
govern domestic governance and security problems. This was not an obvious or 
automatic response to the continent’s problems and can only be understood in light of the 
enduring relevance of pan-African transnationalism, the international ideational context 
(the ascendance of liberal internationalism) and emerging international policy discourses 
emphasizing human-centered policy making and the relationship between democracy and 
security, on the one hand, and economic development on the other. African states were 
responding to both direct pressure from international and domestic actors as well as the 
problem of the continent’s negative image in the eyes of investors and the international 
community. Furthermore, although a high democratic density has not been achieved in 
Africa, as the 1990s progressed, gradual political liberalization and the full 
democratization of some states—including, importantly, South Africa—contributed to 
further institutional reform via civil society activism and democratic state protagonism. 
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Chapter 7 
Southeast Asia 
ASEAN was established with strong sovereignty norms, and these norms were reaffirmed 
rather than challenged over the course of the second half of the Cold War, because there 
existed no powerful regional identity discourses that would contribute to the contestation 
of sovereignty norms. Economic and diplomatic successes in the 1980s further explain 
the maintenance of non-interference in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. In the 
early 1990s, ASEAN states reasserted or promoted their regional normative order (the 
‘ASEAN Way’), the cornerstone of which is non-interference. This contrasts with 
Africa’s efforts to reform their regional normative order and Latin America’s efforts to 
renew dormant aspects of their regional normative order (democracy and human rights 
promotion). I argue that Southeast Asia reasserted and internationally promoted non-
interference, because ASEAN did not experience widespread democratization (as Latin 
America had) and because its (especially economic) successes in the 1980s reaffirmed the 
ASEAN Way. The ‘performance legitimacy’ of these states served to bolster their norms 
and emboldened Southeast Asia to offer their norm-set as a viable alternative to Western 
liberal internationalism.  
 The ASEAN Way was called into question, however, by the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. In the final section of this chapter, I discuss how economic crisis damaged 
Southeast Asia’s international image and made these states more vulnerable to 
international pressure and domestic push-back against illiberal policies, including foreign 
policies. These processes, which mirror those in the African case, have led to the modest 
erosion of the norm of non-interference in Southeast Asia, as evidenced by developments 
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in regional institutions and practices. Democratic states within ASEAN led the charge for 
normative reform, supporting the idea that regime type affects states’ interest in 
promoting intrusive regionalism. 
With respect to great power influence and interventionism explanations, I find, as 
stated in Chapter 3, that ASEAN’s strong non-interference norm is neither attributable 
(directly) to Chinese intervention or to Chinese influence.  Again, the threat of Chinese 
supported communist insurgency did shape ASEAN norms by creating further incentive 
for these states to reduce inter-state tensions among themselves in order to focus on 
economic development and thereby combat revolution.  This rationale continued to be 
relevant during the 1970s, and the 1980s were characterized by a “de facto alignment” 
with China against Vietnam. In the 1990s, a rising China of increasing economic might 
became more threatening again, especially in its activities in the South China Sea. I 
maintain however, that ASEAN states would have no reason to believe a strong ASEAN 
norm to be a way to deter Chinese interference. On the question of influence, while one 
might argue that China has grown more influential as it has become so economically 
powerful, and it is the case that China embraces non-interference as a central pillar of its 
foreign policy, the strength of non-interference in ASEAN reflects a convergence of 
interests with China but does not imply that China has influenced ASEAN to embrace 
non-interference. 
Finally, it is the case that powerful Western states have pressured ASEAN states 
to develop a more intrusive form of regionalism (especially on Myanmar); I find more 
evidence of this in the Southeast case of the than the African case, perhaps because 
ASEAN had become a global ‘laggard’ in this respect by the late 1990s.  International 
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pressure is indeed part of my explanatory framework, and it interacts with states’ material 
and social vulnerability.  
 
ASEAN during the Cold War 
As argued in Chapter 3, ASEAN’s genesis in 1967 was not characterized by tensions 
between sovereignty norms and other norms or identities in the same way that the genesis 
of the OAS or OAU had been. Events over the next two decades reinforced and further 
institutionalized non-interference rather than calling it into question. Western withdrawal 
from the region accelerated, making the communist threat (manifested in domestic 
insurgency and perceived to be supported by China) seem more urgent and further 
solidifying the solidarity among ASEAN states against their domestic challengers. 
ASEAN member state practices—including successful third-party mediation governed by 
ASEAN norms and bilateral coordination in counter-insurgency activities—further 
engrained state-centric regionalism and bolstered the credibility of the ASEAN approach 
to regionalism. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979, ASEAN’s unified response 
and prominent diplomatic activities at the global level, all in the name of upholding non-
interference, boosted the international status of the organization. And as ASEAN states 
began to successfully grow their economies, they credited the norm of non-interference 
for its role in improving interstate relations and thereby creating an atmosphere for 
economic development.  All of these processes and developments served to reaffirm the 
non-interference norm. 
 
The development of the ‘ASEAN Way’: 1967-1976 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, ASEAN was founded in 1967 with the primary aim of 
reducing inter-state tensions and increasing cooperation among a group of like-minded 
states—the ASEAN Five—in order to allow these anti-communist Southeast Asian 
regimes to focus on economic development with fewer regional distractions and internal 
disturbances. The ASEAN Five agreed that economic development was the best line of 
attack against their common problem of communist insurgency. Interference in the 
domestic affairs of fellow member states was prohibited, as interference exacerbated both 
intra-state and inter-state conflict, damaging the shared economic cause. So, again, it’s 
not that non-interference was promoted in order to deter Chinese (or Vietnamese) 
interference—China wasn’t subject to ASEAN norms. 
The norm of non-interference was strong among the ASEAN Five relative to the 
OAS and OAU, even during the Cold War, but ASEAN states did in some instances 
violate the norm, unilaterally, in their relations with non-ASEAN states in Southeast 
Asia. These violations predictably followed Cold War logics. At times, they covertly 
supported anti-communist insurgents “in an attempt to contain perceived revolutionary 
threats.”1 Most of their efforts to contain communism were carried out in support of 
regimes facing threats (which does not count as interference for my purposes), but we can 
find examples of subversion as well. For example, Thailand supported right-wing rebel 
groups in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.2 Another seemingly important violation of the 
non-interference norm was Indonesia’s 1975 annexation of East Timor (half of the island 
of Timor), which had been a Portuguese colony until 1974. At this point, West Timor (the 
other half of Timor) had long been part of Indonesia, and Indonesia campaigned for East 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jones 2010, 486. 
2 At that time, Burma. 
	   224 
Timor’s integration, in part because it feared the emergence of a communist state within 
its archipelago. When the campaign failed, Indonesia invaded East Timor. The other 
ASEAN states were fairly supportive of the annexation, and did not accuse Indonesia of 
violating the norm of non-interference. In fact, they treated it as a matter internal to 
Indonesia, perhaps because of the geographic configuration of the territory and because 
East Timor had not been long established as its own state.3  
 Despite these violations, which demonstrate that non-interference, like any norm, 
was not sacrosanct, ASEAN members upheld the norm of non-interference rhetorically 
and practically4 in their relations with one another. It is the most important component of 
the ‘ASEAN Way,’ a set of sovereignty-promoting regulative and procedural norms 
practiced by ASEAN states since 1967 and later formalized in the 1976 Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation. The norm set includes, most essentially, non-interference, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and consultation and consensus in decision-making (as opposed to 
more formal, legalistic, or confrontational styles of diplomacy).5 During the first decade 
of ASEAN’s existence, the ASEAN Way became further ingrained in ASEAN’s culture 
for several reasons.  
First, ASEAN’s founding threat and partial justification for a strong non-
interference norm—communist insurgency supported by China—was made more 
threatening by the withdrawal of Western forces from the region. In January 1968, 
Britain announced its plan to withdraw all remaining troops from military bases in 
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4 The exception is subversive activities related to the Malaysia-Philippines territorial dispute mentioned 
below. Malaysia allegedly provided military assistance to the Moro National Liberation Front—a rebel 
group in the Philippines—from 1968 to 1972. 
5 Jones 2014, 73. 
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Southeast Asia by 1971, a move that would most affect Malaysia and Singapore.6 
Quickly following the British announcement came indications of “imminent changes” in 
the United States’ Vietnam policy, and then, in 1969, U.S. President Nixon announced 
his Guam Doctrine (also known as the Nixon Doctrine), the first articulation of a move to 
‘Vietnamization,’ Nixon’s “strategy of improving South Vietnamese military capabilities 
while withdrawing U.S. troops.”7 Talk of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and other 
language coming out of the Nixon administration communicated “a complete reappraisal 
of policies towards East and Southeast Asia”8 and was considered by the ASEAN states 
to threaten decreased commitment on the part of the United States to its allies in the 
region.9 These shifts in the regional balance of power, which threatened to empower 
China, reinforced ASEAN’s original justification for elite solidarity and a strong non-
interference norm.  
Second, ASEAN made possible greater coordination between member states in 
their counter-insurgency operations, and this practice further developed elite solidarity 
among ASEAN member governments. This coordination existed before ASEAN but 
expanded after its formation. For example, Malaysia and Thailand agreed in 1969 to 
allow one another’s security forces (police and military troops) to cross their shared 
border in “hot pursuit” of insurgents. Malaysia and Indonesia engaged in similar cross-
border operations starting in 1971.10  
Third, the creation of ASEAN resulted in a reduction in interstate tensions among 
its members, and ASEAN states in part credited the norm of non-interference. Non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Narine 1998, 198. 
7 Prentice 2015, 1. 
8 Jorgensen-Dahl 1982, 77. 
9 Narine 1998, 198.  
10 Acharya 2013, 169. 
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interference and the procedural norms of consultation and consensus (which, as stated 
above, can be contrasted with more formal, adversarial or legalistic approaches) are said 
to have made member states less wary of one another and more willing to submit to third-
party mediation of interstate disputes. For example, a mere six months after ASEAN’s 
establishment, in 1968, a territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines dating 
back to 1961 reemerged. Reports surfaced that the Philippines was organizing an 
invasion of Sabah—a disputed territory on the island of Borneo at that time in Malaysia’s 
possession—and, although Manila denied these reports, tensions quickly escalated 
between the two ASEAN member states. After bilateral talks failed, Indonesia’s Suharto 
mediated a more successful round of negotiations, and, according to Yuen Foong Khong, 
“Reconciliation between Malaysia and the Philippines was greatly facilitated by the 
institutional context of ASEAN, which made third-party mediation legitimate and 
unthreatening. Suharto’s intervention, for example, was consultative and sought to move 
Malaysia and the Philippines toward a consensus.”11  
In 1975, communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam (and the fear that 
Vietnam would arm communist insurgency throughout Southeast Asia) further altered the 
regional landscape and “forced ASEAN’s further institutional development.”12 In 1976, 
ASEAN held the Bali Conference, its first meeting of heads of states (there had only been 
ministerial meeting before this), and adopted its first treaty (there had only been 
declarations before this). The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation is a non-aggression 
pact that codified existing norms—those that constitute the so-called ASEAN Way—
established at the founding of ASEAN and reaffirmed through practices and successes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Khong 1997, 330. 
12 Narine 1998, 200. 
	   227 
Its fundamental principles enumerated in the treaty reflected and reinforced the 
sovereignty-promoting ethos of ASEAN. They include “mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all 
nations,” “the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion,” “non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another,” “settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means,” “renunciation of the 
threat or use of force,” and “effective co-operation.”13 
 
The Cambodian crisis: 1979-1991 
The 1970s was a particularly violent decade in Southeast Asia, even after the Vietnam 
War ended. Two cases of mass murder, the Cambodian genocide (1975-1979) and the 
Indonesian anticommunist counterinsurgency campaign in East Timor (1975-1980), took 
place during roughly the same time period. The Khmer Rouge came to power in 
Cambodia in 1975 and perpetrated a genocide targeting ethnic minorities and political 
dissidents, killing at least one million people and causing many more deaths through land 
reform schemes that resulted in famine. Indonesia’s violent campaign in East Timor 
(after its 1974 annexation of the territory) killed over 100,000 people. Both cases resulted 
in deaths totaling 21-26 percent of the population of the territory in question,14 and in 
neither case did ASEAN states criticize these regimes, let alone investigate or impose 
sanctions on them.15 
In late 1978, after a few years of mostly low-level conflict between Vietnam and 
Cambodia (which was at that point called	  Democratic Kampuchea), Vietnam invaded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ASEAN 1976. 
14 Kiernan 2003. 
15 Drummond 2010, 6. 
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Cambodia and defeated its army in a matter of weeks, sending the Khmer Rouge regime 
into exile. In early 1979, it helped establish a pro-Vietnamese government in the capital, 
and Cambodia remained effectively under Vietnamese occupation for the next decade. 
During this time, ASEAN presented a strong voice of condemnation on the international 
stage against this occupation, consistently calling on Vietnam to withdraw and organizing 
international efforts to this effect. Indeed, ASEAN was principally responsible for 
“ensuring Cambodia’s seat at the [United Nations] was kept for Pol Pot and the Khmer 
Rouge” until free elections could be held in the early 1990s.16  
During the 1980s, evicting Vietnam from Cambodia became ASEAN’s primary 
concern, and its perceived successes in this regard earned the association a reputation as 
“an important and effective international actor,” important because of its ability to lead 
global efforts and effective because of its member states’ ability to cooperate and take a 
united stance on the issue.17 In the immediate wake of the Vietnamese intervention, 
although there was not initially a consensus among ASEAN member states about how to 
respond, ASEAN norms of “accommodative diplomacy” facilitated the development of 
such a consensus, and the association succeeded in speaking with one voice on the issue 
in international arenas.18 Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s initial reaction to the intervention 
was one of less concern than that of Singapore and Thailand.  Rather quickly, though—
after Vietnamese troops chased “Cambodian guerrillas” into Thai territory—the latter two 
were able to convince Indonesia and Malaysia to treat the norm violation as a serious 
violation of international law and to pursue the resolution of the conflict at the 
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17 Narine 1998, 204. 
18 Khong and Nesadurai 2007, 35. 
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international (global) level by organizing an international conference.19 ASEAN was then 
able to effectively frame the conflict as a breach by Vietnam of the “accepted principles 
of international order, namely sovereignty and national self-determination.”20 “Indeed, 
ASEAN’s international prominence was founded on its defense of the ‘sanctity of 
sovereignty’” in this case.21 
 
Economic growth in the 1980s 
The economic performance of the ASEAN Five proved an even more important 
contributor to the development of ASEAN’s and Southeast Asia’s international image or 
reputation as effective and legitimate.  
 
Source: The World Bank22 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Khong and Nesadurai 2007, 42-43. 
20 Khong and Nesadurai 2007, 43. 
21 Jones 2010, 481 (cites Leifer 1989, 14). 
22 Data accessed at http://data.worldbank.org. 
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Figure 7.1 ASEAN Five Economic Growth 
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Starting in the mid-1970s, ASEAN member states starting seeing remarkably high 
economic growth. Although these numbers dipped a bit in the early 1980s, high growth 
rates continued into the 1990s “fueled by foreign direct investment and growth in 
exports.”23 What does economic growth matter for the norm of non-interference? It 
matters because, in the case of non-communist Southeast Asian states, economic success 
helped bolster the performance legitimacy of these “soft authoritarian” regimes24 as well 
as the legitimacy of ASEAN itself. Performance legitimacy served to reaffirm so-called 
Asian Values—a discourse deployed by elites which emphasizes collectivism over 
individualism and economic development over civil and political rights—and the 
ASEAN Way, the cornerstone of which is non-interference.25 While economic crisis in 
the 1980s called African regional norms into question, economic success had the opposite 
effect in Southeast Asia. Non-interference is credited for a reduction in the inter-state 
tensions that supposedly allowed the ASEAN Five to focus on economic development. 
By the end of the Cold War, ASEAN had not achieved much in the arena of economic 
integration per se. Its accomplishments included two joint industrial projects and a slight 
reduction of trade tariffs.26 This reality did not stop ASEAN states from articulating 
satisfaction with the economic accomplishments of the association, though. ASEAN’s 
role in the reduction of inter-state tensions like those surrounding the Sabah dispute 
(noted above) is credited with member states’ economic accomplishments, despite 
ASEAN making very little progress on economic integration itself.  “Southeast Asia is 
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24 Stubbs 2001. 
25 But, see Amartya Sen’s critique of claims about the positive relationship between authoritarianism and 
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26 Khong 1997, 327. 
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one of the most economically dynamic regions in the world. ASEAN contributed to this 
success by alleviating intra-ASEAN conflict, thereby helping to create a politically stable 
and peaceful environment attractive to foreign investors.”27  
 
The end of the Cold War and the reaffirmation of the ASEAN Way 
ASEAN entered the 1990s as an international success story, principally due to the 
incredible economic performance of its member states but also to some degree due to the 
association’s rising diplomatic clout as a driving force behind the international 
Cambodia-Vietnam negotiations. Whereas Africa’s economic crisis contributed to its 
image of dysfunction and rendered it materially and socially vulnerable, Southeast Asia’s 
remarkable growth rates created an image of success for the region and bestowed upon 
ASEAN and its member states material and social security. ASEAN states expressed 
satisfaction about the region’s positive international image and conviction in Southeast 
Asia’s distinctive set of domestic and regional norms (so-called ‘Asian Values’ and the 
ASEAN Way, respectively). In the face of the West’s proclamation of the “unabashed 
victory of economic and political liberalism”28 and the rise of liberal internationalism in 
the wake of the Cold War’s end, the ASEAN states were empowered by their 
performance legitimacy to insist upon an alternative—illiberal political systems protected 
by sovereignty-reinforcing regionalism—and they did. Economic success also 
empowered ASEAN to expand its membership (by incorporating Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Laos and Cambodia), to assume a leadership position in East Asia through the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, and to promote the ASEAN Way by encouraging extra-ASEAN 	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accession to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in which these norms are 
formalized.  
Suharto’s address at the 23rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (July 1990) speaks to 
the rise of ASEAN’s image and the need to “reassert” itself:  
Today, ASEAN has not only survived but has grown into a vigorous entity, with its 
presence, potentials and achievements appreciated, not only in our own region of East 
Asia but in the world at large. However, given the speed and scope of changes around us 
and the nature of the challenges and opportunities that need to be met and seized, there 
can be no room for self-satisfaction. In these circumstances, ASEAN will inevitably be 
challenged to re-assert its identity and basic purposes.29  
 
He went on to identify the developing Single European Market (with its potential external 
trade barriers) and the political and economic developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe (with their potential financial, investment, and trade diversion implications) as 
challenges to address. But, instead of proposing a collective ‘rethink’ of regional norms 
and institutions as prominent voices in Africa were doing, Suharto’s plan to “improve the 
internal functioning as well as the external effectiveness” of ASEAN involved expanding 
its existing institutions while keeping their norms intact:  
In managing the changing relationships with our major economic partners, we should 
actively contribute to developing [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] into an outward-
looking, mutually beneficial forum, for wider regional consultation and cooperation 
among the countries of the Asia-Pacific, on the basis of principles and modalities which 
strengthen rather than dilute ASEAN’s identity, cohesion, and cooperation with other 
countries.30  
 
ASEAN’s 1987 Manila Declaration speaks of the “achievements of ASEAN in the last 
two decades, particularly in creating a political environment conducive to the 
development of its members, and in carving out a distinct identity recognized and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Suharto 1990, 7. [Emphasis mine] 
30 Suharto 1990, 8. [Emphasis mine] 
	   233 
respected in the community of nations.”31 The 1987 Joint Press Statement of the Meeting 
of the ASEAN Heads of Government states that “ASEAN has grown into a viable and 
dynamic organization fostering the spirit of regional cooperation and solidarity and 
strengthening national and regional resilience…ASEAN has also developed a distinct 
identity and has become an effective vehicle for joint approaches to regional and 
international issues.”32 In a 1992 speech, Prime Minister Ramos of the Philippines 
referred to ASEAN as the “most successful case of regionalization among developing 
countries.”33 
Singapore and Malaysia’s promotion of the so-called Asian Values discourse 
should be considered part of these efforts to promote non-interference—as part of a 
distinctly Asian normative order—as a legitimate and successful alternative to Western 
norms. The Asian Values perspective is most associated with it’s challenge to universal 
human rights, but embedded in claims about distinctive or relativistic approach to human 
rights are claims about sovereignty and specifically non-interference. According to 
Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp, “The Asian values debate demonstrates that some 
states command sufficient international legitimacy to establish a counter-discourse to 
Western-led human rights arguments.” Because Southeast Asian states “command 
powerful social resources which allow them to fight off external pressure,” they are less 
‘socially vulnerable’ than they otherwise would be.34 The assertion of Asian Values can 
be read in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, a document produced by a group of Asian 
states in preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna (also 
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33 Quoted in Yukawa 2011, 264. 
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1993). In addition to the sovereignty emphasis of the document, the promotion of social 
and economic rights is important, because economic development had become a point of 
pride of a handful of (Southeast) Asian states, providing them with greater legitimacy and 
legitimizing a normative order that had supposedly made possible these advances. Non-
interference is affirmed as part of a normative order that leads to success and calls into 
question the hegemony of Western models. Lee Jones sums this up nicely:  
 
[I]n the years following the end of the Cold War, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) was widely regarded as the world’s most successful third-world 
regional institution, and as a model for wider cooperation. In a context where regional 
policymakers were announcing an ‘Asian renaissance’ and aggressively promoting 
‘Asian values’ as a superior, contextualised alternative to the West’s liberal 
triumphalism, analysts heralded the ‘Pacific century’ and singled out ASEAN in 
particular as offering a better route to cooperation than Western ‘legalism’. This route 
was the so-called ‘ASEAN way’ to regionalism, supposedly a bundle of norms that had 
created peace and stability in Southeast Asia which included traditions of consultation 
and consensus-building and, in particular, the norm of non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs.35 
 
The Asian Values discourse emerged from a period of high growth in the 1980s, 
growth that legitimized illiberalism. In 1992, Lee Kuan Yew explicitly made a link 
between non-democracy and development, stating that “the exuberance of democracy 
leads to undisciplined and disorderly conditions which are inimical to development.”36 
Relative to Latin America, Southeast Asia proved mostly immune to the Third Wave of 
democratization. In the 1980s, only one Southeast Asian state, the Philippines, 
transitioned to democracy (it did so in 1986). Thailand followed in 1992 (although the 
military would reseize power in 2006), and Indonesia democratized in 1999.  
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace37 
 
This relative immunity from the Third Wave of democratization is puzzling. In 
his seminal book on the waves, Samuel Huntington argues that higher levels of economic 
development are conducive to a more highly educated public, a larger middle class, and 
certain attributes of civic culture—“trust, satisfaction, and competence”—all of which 
generate support for democratization.38 He also submits that particularly rapid economic 
growth, like that experienced by some of the ASEAN Five, can lead to social unrest and 
political mobilization, destabilizing authoritarian regimes and therefore facilitating 
regime change, possibly democratization.39 Huntington’s thesis doesn’t hold here; 
counterintuitively, growth provided non-democracies in Southeast Asia with the 
rhetorical and material tools to justify their forms of rule and coopt the middle class, 	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38 Huntington 1991, 65-68. 
39 Huntington 1991, 69. 
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bolstering their regimes.40 When Lee Kuan Yew made his statement about democracy 
and disorder, the only country of the ASEAN Five to have transitioned to democracy was 
the Philippines, and it was also the worst performer economically. In 1986, the 
nonviolent Filipino People Power Revolution succeeded in removing authoritarian 
President Ferdinand Marcos, who had held power since 1965. Polity IV rates the 
Philippines 8 in 1990, which indicates that it was a high-quality democracy compared to 
the others, who ranged from Indonesia’s -7 to Malaysia’s 4.41 This fits nicely into the 
Asian Values narrative, since the Philippines had the lowest average annual growth rate 
of the ASEAN Five during the 1987-1991 period: 3.9 per cent. The other members of 
ASEAN Five boasted much higher growth rates: 7.7 per cent (Indonesia), 8.6 per cent 
(Malaysia), 9.8 percent (Singapore), and 11 per cent (Thailand). 
At the end of the Cold War, some predicted that ASEAN’s importance would 
lessen—that it would “lose its raison d’etre”—but the opposite occurred.42 Like other 
regional groupings, ASEAN’s institutions widened and deepened. It also took on a 
leadership role in wider regional (East Asian) activities. Yuen Foong Khong and Helen 
Nesadurai characterize Asia-Pacific developments beginning in the late 1980s as a 
“frenzy” of regional institution building, noting that, perhaps unexpectedly, ASEAN—an 
organization made up of a handful of middle powers—initiated and led many of these 
regional initiatives and transferred their distinctive norm set—the ASEAN Way—to 
them.43 It sought to bring other states under the ASEAN normative umbrella (by 
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expanding ASEAN’s membership and inviting non-ASEAN members to accede to its 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation).  
Bringing on new signatories to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
effect extends the ASEAN Way. We see movement on this front with the 1987 Protocol 
Amending the Treaty,44 which was aimed at “enabl[ing] states outside of Southeast Asia 
to accede to the Treaty.”45 The Treaty currently has twenty seven signatories including 
China, the United States, and the European Union. The establishment of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum should also be considered part of ASEAN’s efforts to promote ASEAN 
norms beyond ASEAN and the region. According to Amitav Acharya, seizing a 
leadership role was seen as a way of “ underscoring the continued and broader relevance 
of ASEAN’s norms.46 Similarly, ASEAN’s role in promoting the ASEAN Regional 
Forum “reflected its growing self-confidence about the relevance of its norms of regional 
cooperation.”47 The Regional Forum was established in 1993 as a formal dialogue group 
for political and security issues, whose membership now includes, in addition to the 
ASEAN states, several other Asian countries (including China) and extraregional 
members including the United States and the European Union. As Yukawa has argued, 
“[U]sing the image of success that it had attained in the 1980s as a platform, ASEAN 
greatly expanded its role in overseeing the regional order of the Indochina and Asia 
Pacific region in the 1990s, through the institutionalization of … the [ASEAN Regional 
Forum].”48 Shaun Narine attributes ASEAN’s “assertiveness on the international stage” 
to a “confidence born of economic success.” That ASEAN would lead and set the agenda 	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for the [ASEAN Regional Forum], despite the small size of its states, was justified by the 
grouping’s “collective economic potential and how that potential might translate into 
military clout in the future.”49  
One aspect of Southeast Asia’s material and social security relative to Africa was 
that international community was less interested (although not uninterested) in applying 
pressure for liberalization and intrusive regionalism here. According to Amitav Acharya, 
because of its exceptional economic performance, 
Southeast Asia was spared the kind of vigorous democratization campaign directed by 
Western countries and financial institutions at the economically less vibrant African and 
Latin American states. Western opposition to authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia was 
balanced by a pragmatic recognition of trade and investment opportunities available in 
the region…A popular argument against the use of sanctions remains the view that 
economic growth and liberalization, partly fostered through Western trade and 
investment, will ultimately promote democratization.50  
 
When the international community did apply its democratization and liberalization 
campaign to Southeast Asia (e.g. on the issue of Myanmar’s membership in the 
association—see below), the ASEAN Way “was found to be a useful modus vivendi for 
engaging with the West.”51 
 
China in the 1990s 
China’s economic growth and threatening activities in the South China Sea raise 
questions about the rising great power’s impact on ASEAN norms. Economic reforms 
following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 set China on a path to economic might. Economic 
growth sharply accelerated in the 1990s. China became more powerful and arguably 
more influential, and non-interference has long been a foreign policy priority of China, in 	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50 Acharya 1999, 423-24. 
51 Khong and Nesadurai 2007, 35. 
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rhetoric if not always in practice. But it does not follow that China influenced ASEAN to 
maintain the non-interference norm, as non-interference is a foundational ASEAN norm 
and has only grown stronger over time. That China’s and ASEAN’s position on non-
interference have converged does not mean that China has influenced ASEAN (or vice 
versa, for that matter). 
 Then there is the question of Chinese threat, given that territorial disputes over 
islands in the South China Sea were reinvigorated in the 1990s among China, Taiwan, 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Again, though, I would again emphasize 
that, because China is not a member of ASEAN, creating and maintaining a strong non-
interference norm within ASEAN is not a viable strategy for reducing a Chinese 
interventionist threat. 
 
The question of Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN 
Western states did pressure ASEAN to isolate and sanction Myanmar in the mid-1990s, 
but ASEAN admitted Myanmar in part to send a message to its North American and 
European dialogue partners that this type of bullying would not be accepted. The two 
ASEAN members that did, at least temporarily, reconsider supporting Myanmar’s 
accession were the association’s two democratic states: the Philippines and Thailand. 
This reluctance on the part of the democracies to associate with an infamously repressive 
state foreshadowed the role that they would play in encouraging the reform of ASEAN 
norms in the aftermath of economic crisis later that decade. 
During the 1990s, ASEAN (who, at the end of the 1980s, counted the ASEAN 
Five and Brunei as members) embarked on a process of membership expansion in the 
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name of achieving the founders’ ‘One Southeast Asia’ vision:  an ASEAN encompassing 
all ten Southeast Asian nations.52 Vietnam, which transitioned to a mixed economy with 
market elements beginning in the late 1980s, was the first to accede in 1995, followed by 
Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). But expansion challenged the 
norm of non-interference by raising the issue of membership criteria: should the domestic 
politics of a candidate member state have bearing on ASEAN’s decision to admit it? This 
was an especially pertinent question in regards to Myanmar because of its human rights 
record, making the Myanmar accession question “the first major test of ASEAN’s non-
interference doctrine in the post-Cold War setting.”53  
In 1994, ASEAN began seriously debating Myanmar’s candidacy. Up to this 
point, the Philippines and Thailand had supported its inclusion in ASEAN, but from 
1994, there emerged “a new liberal–illiberal divide” within the association,54 as the 
Philippines (democratic since 1987) and Thailand (democratic since 1992) began 
questioning the wisdom of Myanmar’s immediate inclusion as a member. The Burmese 
junta had by this point become the target of increasing international criticism for its 
human rights record and for blocking democratization. In 1990, the country had held its 
first multiparty elections since 1960, but, when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's 
National League for Democracy won 59% of the national vote and 81% of the 
parliamentary seats, the regime refused to acknowledge the outcome or transfer power. A 
crackdown on pro-democracy forces followed. Even before the elections, Suu Kyi had 
been placed under house arrest, and she would remain a political prisoner until 2010.  
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The United States and European countries publicly criticized ASEAN for its 
accommodating approach to Myanmar, and, for a time, ASEAN’s democracies were 
more susceptible to this criticism than were ASEAN’s non-democracies. The Philippines 
and Thailand became more reluctant to move forward with Myanmar’s membership. An 
argument that emerged at this time was that a formal association with Myanmar would 
hurt ASEAN’s (and its members’) reputation,55 and these democracies had more to lose 
than their illiberal neighbors; they wanted to maintain a democratic image vis-à-vis 
international and domestic audiences.  
In 1996, after Myanmar’s military junta had arrested hundreds of pro-democracy 
activists in a major crackdown, Philippine President Fidel Ramos argued that the 
membership process should be postponed. This position was in part based on the 
government’s awareness that “its own domestic political system and NGO community 
wanted it to take a hardline stand on Burma.”56 Beginning in the late 1980s, NGOs in the 
Philippines grew rapidly, and by the late 1990s, the Philippines was home to the third 
largest NGO community in the global South.57 The Thai government was meanwhile also 
experiencing pressure from above and below, as domestic groups became “increasingly 
outspoken” in their opposition to Myanmar’s accession and Thai newspapers frequently 
published editorials expressing this opposition.58 Compared to countries like Malaysia 
and Singapore, where the state exacted more control over the media and political 
mobilization, more space existed (at this time) in Thailand for vocal opposition to Thai 
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foreign policy,59 and, as a new democracy, the Thai government had incentive to distance 
itself from the previous, authoritarian regime. 
In the end, the Philippines and Thailand relented, and ASEAN unanimously 
agreed to grant full membership to Myanmar during its May 1997 summit. The norm of 
non-interference unsurprisingly emerged as a primary justification. Singapore’s prime 
minister asserted that “we have always taken the position that the internal situation of a 
country is that country’s concern” and that “as far as the internal politics within each 
country, well, we did not begin ASEAN by examining that and excluding those that had a 
different system from ours.”60 Indonesia’s foreign minister echoed this, saying it would 
be “impossible for ASEAN to apply criteria and conditions for Burma’s entry which have 
never been applicable for other members in the past.”61 Similarly, Vietnam (a member 
since 1995) offered non-interference as its main rationale for moving forward with 
membership. In an October 1996 statement, a representative of the Vietnamese foreign 
ministry stated “A fundamental principle of ASEAN calls for respect for independence 
and sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Based on this 
principle, the member countries regard events that have taken place in Myanmar as 
entirely that country’s internal affair.”62   
Furthermore, the decision to defy Western criticism and move forward with 
accession was arguably taken because of rather than in spite of intensifying pressure in 
the lead-up to the 1997 summit; ASEAN states wanted to continue to assert the ASEAN 
Way as a viable alternative to liberal internationalism and did not want to be perceived to 
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be under a Western thumb. As Alice Ba explains, “[W]hile Western objections did 
initially persuade Bangkok and Manila to reconsider their original positions, their very 
public efforts to pressure ASEAN states to deny membership to Myanmar ultimately had 
the opposite effect.”63 In 1996, the United States and European Union suspended high-
level visits to Myanmar and placed a ban on members of Myanmar’s military regime 
from visiting them, and, in April 1997, the United States imposed economic sanctions on 
Myanmar. ASEAN states understood these policies not only to be aimed at influencing 
Myanmar to liberalize but also ASEAN to postpone accession. One Indonesian analyst 
concluded in an editorial that “[I]t is consistent with ASEAN’s objective to establish an 
autonomous regional order free from external interference that the association refuses to 
bow to outside pressure about which nations are eligible for membership.”64 One former 
Thai foreign minister (and ASEAN founder) attributed the achievement of “unanimity 
where divided opinion existed” to the West’s “heavy handed, even brutal move,” which 
“galvanized ASEAN members who balked at the unjustified interference.”65  
It’s notable, however, that the Philippines agreed to Myanmar’s admission at the 
1997 summit in part because the summit itself was hosted by Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur. 
The next year’s summit was to take place in Manila, and the Philippine government 
reasoned that, if the Myanmar question were postponed to the 1998 summit, Myanmar’s 
accession would have been “more tightly and problematically linked” to Manila.66 One 
Philippine official indicated that having this event take place on Philippine soil would 
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have been “a disaster, at least for the Philippines, as the ‘champion of human rights.’”67 
Again, this indicates that, for the democracies, their liberal image was at stake here. After 
the fact, a Thai parliamentarian criticized the decision to admit Myanmar in reference to 
ASEAN’s international image, explaining: 
Because image is important, ASEAN’s ability to maintain and enhance its status as an 
influential diplomatic community will be determined not by the number of members but 
by the perceived quality of membership, which in turn, is likely to be determined by the 
quality of new members…Many groups in the West believe ASEAN to be a ‘club of 
dictators’: it is an unjust label, but an early admission of Burma will simply give 
sustenance to this prejudice…Why should the ASEAN governments and peoples have to 
bear the costs of the [junta’s] folly and intransigence?68	  
 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Modest Erosion of Non-Interference Norm 
In the 1980s and early to mid 1990s, low democratic density and exceptional economic 
growth in the region (and the material and social security it brought) worked against 
circumscription of the ASEAN Way—and therefore non-interference—in Southeast Asia. 
In 1997, the Asian financial crisis caused growth rates to tumble and damaged the 
region’s international image of success, making ASEAN states more materially and 
socially vulnerable to liberalization pressures. In the post-1997 era, Southeast Asia 
became the target of greater pressure from the international community and growing civil 
society groups to liberalize domestically and promote this liberalization through regional 
institutions. Its states became more interested in international image management, 
including the improvement of ASEAN’s collective image. In this environment, aided by 
the protagonism of Southeast Asia’s democracies, some changes in law and practice did 
result, constituting modest erosion of non-interference.  
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The 1997 Asian financial crisis began with currency collapse in Thailand and 
developed into a serious economic crisis affecting many countries in the Asia Pacific and 
resulting in “investor panic” and the diversion of foreign funds out of the region.69 
Growth rates plummeted, many firms were bankrupted, and several countries in the 
region were forced to request “costly and politically humiliating [International Monetary 
Fund]-led bailouts.”70 Figure 6.1 displays average annual GDP growth rates in Southeast 
Asia and in the group of the original ASEAN Five. 
 
 
Source: The World Bank71 
 
The crisis contributed to domestic political change in some countries. A new government 
came to power in Thailand in 1997 and enacted the so-called “People’s Constitution,” the 	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country’s first constitution to be drafted under a democratically elected government. 
Indonesia’s Suharto resigned in response to public pressure in 1998, and his resignation 
led to democratization in Indonesia and independence for East Timor in 1999. 
The 1997 crisis weakened the Asian Values discourse sermonized by authoritarian 
leaders in the region by calling into question the supposed positive relationship between 
the kinds of illiberalism practiced by some Asian regimes and the incredible growth 
experienced by their economies in the pre-1997 years. Two democratic regimes—
Thailand and South Korea—managed recovery better than did authoritarian Indonesia. 
Southeast Asian states became more vulnerable to international pressure—from the 
International Monetary Fund and Western donors—to liberalize (economically and 
politically) than they had been when their economies were strong.72 
Western governments and international institutions pointed to “market-distorting 
connections between Asian governments and business” as responsible for the crisis,73 
and, whereas earlier economic successes had been attributed to—and authoritarian rule 
justified by—Asian Values, the 1997 economic crisis was blamed in part on these same 
Asian Values.74 In June 1998, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright delivered a 
speech attributing the relative success of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand in 
managing the economic crisis to their democratic governance, specifically, that “their 
people were able to elect new governments, which started work in a climate of openness 
and trust, and with the moral legitimacy to call for shared sacrifice.”75 Similar attributions 
came from within the region as well. For example, Filipino President Fidel Ramos 
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asserted publicly that “the present economic crisis proves that in choosing democracy 
over authoritarianism, we Filipinos were on the side of history, rather than outside of it as 
earlier believed.”76  
The Asian financial crisis also hurt ASEAN’s reputation as a successful regional 
organization. First, it called into question the rationale for the grouping’s growing 
leadership role in the region. ASEAN’s economic growth and diplomatic 
accomplishments in the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict had served to justify its post-Cold 
War agenda-setting position in broader regional institutions like the ASEAN Regional 
Forum and the Asian Pacific Economic Commission. The economic crisis and ASEAN’s 
“organizational disunity” in the face of this crisis therefore challenged the foundations of 
ASEAN’s international influence and prestige.77 ASEAN states articulated concerns 
about changing international perceptions leading to the association’s marginalization. For 
example, Singapore’s foreign minister lamented that growing perceptions of ASEAN as 
an “ineffective…sunset organization…are political facts. Perceptions can define political 
reality—if we continue to be perceived as ineffective, we can be marginalized as our 
Dialogue Partners and international investors relegate us to sidelines.”78 
Furthermore, the crisis challenged the association’s core norms—the ASEAN 
Way. While this dissertation focuses on non-interference in the political and security 
arenas, ASEAN’s norm of non-interference also applied to the economic arena, and the 
crisis was attributed in part to ASEAN’s “elite-centered regionalism” that inhibited the 
exchange of “vital economic information about their national economies as an early 
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warning system.”79 Economic failure made the grouping more vulnerable to pressure 
from the international community to promote human rights and democracy norms. 
ASEAN norms protecting illiberal practices—the ASEAN Way—had long been justified 
by the region’s economic performance.  
The economic crisis undermined this justification and opened the association up 
to criticism, not just for its ineffectiveness, but for its accommodation of illiberalism. 
“[R]egional groupings of authoritarian states, or groupings that reluctantly tolerate 
authoritarianism out of deference to the principle of non-interference, are unlikely to find 
sympathy and support from international donors…more aid is now available to regional 
groupings which promote democracy and human rights.”80 Writing in 1999, Acharya 
observed: “[T]he crisis has undermined regional norms shielding authoritarian rule from 
foreign, especially neighborly criticism. The retreat of the doctrine of noninterference in 
[ASEAN] has created space for a more open form of regionalism in Southeast Asia, 
which could aid the cause of human rights and democracy.”81 
Southeast Asian states now had to manage “pressures accompanying rescue 
packages from international financial institutions…and Western donors, who had 
tolerated authoritarian rule during the years of the cold war geopolitics and the so-called 
Asian economic miracle.”82 For example, in 2005, the United States threatened that its 
relations with ASEAN would “suffer” if Myanmar became chair of the association the 
following year.83 This international pressure was reinforced by pressure from civil 
society, as ruling groups in ASEAN states “faced an upsurge in opposition from…forces 	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including rioting peasants and workers, middle-class reformists, and Islamist and 
separatist movements,”84 and some of these forces favored greater liberalization and 
liberal internationalist ASEAN policies.85  
According to Mely Caballero-Anthony, semi-authoritarianism and high economic 
performance (which gave states “performance legitimacy”) both served to stifle civil 
society organizing in the Southeast Asia, but in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis, 
civil society organizations’ “numbers rose dramatically and their visibility increased.” 
Since the crisis, the most prominent groups have been those working on human rights, 
democracy, and “advocacy against globalization,” including the Asian Forum for Human 
Rights and Development and the Asian Cultural Forum for Development. National and 
regional organizations have increasingly formed coalitions and networks and developed 
more sophisticated strategies for influencing governments and ASEAN. 86 
When the economic crisis hit, two democracies, the Philippines and especially 
Thailand, took the lead in pushing for the revision of regional norms. Beginning in 1997, 
Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan initiated debate within ASEAN about the continued 
utility and appropriateness of strict non-interference. In the lead-up to the July 1998 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, he put forward a proposal for a revision of the non-
interference policy: “flexible engagement.” Flexible engagement would permit ASEAN 
to collectively discuss and publicly comment on member states’ domestic problems if 
these problems could be shown to have regional implications.87 The proposal was aimed 
at both economic and political issues, as it would allow for peer review of economic 
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policies as well as criticism of “unacceptable internal conduct” (related to violations of 
human rights and democracy norms).88  For Surin, flexible engagement was to shift 
emphasis from member state rights to member state responsibilities: “responsibilities for 
engagement, that is for contributing to the achievement of common regional goals.”89 
Several (related) concerns motivated Thailand’s proposed departure from the 
ASEAN Way. Like other members, it considered the financial crisis to be a threat to the 
Association’s international standing and relevance. The reasoning was that crisis exposed 
the need for liberal economic and political reforms in ASEAN states, and that these 
reforms would be necessary to regain the confidence and support of investors—and the 
international community more broadly—and to achieve economic recovery. Minister 
Surin insisted that “we either reform ourselves to meet international standards, or we can 
resist and be overwhelmed in the end, with no control over the pace or direction of 
change.” Echoing this, Surin’s deputy minister has argued that “States or groups of states 
which hope to play an influential role in the international political arena…cannot 
blatantly and cynically ignore or violate [international norms] on a sustained basis.” 
Instead, they must “do their utmost to make themselves acceptable in the eyes of the 
international community.” Furthermore, in affirmation of the “principle and practice of 
sovereign accountability,” ASEAN members member states should have the “right to 
encourage fellow members to become more accountable to the region and to the 
international community.”90 
Thailand was, at the time, one of two democracies in the region (the other being 
the Philippines). This mattered in two ways. First, there was domestic pressure for 	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liberalizing reforms and a more “liberal” foreign policy, as discussed above in relation in 
to the question of Myanmar’s 1997 accession. This was especially the case in Thailand, 
where the financial crisis had resulted in a change in government. The Democrat Party 
that came to power was “predominantly urban, middle-class party espousing (neo)liberal 
values” and was eager to enact reform policies “aimed at ‘internationalizing’ both 
Thailand and ASEAN.”91 Second, and relatedly, Thailand was eager build up its 
democratic image internationally. As Acharya explains, although Thailand’s criticism of 
the ASEAN Way “was initially inspired by ASEAN’s perceived inability to respond 
effectively to the Asian economic crisis,” flexible engagement “was partly inspired by a 
desire to project its own democratic credentials” as the new government “did not want to 
be seen as part of a ‘club of dictators.’”92 Thailand was interested in the reputation of 
Southeast Asia as a whole; its own reputation was linked to the region’s. As Jurgen 
Haacke argues, “there was sufficient reason…to calculate that it would be inadequate to 
merely take steps aimed at the reform of domestic political and economic institutions. 
Indeed, perceptions of Thailand within the [United States] and European Union would 
almost certainly be influenced by Thailand’s foreign policy.”93  
The Philippines, a supporter of Surin’s proposal, was also motivated by a desire to 
improve ASEAN’s international image and reasoned that the association’s continued 
refusal to engage with human rights and other issues would hurt this image.94 Apart from 
the Philippines, the rest of the ASEAN member states rejected flexible engagement. 
Instead, though, they adopted a diluted version: “enhanced interaction.” Enhanced 
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interaction would allow for public criticism of domestic problems and policies, but not at 
the level of ASEAN, only at the individual state level. This is still a departure from non-
interference as it had been practiced previously, but it was considered to be less 
threatening to regime security.95  
Changes in practice since 1998 do suggest that non-interference is eroding in 
Southeast Asia, albeit more slowly than in other regions, and the financial crisis and 
Surin’s reform advocacy appear to have initiated this change. Evidence of the effect of 
the new enhanced interaction policy on practice can be found high profile instances of 
public criticism by ASEAN member states each other beginning in the late 1990s. For 
example, when the Malaysian prime minister dismissed and jailed the deputy prime 
minister in 1998, Indonesia and the Philippines publicly criticized Kuala Lumpur for 
violating the official’s due process and other human rights. According to Acharya, this 
incidence “may have been the first time that the head of state of an ASEAN state had 
complained directly about human rights violations in a fellow member state.”96  
The East Timor crisis of 1999 tested ASEAN norms. When Indonesian President 
Suharto stepped down in 1998, the new president moved to grant East Timor greater 
autonomy. The United Nations organized a special referendum in the territory on the 
question of self-determination, resulting in majority approval of East Timorese 
independence. Anti-independence militia within East Timor responded with violence, and 
a humanitarian emergency developed. Under pressure from the international community, 
and especially vulnerable to this pressure because of its precarious economic situation, 
Indonesia consented to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. A 	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Security Council resolution then authorized a multinational force to “restore peace and 
security in East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations there.”97  
ASEAN states initially held reservations about the peacekeeping force; they were 
wary of the decision to allow the mission to operate under a Chapter XII mandate (which 
involves greater coercion than Chapter XI), and they worried that it would set a precedent 
for future Western-initiated interventions.98 Within ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines 
were “the most sympathetic” to humanitarian intervention in East Timor.99 In the end, 
though, Malaysia and Singapore joined Thailand and the Philippines in contributing 
troops to the multinational force. Because ASEAN’s “initial low key response” to the 
violence in East Timor had “deepened skepticism in the West about the organization’s 
usefulness,” Southeast Asian states were concerned about their reputation, which was “on 
the line” because of ASEAN’s “inability to respond effectively to the economic crisis or 
ameliorate the anti-democratic behavior of Burma.”100 
Other developments since the 1997 crisis reflect a diluted norm of non-
interference, but, in part due to changes in government, leadership within ASEAN shifted 
somewhat over the 2000s on the issue of reforming the ASEAN Way in favor of human 
rights and democracy promotion. Although Thailand didn’t revert to authoritarianism 
until its military coup in 2006, a new government came to power in 2001 with different 
set of foreign policy priorities, and the foreign ministry backed away from its ASEAN 
reform campaign. This shows that a democratic regime type doesn’t necessarily produce 
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pro-interventionist foreign policy orientations—even if it is a very causally relevant 
factor—since many factors are at play. If Thailand became less of a leader on these issues 
at this time, though, a recently democratized Indonesia assumed its place.  
According to Rizal Sukma, while Indonesia’s transition to democracy (which 
began in 1999) was tenuous for the first few years, democratization has had a “significant 
impact” on its foreign policy. By 2003, Indonesia’s democratic identity had become 
cemented, and the aspiring regional leader began to push for Southeast Asian states to 
incorporate more human rights and democracy promoting institutions and practices into 
ASEAN. Indonesian foreign minister during this time, Hassan Wirajuda (2001-2009), 
stated that “We have to reflect democracy in our region. That is why we are active in 
promoting democracy in ASEAN.”101 The new regime sought to legitimize itself 
internationally and domestically by “project[ing] its new democratic credentials.”102 In 
the wake of the 1997 financial crisis and associated political and social upheaval, 
Indonesia was eager to repair its international reputation with respect to political stability 
and economic dynamism. Telegraphing a democratic and responsible image through 
foreign policy became part of its strategy; this was aimed at rebuilding “pride and 
confidence” as well as “its ability to reinvigorate the economy.”103 It was also meant to 
communicate to domestic audiences, since “academics, activists, NGOs, and 
parliamentarians have strongly supported the inclusion of democracy and human rights in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy.”104 
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 ASEAN has increasingly put pressure on Myanmar to make political reforms. 
According to Lee Jones, “ASEAN states’ efforts to regain international political and 
economic ‘relevance’ and to restore domestic legitimacy in the wake of the crisis has core 
ASEAN states to try to discipline Myanmar when its actions endanger this process of 
renewal.”105 Domestic and regional transnational groups added to the pressure for a 
tougher ASEAN stance on Myanmar. For example, in 2004, a transnational group of 
parliamentarians formed the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, the goal of 
which was to “to campaign for their governments to adopt liberal-interventionist policies 
on Myanmar.”106 According to Lee Jones, these campaigns have been most influential in 
Indonesia and the Philippines.107  Some progress was made toward this goal, but it fell 
short of the Caucus’ demands. ASEAN denied Myanmar its turn at the association’s 
chairmanship in 2006 because it had not made sufficient progress on democratic reforms 
(this was considered a “minor defeat for the non-interference doctrine”). Malaysia even 
suggested that Myanmar might risk expulsion if it continued on its current path (although 
this harsh approach was never seriously considered by the group).108 Over the next 
several years, ASEAN increasingly issued critical statements and applied “mild pressure” 
on the repressive regime. This constitutes a change in its non-interference policy (but not 
a major change).109  
ASEAN also engaged in institution building in attempt to improve its image. The 
establishment of the ASEAN Economic, Security, and Socio-Cultural Communities and 
the ASEAN Charter are good examples of this. These initiatives were motivated in part 	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by ASEAN states’ desire recapture the association’s “economic and political relevance” 
and to “project a reformist, progressive image” of the region as a whole.110 In 2003, 
Indonesia proposed the creation of an ASEAN Security Community in order to intensify 
cooperation on common security problems. Controversial aspects of the proposal 
included the establishment of a peacekeeping force, an ASEAN human rights 
commission, and measures to promote democracy and good governance. The October 
2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II endorsed the creation (by 2020) of the ASEAN 
Community, made up of three ‘pillars’ of integration and cooperation: the ASEAN 
Security Community (later renamed ASEAN Political-Security Community), the ASEAN 
Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.  
Since Indonesia held the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee at this time, it 
was tasked with drafting a proposal for a blueprint of the Security Community. 
Democracy and human rights featured prominently in Indonesia’s February 2004 draft 
plan, and, after several months of “painstaking negotiations,” the final version adopted by 
ASEAN reflected some of this emphasis but in a watered-down form. For example, while 
Indonesia had proposed language reading “ASEAN member countries shall not tolerate 
unconstitutional and undemocratic changes in government,” the adopted text read 
“ASEAN Member Countries shall not condone unconstitutional and undemocratic 
changes in government…” While Indonesia’s version included the creation of a regional 
human rights commission, the final version called for the establishment of “a network 
among existing human rights mechanisms” (a human rights body would, though, be 
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approved later that decade). Finally, Indonesia’s proposed peacekeeping force was 
dropped.111  
Traditionally averse to legalistic regionalism, ASEAN did not adopt a charter at 
its founding in 1967. It finally did so forty years later, providing the association with a 
more formal legal status and institutional framework.112 The 2007 ASEAN Charter 
(which entered into force in 2008) was proposed in 2005. The ASEAN Eminent Persons 
Group was formed to develop the document. Echoing Thailand’s former foreign 
minister’s ‘flexible engagement’ proposal, Indonesia’s representative to the group argued 
for “an agreed mechanism through which member states could work together to help a 
member country in addressing internal problems with clear external implications” and 
more broadly that, although “respect for sovereignty must remain a basic principle of 
ASEAN,” a more flexible interpretation of non-interference should be adopted (“we have 
to be non-doctrinaire in some of these things”).113 In general, the ASEAN Charter 
codifies existing norms, and the working group’s least conservative recommendations, 
including sanctions for member non-compliance with ASEAN rules and majority voting 
procedures (to replace consensus decision making) were not incorporated. The charter 
does, however, contain several affirmations of ASEAN’s commitment to democracy and 
human rights, which is novel for the association even if not accompanied by enforcement 
mechanisms. The Charter also provided for the establishment of a regional human rights 
body. 
The association created the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights in 2009. According to Amitav Acharya, this development “illustrates the proactive 	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role of civil society in human rights norm diffusion in Southeast Asia.”114 Regional 
human rights groups had been advocating for a regional human rights body since the 
early 1990s, but ASEAN didn’t seriously consider it until the late 1990s. Indonesia was 
also, unsurprisingly, a proponent. In a press briefing a few months prior to the 
commission’s creation, the Indonesian foreign minister stated that “violations of human 
rights in a country can no longer be seen as internal matters. ASEAN should not hide 
behind the principle of non-interference.”115 The commission was tasked with the 
development of a human rights declaration, and ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration in 2012.  
The Commission is relatively very weak. It is distinct from its Inter-American and 
African counterparts in that it is not authorized to investigate or publish reports on the 
human rights situation of specific countries. Its 2010-2015 “work plan” primarily 
involves the preparation of studies on priority thematic issues including, for example, 
corporate social responsibility and migration.116 It is not the “watchdog” that civil society 
groups were pushing for; it engages in human rights promotion but not protection.117  
Despite its very limiting mandate, the Commission is reported to have held a 
closed-door meeting in March 2013 on the problem of the persecuted Rohingya people of 
Myanmar, a Muslim minority group in the western Rakhine state.118 Ethnicity-based 
citizenship laws in Myanmar have left many of the 1.33 million Rohingya stateless, and 
coordinated attacks on the Rohingya by members of the Buddist community (with the 
acquiescence or even participation of the authorities) has involved killings, the 	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destruction of villages, torture, and rape, and has resulted in massive population 
displacement.119  Apart from the 2013 meeting, ASEAN has done very little to address 
the situation, even though it has been labeled a genocide by some and has created a major 
refugee crisis in Southeast Asia.120 This is an excellent illustration of ASEAN’s modest 
normative change but persistent exceptionalism: it has created a human rights body which 
has considered a specific human rights problem in a specific member state, but it remains 
far from as intrusive as its Latin American and African counterparts.  
Finally, it is important to note that, since 2004, a Malaysia-led unarmed 
international monitoring group has been deployed to the Philippine island of Mindanao, 
with the consent of the government, to observe a ceasefire between the state and an 
Islamic separatist group that has been active since the 1960s. This deployment follows 
Malaysian efforts to mediate the conflict under the auspices of the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (Malaysia is a majority Muslim state). It is quite exceptional 
considering the low rate of regional response to internal crisis in Southeast Asia (see 
Chapter 2) and ASEAN’s continued general aversion to intrusive regionalism. It suggests 
that non-interference has indeed eroded but also that an important identity discourse—
Islam—might provide basis for intrusive regionalism even if pan-Asianism cannot.  
 
Conclusion 
The timing and justification of the erosion of non-interference in Southeast Asia have 
many parallels with African reforms in the 1990s following a decade of crisis in the 
1980s and also demonstrates the importance of regime type. Still, as Chapter 2 clearly 	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shows, these changes are “little and late” compared to developments in other regions. 
What accounts for the relative maintenance of non-interference? Most importantly, 
because of the lack of a regional identity discourse challenging sovereignty norms, non-
interference had remained relatively uncontested over the decades of ASEAN’s 
existence, and, in fact, the legitimacy of non-interference only grew stronger over time 
because of ASEAN successes. Non-interference was therefore a ‘stickier’ norm by 1997 
in Southeast Asia than in was in Africa in 1990. The 1997 crisis called ASEAN and its 
norms into question, but it did not erase history. Furthermore, the Asian crisis was not as 
long and devastating as the African economic crisis of the 1980s—recovery in Southeast 
Asia began as early as 1999, and growth rates had mostly bounced back within a decade 
(see Figure 6.1).121 Finally, the resilience of the ASEAN Way can in part be attributed to 
the “absence of genuine democracies in parts of ASEAN”122 as Southeast Asia did not 
experience the widespread democratization that Latin America did.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
The foregoing chapters have made the case that non-interference has eroded over time 
(and especially since the second wave of regionalism) in Latin America and Africa as the 
regional promotion and protection of democracy, security, and human rights has demoted 
but not displaced this fundamental sovereignty norm. Non-interference has meanwhile 
been maintained to a much greater degree in Southeast Asia, where its erosion has taken 
place later (post-1997) and has been much more modest.  I argue that regional identity 
discourses in Latin America and Africa—liberal and legalistic pan-Americanism and pan-
African transnationalism—have long presented a challenge to strict interpretations of 
sovereignty, and that similar identity discourses in Southeast Asia have not been strong 
enough to facilitate the contestation of non-interference in the same way. In the shorter 
term (ahead of and during the second wave of regionalism), high regional democratic 
density and poor economic performance (and the material and social vulnerability it 
brings) contributed to the reinvigoration of intrusive liberal regionalism in Latin America 
and the reform of the African regional normative order, respectively. I also find that, in 
Africa, gradual political liberalization (short of democratization) and the full 
democratization of some states—especially South Africa—contributed to the further 
development of intrusive regional institutions due to the expanded activity of civil society 
groups and the protagonism of these democratic states. In the wake of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, I find a similar (but muted) effect of poor economic performance on 
regional norms, as ASEAN’s commitment to non-interference softened. Southeast Asia’s 
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democracies have generally been those pushing for relevant reforms, and civil society has 
also been impactful. 
 
I dedicate this concluding chapter to a discussion of the alternative explanations 
presented in Chapter 1 as well as to my case for the added value of this study to the 
comparative regionalism literature. 
 
Alternative/Complementary Arguments 
In general, my findings do not support the argument that a rise in civil conflict (the so-
called ‘new wars’) in the 1990s accounts for the greater normative change taking place in 
Africa than elsewhere. First, civil conflict leading to massive human rights violations and 
refugee flows was not a new problem in Africa at this point, even if the 1990s were 
somewhat more conflictual than previous decades (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.6). Edward 
Newman makes this claim—that the ‘newness’ of the ‘new wars’ is exaggerated—in his 
2004 study, with special attention to Africa.1 Second, civil conflict is not a problem 
unique to Africa even if though it constitutes an important part of the continent’s image. 
Southeast Asia’s crisis-level dispute levels and Civil Violence Magnitude and Impact 
scores are higher than Africa’s (see Figure 2.3 and Table 2.6). Finally, as I argue in 
Chapter 6, the African normative shift of the 1990s started right at the beginning of the 
decade, before a ‘new wars’ trend could be identified (and before the Rwandan genocide, 
which is often cited as a ‘wake up call’ moment with respect to the need for regional or 	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international conflict management mechanisms). It is the case that the Rwandan genocide 
exposed capacity deficits in regional conflict management, and that this contributed to the 
push for a new regional organization (the African Union), but norm change was already 
well underway. None of this is to say that regional groupings aren’t in fact responding to 
real problems with real spillover effects—they are. The point, though, is that the nature 
and level of conflict can’t account for the temporal and regional variation I am 
investigating in the intrusiveness of regionalism. 
 With regard to the causal importance of great power interventionism and 
influence, my findings are more mixed. In general, they do not support the argument that 
the (perceived or actual) threat of great power intervention creates a stronger regional 
non-interference norm. In Southeast Asia, great power intervention did indirectly shape 
the regional normative order via its effect on an emerging regional identity discourse, 
pan-Asianism. Japanese imperialism made pan-Asianism less politically important, and 
therefore prevented it from presenting a challenge to sovereignty norms in Southeast 
Asia. Furthermore, the threat of Chinese support for communist insurgencies in Southeast 
Asian states during the Cold War did contribute to ASEAN’s founding (and sustained) 
commitment to non-interference, but, again, only indirectly. For the original ASEAN 
Five, observing non-interference constituted part of a coordinated strategy against this 
common threat external-internal threat: it would reduce intra-ASEAN inter-state tensions, 
thereby allowing states to focus on domestic tasks, mainly economic development, in 
order to undermine the appeal of communist revolution. It seems implausible, however, 
that Southeast Asian states would believe that a strong ASEAN norm against interference 
would in any way deter Chinese interference or that China would consider itself bound to 
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respect ASEAN norms, either in the Cold War period or in the 1990s, when ASEAN 
states grew concerned about Chinese activities in the South China Sea. 
 In the Latin American case, the United States was in fact a formal member of the 
OAS (and the Pan-American Union before 1948), and so U.S. interventionism did make 
Latin American states wary of creating mechanisms through which the United States 
could further interfere in their domestic affairs. They attempted to use regionalism to 
secure sovereignty norms and thereby constrain the hegemon. U.S. interventionism 
during the Cold War, sometimes through the cooptation of OAS processes, contributed to 
period of decline for multilateralism. Great power interventionism did affect the norm of 
non-interference in this case, then, because of U.S. membership in the OAS, but this does 
not help us understand variation across regions. 
 Africa does not have a ‘local’ great power in the way that the other regions do, 
and Africa was more marginal to superpower interests during the Cold War. Its leaders 
did express concern, though, about extraregional intervention and neocolonialism, 
broadly defined. Interestingly, however, early on it was those states most concerned 
about neocolonial intervention—and most in favor of severing ties between African states 
and former colonial powers—that advocated for Africans to pool their sovereignty and 
create a United States of Africa. The argument that these three regions have been the 
targets of differing levels of extraregional intervention and have therefore become 
sensitive about their sovereignty to differing levels is therefore unconvincing. 
 Great power influence is more causally relevant than is interventionism to the 
variation I seek to explain. In Chapter 1, I identify two broad types of influence—one 
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more indirect (i.e. Luke’s ‘third face’ of power—influence through hegemonic ideas) and 
more direct (e.g. material pressure, social shaming). With respect to the former, it is the 
case, as I assert in Chapter 1, that the international ideational context during the second 
wave of regionalism—the ascendance of liberal internationalism beginning in the late 
1970s and the human security paradigm in the 1990s—is a critical component of the rise 
of intrusive regionalism, since the types of practices constituting this regionalism were 
aimed at promoting democracy, human rights, and more broadly defined security 
objectives (including civilian protection). To reduce this story to ‘great power influence’ 
is reductive and misleading for two reasons.  
First, as Chapters 3-5 show, the regional identity discourses that I argue present a 
challenge to sovereignty norms in Latin America in Africa had emerged and were already 
shaping the development of regional norms before the late 1970s. These identity 
discourses interacted with (and arguably contributed to) the international ideational 
context. Second, during the last quarter of the 20th century, actors in the global South 
engaged in the construction and promotion of liberal internationalism and human 
security. For example, Latin American human rights organizations and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights responded in the 1970s to the repressive 
practices of authoritarian regimes in the region by advocating for international 
accountability. Likewise, African regional bureaucrats like the ECA’s Adebayo Adedeji 
responded to the imposition of structural adjustment programs by calling for human-
centered and holistic international policy making, helping to lay the foundation for the 
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human security paradigm, and it was Sudanese diplomat Francis Deng who later coined 
the phrase ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’2  
With respect to more direct forms of great power influence, I do not find evidence 
for this influence on the emergence or content of the regional identity discourses that I 
identify as causally relevant in Latin America or Africa. While some might suppose the 
United States to be responsible for the liberal commitments of pan-Americanism, these 
originated in the hemisphere’s independence period, before the United States assumed 
leadership of pan-American cooperation. Also, the United States has since been an 
inconsistent supporter of intrusive liberal regionalism in Latin America. Furthermore, in 
Africa, former colonial powers like France opposed radical pan-Africanism, as it 
weakened relationships between African states and former colonial powers.  
In the case of Southeast Asia, China’s (rhetorical) commitment to non-
interference (against Western liberal internationalism) does not account for ASEAN’s 
commitment to it. ASEAN embraced non-interference at its founding, and a convergence 
of values among the ASEAN states and China does not imply Chinese influence. 
 It is the case, however, that powerful states in the global North and international 
financial institutions have pressured states in the global South to liberalize, politically and 
economically, especially during the second wave of regionalism and beyond. While this 
pressure—both material and social—has mostly targeted domestic policy, I also find 
evidence of states being pressured to adopt liberal foreign policy orientations. For 
example, the ASEAN states have been heavily criticized for not taking a harder stance, 
individually and as a group, on the Myanmar regime. This pressure, in combination with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Deng et al 1996. 
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domestic pressure, indeed constitutes part of my theoretical framework, since democratic 
states and materially and socially vulnerable states are more susceptible to this very 
pressure and therefore more likely to create intrusive regional institutions. Great power 
pressure is only one aspect, however, of the link between material and social 
vulnerability (caused by economic crisis or uncertainty), on the one hand, and the 
emergence or expansion of intrusive regionalism, on the other hand. States’ 
consciousness of and desire to manage their region’s collective image—vis-à-vis 
investors and the international community—is a perhaps more important aspect. In the 
wake of economic crisis, states in Africa and Southeast Asia articulated concerns about 
outsiders’ perceptions of their regions’ states and regional organizations as illegitimate, 
dysfunctional, illiberal, irresponsible, bad for business, et cetera. The regional promotion 
and/or protection of democracy, human rights, and security was pitched as a collective 
image management strategy—a way to project responsibility and legitimacy and avoid 
economic and political marginalization. Again, the ideational context is important here, 
since the idea that democracy and security promote economic development has not 
always and everywhere been prominent.  
Although there is a growing literature on collective identity, including the impact 
of identity on regional norms and institutions and the reverse (the impact of regional 
institutions on identity)3, there is relatively little work being done on the role of collective 
image, or how regions are perceived by extraregional actors and how regional actors 
understand these perceptions. The findings of this dissertation suggest that more attention 
should be paid to the role of collective image consciousness and management. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See, for example, Checkel forthcoming. 
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Scholarship on soft power, public diplomacy, and ‘nation branding’4 provides a useful 
starting place for thinking about collective image management. Currently, these concepts 
are (nearly exclusively) applied to activities of the nation state, which is a more unitary 
actor than are regional groupings, so a careful application to the regional level will need 
to address issues of collective action problems and ‘actorness.’ 
 Furthermore, the notion that extraregional actors’ perceptions of countries in a 
particular region are tied to the reputation or image of other countries in that region is 
supported by the findings of Julia Gray’s recent book, The Company States Keep: 
International Economic Organizations and Investor Perceptions. Gray concludes that one 
‘short cut’ investors use (when evaluating political risk in a candidate country) is the 
reputation of other countries that ‘keep company’ with the candidate country (through 
membership in a regional organization). In other words, states bear the costs or reap the 
rewards of the reputations of those states with whom they formally associate, because 
investors have incomplete information.  
 
The Comparative Regionalism Literature 
Why study regions? Over the last three decades, the management of security has 
increasingly been approached through diverse regional cooperation schemes, and, 
according to some accounts, over half of international commerce now takes place within 
regional preferential trading arrangements (ranging from free trade agreements to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Anholt 2007. 
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economic unions).5  Scholars of diverse theoretical orientations have in recent years 
urged us to pay greater attention to the regional level of global governance as we seek to 
understand existing and emerging governance challenges and responses. Charles 
Kupchan calls for the devolution of power to regional bodies as a way to manage a global 
turn away from Western dominance.6 Andrew Hurrell predicts that regions will play a 
central role in the “coming struggle for global political legitimacy,”7 and Amitav Acharya 
sees the policies of regional actors, emerging powers, and the United States as key to the 
promotion of stability in the approaching “multiplex world.”8 Yet, relatively little 
scholarship works to compare norms and institutions across regions in the global South.  
The late 20th century resurgence of regionalism referenced in Chapter 1 has 
inspired renewed academic interest in regional dynamics, but the resultant body of work 
has been inadequate with respect to the developing world. Some have labeled this most 
recent wave9 the ‘new regionalism,’ arguing that it is qualitatively different from regional 
integration patterns of the 1950s and 1960s, in part because of its ‘multidimensional’ 
nature:  no longer just a matter of free trade agreements and security regimes, integration 
has interwoven economic, cultural, political and social dimensions.10  The term ‘new 
regionalism’ is used not only to describe this real world development, but also to label the 
dominant approach to its study which also emerged in the 1990s—the New Regionalism 
(NR).  The NR approach is not so much distinguished by a coherent theory11 or 
framework for studying regionalism but rather by a shared normative commitment to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mansfield and Solingen 2010, 147. 
6 Kupchan 2012. 
7 Hurrell 2007, 146. 
8 Acharya 2014b. 
9 Mansfield and Milner 1999. 
10 Farrell 2005, 8. 
11 Soderbaum and Shaw 2003. 
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regionalism, an emphasis on its multidimensionality, the attention it pays to the 
importance of sub-state as well as state actors, and its understanding of the project of 
regionalism as a response to globalization.12  
One of the many professed aims of this new wave of scholarship is to correct the 
Eurocentric tendencies of ‘old’ regionalism by broadening the object of study to include 
regional institutions and processes in the developing world. But much of this work 
maintains a European Union-focus. For example, a recent edited volume’s concluding 
chapter, titled “Regionalism and World Order,” re-emphasizes this special attention to 
European developments, arguing that “To understand the future world order is…to 
consider the relative strength of…two competing world order projects,” that of the United 
States and that of Europe, both aiming to “restructure the world in accordance with a 
certain set of values.”13 It is unclear where developing world regionalism fits in to either 
of these projects. The bulk of empirical NR work continues to either look exclusively at 
the European or to compare the European Union to other regional projects. For example, 
there is a growing comparative literature on the European Union and ASEAN.  NR work 
on ASEAN makes up the biggest percentage of that done on regionalism in the Third 
World.14 This contributes to conventional wisdom about ‘developed world norms’ versus 
‘developing world norms’ by taking ASEAN as representative of the developing world.   
The NR’s normative commitment to regionalism is propped up by the actual 
achievements of the European regional project, and so we find the NR scholars returning 
again and again to the particular European experience in order to theorize regionalization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hettne 1999. 
13 Hettne 2005. 
14 For example, see Nesadurai 2003. 
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generally.  The European Union often remains the implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
standard toward which developing regions might progress, despite language professing 
an attention to the ‘diversity’ of regional models, and the importance of avoiding the 
imposition of one region’s ‘model’ onto another’s. Regional projects that don’t look like 
the European Union are often dismissed as irrelevant or at least much less interesting. 
Even if not dismissed as irrelevant, they are studied for the purpose of discovering how 
they might perform the functions of European institutions.  Their features are analyzed in 
terms of ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses.’   
Amitav Acharya and A.I. Johnston’s comparative study15 on regional institutional 
design improves upon some of the problems of the NR, primarily by doing more to 
consider Third World regional projects ‘on their own terms.’ The editors asked their 
group of experts on Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, North America, the Arab 
world and Europea to structure their chapters according to a more or less common 
framework, examining both the causes and effects of regional institutional features and 
considering a list of potentially important causal factors (drawing on a variety of 
theoretical approaches laid out by Acharya and Johnston in their introduction).  Although 
seeking to produce systematic comparative work, the editors are also wary of working too 
deductively, imposing a framework that may or may not apply to every region.  They 
therefore instruct their contributors not to restrict their analyses too much to the common 
framework, in the hopes of producing inductively generated findings. As a result, the 
book’s conclusion looks slightly different than the introduction. For example, they 
change their second dependent variable from ‘quality of cooperation’ to ‘nature of 
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cooperation.’16 This seems to be an effort to avoid the sort of ‘success’ vs. ‘failure’ 
framework that I critiqued in my discussion of the NR approach. However, like so much 
of existing work on comparative regionalism (work that is not a single case study), this is 
an edited volume and therefore does not engage in truly direct comparison. One of the 
conclusions of the volume, as noted in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, is that regional 
institutions in the developing are sovereignty-preserving rather than sovereignty-effacing, 
but the book does not identify important variation across the global South on this 
question because there is no systematic comparison of sovereignty norms across regions.  
A more recent (2015) comparative study on ‘governance transfer’ to regional 
organizations employs a much more systematic framework and does recognize important 
variation across Southern regions.17 The editors, Tanja Börzel and Vera van Hüllen, and 
contributors ‘map’ this governance transfer to twelve regional and sub-regional 
organization in the global, with special attention to regional legal instruments. In order to 
explain persistent differences across regions in transfer patterns, they offer a menu of 
‘supply’ and ‘demand’ factors that contribute to transfer. Contributors focus on a 
particular regional organization and draw upon these supply and demand factors to 
explain particular outcomes. This volume makes a significant and timely contribution to 
the comparative regionalism literature and has offered me a useful resource in the later 
stages of this dissertation. It is still, however, still not a truly direct comparison of 
regional normative orders aimed at deriving a central, generalizable causal argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid. 263. 
17 Börzel and van Hüllen 2015.	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The New Regionalism—and area studies work that predates the NR by many 
years—has produced a wealth of single-case studies that offer tremendous resources to 
students of comparative regionalism like me who seek to address the shortage of broader 
theory building in the literature by putting analyses of individual regions in conversation 
with one another. This present study is my first contribution in this regard, and I look 
forward to building on it in future research endeavors. 
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